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Abstract
A major challenge for organisations is effectively implementing security policies where
employees have a choice to comply. For instance, an organisational requirement such as no
unauthorised personnel in restricted areas may have a policy stating authorised persons must
wear identification badges and, therefore, places the onus on employees to make a choice and
have the responsibility of wearing their badge. Existing literature in psychology and human
factors in security tells us that a person’s compliance behaviour for a security policy depends
on their compliance attitude. For the organisation, there exists uncertainty for quantifying
compliance attitudes of employees towards security policies where those employees have
a choice to comply. Quantifying the compliance attitudes would allow an organisation
to further establish its current risk environment. In the case of not wearing identification
badges due to poor compliance attitudes, it would be challenging to identify unauthorised
personnel and the organisational requirement would not be met. A person’s compliance
behaviour depends on their compliance attitude which itself depends on the compliance
behaviour of themselves and of others. For example, the compliance behaviour from top-level
management can influence others to be non compliant. This thesis poses the question how
could one quantify compliance attitudes for security policies in an organisation where people
can observe other people’s compliance behaviour. This thesis contributes the following: 1)
modelling of social influences in Coloured Petri Nets 2) a rule based model to represent
agents that observe the actions of other agents 3) the application of machine learning to
identify hidden compliance attitudes 4) a user study with behavioural interventions towards
security policy compliance 5) a simulation tool for assessing how compliance attitudes evolve
amongst agents 6) validation of the simulation tool by comparison to the empirical data
from the user study. Overall, we believe that this thesis provides a holistic approach towards
social influences over compliance attitudes and the simulation tool paves the way towards
accurately assessing compliance attitudes for security policies.

Contents
List of Figures xix
List of Tables xxi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Background 13
2.1 Social Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Cialdini’s Seven Influence Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2 Nudging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.3 MINDSPACE: A Framework of Social Influences . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 COM-B Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Understanding the Compliance Attitude of a Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Variables Impacting Compliance Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Decision Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.1 Cross-Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Julia and SysModels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Petri Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Multi Agent Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 Statistical Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
xii Contents
2.8.1 Planned Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8.2 Analysis of Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8.3 Effect Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8.4 Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.8.5 Chi Squared Goodness of Fit test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Related Work 33
3.1 Formal Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Security Aware Organisational Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 User Studies Influencing Compliance Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Nudging in Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Simulation Tools for Human Security Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Influence Tokens 39
4.1 Influence Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.1 The Modelling of Influence Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Modelling Influence Tokens with Coloured Petri nets . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.1 Coloured Petri Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.2 Motivation for Using Petri Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.3 Behaviour of Coloured Petri nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.4 Coloured Petri nets Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Influence Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.1 Coloured Petri net Influence Model Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.2 Model Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.3 Token Types & Internal Transition Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.1 Analysis: Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.2 Influence Tokens and Propagation: Test Case Experiments (1-4) . . 57
4.4.3 Combination of Influence Tokens (Test Case Experiments 5 & 6) . . 61
4.4.4 Test Case Experiments - Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5 Influence Tokens: Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.5.1 Are Influence Tokens Subject to Diminishing Returns? . . . . . . . 65
Contents xiii
4.5.2 Petri nets Allow for Reachability and Deadlock Detection . . . . . 65
4.6 Influence Tokens: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5 Building a Rule Based Model 69
5.1 Building a Cyclic Observational Agent Based Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1.1 Model Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2 Agent Based Model for Human Security Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2.1 Location Based Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.2.2 Observing Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.2.3 Behaviour Change Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3 The Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3.1 Influencing Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4 Rule Based Model: Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.1 Formalisation of Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.2 Example 3: Influence by Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4.3 Computation Tree Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.5 Rule Based Model: Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.5.1 The Model Does Not Express the Ordering of Agent Actions . . . . 85
5.5.2 The Model Does Capture Agents Observing Other Agents . . . . . 86
5.5.3 A Context is Not a True Representation of a Person’s Internal State 86
5.6 Rule Based Model: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6 Learning Decision Trees from Synthetic Human Behaviour 91
6.1 Building Synthetic Traces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.1.1 Compliance Attitude Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.1.2 Implementing to Build Synthetic Traces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2 What Can We Learn? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.3 Multi Agent System - Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3.1 Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3.2 Assessment Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.4 Analysis - Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
xiv Contents
6.6 Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.7 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7 Social Influences Towards Compliance Behaviour 109
7.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.1.1 Analysis of Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.1.2 Effect Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.1.3 Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.1.4 The Broken-Window Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.1.5 Social Influences - Messenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.2 Chapter Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.3.1 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.3.2 Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.3.3 Grouping & Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.3.4 Experimental Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.3.5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.3.6 Manipulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.3.7 Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.3.8 Controlling Confounding Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.3.9 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.4.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.4.2 Outcomes of Data Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.4.3 Metric 1: Total Swipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4.4 Metric 2: Swipe Rate Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.5.1 The broken-window effect has an effect on how users respond to a
security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.5.2 The Messenger effect had no observable measurable impact on total
number of swipes or the swipe rate ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.5.3 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Contents xv
7.5.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.5.5 Reflection on Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.6 Collecting Data Set: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.7 Collecting Data Set: Future Work - Data Observations . . . . . . . . . . . 134
8 Simulation Tool 137
8.1 Modelling Security Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.1.1 Modelling Challenging Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.2 PCASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.2.1 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.2.2 Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.2.3 Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.2.4 Behaviour Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.2.5 Evaluating Policy Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.2.6 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8.2.7 Discussion: Global Compliance Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
8.3 Impact Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
8.3.1 Impact Change Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.4 Simulation Tool: Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
8.4.1 PCASP is a Proof of Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
8.4.2 PCASP Responds to Intervention as Expected . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
8.4.3 PCASP is Contextual and Does Not Generalise . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8.4.4 The Accuracy Between the Tool and the Formal Model . . . . . . . 158
8.5 Simulation Tool: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
9 Validating PCASP 161
9.1 Background: Validation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9.1.1 Validation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
9.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
9.2.1 Analysis of Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9.2.2 Chi Squared Goodness of Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9.3 Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
xvi Contents
9.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9.4.1 PCASP Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9.4.2 Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
9.4.3 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
9.4.4 Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
9.4.5 Implementing observed Interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
9.4.6 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
9.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
9.5.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
9.5.2 Metric 1: Total Swipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
9.5.3 Metric 2: Swipe Rate Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
9.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.6.1 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
9.6.2 Ecological Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.7 Chapter Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
10 Conclusion 179
10.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Bibliography 183
Appendix A Experiment Pre-Registration 191
A.1 Structured Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
A.2 State of Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
A.3 Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
A.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
A.4.1 Study Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
A.4.2 Experimental Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
A.4.3 Study Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
A.4.4 Experiment Group One - Discrete Intervention Positive . . . . . . . 196
A.4.5 Experiment Group Two - Continuous Intervention Negative . . . . 196
A.4.6 Ecological Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Contents xvii
A.5 Independent Variables (IVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
A.6 Dependent Variables (DVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
A.7 Mediator Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
A.8 Moderator Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
A.9 Control of Confounding Variables (CVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
A.10 Data Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
A.11 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
A.11.1 Consistency Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
A.12 Main Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
A.12.1 ANOVA Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
A.12.2 Inclusion of Outliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
A.12.3 Calculating Effect Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
A.13 Intermediary Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
A.14 Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
A.14.1 Pilot Study: Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
A.15 Secondary Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
A.16 Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
A.17 Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.18 Exclusion Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.19 Exception Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.20 Sign-Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Appendix B User Study Material 209
Appendix C Simulation Models 221
C.1 Challenge Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
C.2 Challenge: Observation Intervention Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
C.3 Challenge: Forced Challenge Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Glossary of Terms 225

List of Figures
1.1 Relationship between compliance attitude and compliance behaviour. . . . 5
1.2 Relationships between chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Cost Exchange Matrix [49] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Compliance Attitudes Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 The COM-B Model [82] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Cross-Validation [92] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Holistic View of Multi Agent System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1 Example of Propagating Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 An example Coloured Petri net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3 Influence Token Running Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 State Space Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 Adversary: Use of messenger token without delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.6 Adversary: Use of priming token without delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.7 Adversary: Use of priming token with delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.8 Adversary: Use of priming tokens with delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.9 Adversary: Combination of influence tokens without delay. . . . . . . . . . 63
4.10 Adversary: Combination of influence tokens with delay. . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1 Multi Agent System: Overview of agent interaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.1 Lack of knowledge for compliance attitudes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.2 Example of a learned Decision Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3 Overview of the mean error rate for 50,100 and 200 agents. . . . . . . . . . 105
xx List of Figures
7.1 Study Structure: An overview of what study participants were exposed too. 112
7.2 User Study: Floor plan of office space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.3 Large view of Cyber Security Room + Messy Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.4 User Study: Process for recording an event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.5 Effects of interventions on total swipes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.6 Effects of interventions on swipe rate ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
8.1 PCASP : Visualising Influencing Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.2 PCASP: Example floor plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.3 PCASP : Evolution of System States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
8.4 PCASP : Weak vs Strong Compliance Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8.5 The impact analysis for two different interventions in comparison to the
original behaviour of the model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.6 PCASP : Relationship between compliance attitude and compliance behaviour.157
9.1 An overview of the simulation path. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
A.1 User Study: Event Recording Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
List of Tables
2.1 Example Statistics: Total Swipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Example Statistics: Within Groups Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1 Mapping of Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1 Rule Based Model: Internal States of agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2 Rule Based Model: Transition of internal states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Cyclic Influencing - Agents locked in a loop influencing each other. . . . . 82
5.4 Influence Propagation - Agent alice influencing eve by propagation. . . . . 83
5.5 Influence by Observation - Agent alice influencing eve by observation. . . . 84
6.1 Example Trace of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Accuracy of Decision Trees for one hundred agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.3 Accuracy of Decision Trees for fifty agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.4 Accuracy of Decision Trees for two hundred agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.1 Operationalisation of Study: Interventions on Smart Card Swiping Behaviour 114
7.2 User Study: Participant Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3 Descriptive Statistics: Total Swipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4 ANOVA Results: Total Number of Swipes (with Planned Contrasts) . . . . 126
7.5 Effect Sizes: Total Number of Swipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.6 Descriptive Statistics: Swipe Rate Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.7 ANOVA Results: Swipe Rate Ratio (with Planned Contrasts) . . . . . . . . 129
7.8 Effect Sizes: Swipe Rate Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
9.1 Descriptive Statistics: Total Swipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
xxii List of Tables
9.2 ANOVA Results: Total Swipes (Control) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.3 ANOVA Results: Total Swipes (Discrete+) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.4 ANOVA Results: Total Swipes (Continuous−) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.5 Descriptive Statistics: Swipe Rate Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
9.6 ANOVA Results: Swipe Ratio (Control) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.7 ANOVA Results: Swipe Ratio (Discrete+) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.8 ANOVA Results: Swipe Ratio (Continuous−) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
A.1 Operationalisation of Study: Interventions on Smart Card Swiping Behaviour 192
A.2 Example Frequency table for study results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
A.3 Planned Comparisons against Control condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
A.4 Pilot Study: Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Chapter 1
Introduction
Roughly two thirds of medium/large organisations in the UK experienced some form of
cyber breach in 2018 [3]. In 2014, Coca-Cola had a number of laptops stolen which led to
74,000 employees, suppliers and contractors having personal data compromised due to an
unencrypted laptop [10]. Organisations classify these cyber breaches as security incidents,
where there may be financial and operational loss or loss of reputation. Security policies are
often deployed by organisations to ensure some high level requirements are achieved. This is
to ensure security incidents are avoided or handled in the most appropriate way should they
occur.
One of the major challenges for organisations is ensuring security policies where em-
ployees have a choice are effectively implemented, and ensuring employees have a positive
security attitude [91]. Employees unintentionally not following a security policy can create
a risk environment which does not align with the organisation’s beliefs [112]. The exact
wording of these security policies may change between organisations. For example, a security
policy at the National Health Service (NHS) is as follows:
"In order to improve security all staff are required to wear a photo identification
badge in a visible position at all times during working hours. In order to ensure
security, every member of staff should be prepared to challenge individuals
without identification badges where it is safe to do so." [1] 1
1The notion of challenging others or policies requiring interaction extends to others such as use of USB
devices, tailgating, password management and so on.
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A high level requirement for this policy would most likely be ensuring that no unau-
thorised personnel are permitted in restricted areas. For the organisation, the challenge
of whether or not this type of policy is being effectively implemented is complex. People
move around in many different locations and areas and interact with a range of other people.
Without constant surveillance it is reasonable to assume that we cannot reliably assess or
manage the number of people complying with the policy. That is, are they a) wearing their
identification badge and b) challenging others who are not wearing their identification badges.
For the organisation, it is a major challenge to achieve the high level requirement. However,
a different type of policy might be capable of achieving the high level requirement.
Security policies placing the onus on the employee to make a choice may expect pro-
active behaviour in the form of social interaction. Two or more people making some form
of exchange is classed as social interaction. For example, the previously mentioned NHS
security policy expects employees to challenge others not wearing identification badges [1].
The challenge behaviour is a form of exchange occurring and will require a minimum of two
people. Choosing not to comply for any policy could lead to a security incident. In the NHS,
a lack of compliance for the challenging policy could allow an unauthorised person to access
a restricted area. This could lead to the theft of hardware, which would have comparisons
with the aforementioned Coca-Cola breach [10].
For an organisation, these security policies expecting social interaction and a choice are
extremely complex to assess and determine how many individuals have a positive attitude
and would be compliant with the security policy. CCTV surveillance is one example for
measuring compliance for the NHS challenging security policy; however, this would come at
an extremely high financial cost. Often, organisations will use surveys to assess how their
employees currently perceive security policies but this can be time consuming and provides
only a snapshot. For example, a survey to assess security awareness provided a holistic view
for how employees viewed security in their organisation [89]. To counter the idea that a poor
culture of perceptions and attitudes around security exists, we often see campaigns deployed
to change people’s perceptions towards security [11].
A person presented with a choice can often be influenced to make a different choice. In
2010, the UK government created The Behavioural Insights Team [2]. Commonly referred
to as the Nudge Unit, they influence public policy. One of their projects increased the uptake
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of registrations for organ donor cards by targeting people with personalised messages when
they completed their tax return online [104]. The social influence mechanisms they used
made use of MINDSPACE which is a framework of social influences [44].
For security policies where there is a choice that is the responsibility of the employee,
these choices can be do I wear my ID badge? or do I challenge someone tailgating? and so
on. Like any choice, for certain people they can be nudged. In the context of security, Zhu
et al. demonstrated that by mutually exchanging information, they could utilise reciprocity
norms and by providing different types of information, they were able to increase the amount
of personal information that people reciprocated [117]. As a nudging mechanism, reciprocity
along with others are well established, most notably from the behavioural scientist Robert
Cialdini [33]. The social influences from Cialdini form a base for the previously mentioned
MINDSPACE framework [44].
For a particular person, their beliefs and attitudes towards security policies will dictate
whether or not they are compliant. This is often referred to as the Theory of Planned
Behaviour [8]. For a security policy, the attitudes towards complying with the policy may
be influenced by the benefit of compliance, the cost of compliance and the cost of non
compliance. This holistic assessment of consequences for compliance or non-compliance
can shape a person’s belief and subsequently their compliance behaviour [63]. The Theory
of Planned Behaviour has been investigated numerous times when assessing an individual’s
decisions to comply with security policies [56, 76, 79]. With such a vast array of attitudes and
beliefs, people must be considered heterogeneous. We introduce the term compliance attitude
which we use to capture a person’s beliefs, attitudes and perceptions towards complying with
security policies.
We often see poor security decisions as a result of phishing, where social influences are
common (e.g. an email impersonating a bank is a form of social influence) [41]. Phishing
attacks are one example of how a social influence can nudge a person’s decision. On
the physical side, where people interact face to face, it has been shown that top level
management can significantly increase policy compliance attitudes at lower levels of the
employee hierarchy [62]. Influencing people’s compliance attitudes is not limited to social
influences. Other factors such as the surrounding physical space and any tools/capabilities
may affect a person’s compliance attitude. A physical space which creates or removes the
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opportunity to change a person’s compliance attitude could have a major impact. Additionally,
a tool/capability such as physically wearing a lanyard of a bright colour to display a badge
may have an influence over a person’s compliance attitude. Therefore, it is not just a social
influence which impacts a person’s security decision.
When comparing top level management as a social influence we can see similarities with
the Messenger effect from MINDSPACE [44]. The social influences from MINDSPACE,
such as Messenger or Norms could participate in influencing the compliance attitudes for the
NHS security policy:
• Messenger: If individuals in top level management stopped wearing their badge or did
not challenge those not complying, this could influence others to be less compliant.
• Norms: If a number of people are not complying, then it may become the norm
behaviour and others would adopt a lack of compliance.
Continuing with the NHS policy, a social engineer could exploit influence techniques
to avoid being challenged [87]. Furthermore, the behaviours of others may unintentionally
influence the compliance attitude of more people. The Messenger effect from MINDSPACE
describes the authoritative influence that people have over other peoples choices [44]. These
social influences from MINDSPACE exist and change a person’s behaviour. Furthermore, a
social engineer will exploit these social influences to achieve their goal. We declare our first
remark based on our observations so far.
Remark 1 (Informs). The compliance attitude of people informs their behaviour.
Social influences also assist with good security decisions. For the Messenger effect,
top-level management could actively challenge employees, re-enforcing the message that
security policies need to be followed [62]. Norms could be exploited as an incentive not to
lose out on something for lack of security policy compliance, thereby creating a subjective
norm for those not complying [70].
The compliance attitude governs a person’s behaviour towards security policies [8]. Social
influences nudge a person when they are presented with a choice [44]. If the behaviours
of others can influence a person’s compliance attitudes, then the behaviour must have been










Figure 1.1 Relationship between compliance attitude and compliance behaviour.
compliance attitude, which then changes their behaviour, which then changes the compliance
attitude of themselves and others. A social influence, therefore has the potential to propagate
around a group of people. We declare the following remark based on the discussions so far.
Remark 2 (Influence). The compliance behaviour of people can be observed and is a social
influence.
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of Remark 1 by considering the dependencies between
a person’s compliance behaviour (i.e. how they behave towards a security policy) and
their compliance attitude. Additionally, Figure 1.1 includes the relationship between the
compliance attitude and the compliance behaviours of others.
When designing and managing any security policy, an organisation will consider risk
management processes, as this is crucial to designing a solid security architecture [46]. Often,
standards such as the ISO Information Security Management Systems standard are adopted
to enhance certainty that any policies are being implemented in the most effective way [?
]. However, an organisation does not know how a social influence impacts employee’s
compliance attitudes and beliefs towards security policies. Should certain people behave
in a particular manner, i.e. not comply with a policy, this could propagate to others and
create a general norm of non-compliance attitude amongst employees. For the organisation,
they do not have all the pieces of the puzzle, and where the risk framework identifies a need
for a policy, in practice it is not effectively implemented due to the social influences over
employees’ compliance attitudes.
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If an organisation cannot assess the impact a social influence has on employee’s compli-
ance attitudes towards security policies, they cannot guarantee that employees will always
comply with the security policy. A lack of compliance without any malicious intent may
place an employee in a state of being or becoming an unintentional insider threat [53]. If it is
the case that they are unaware of their potential damage capability, it begs the question, have
they been influenced towards this current security attitude? Attaining this information would
allow the organisation to fully understand if policies are being effectively implemented.
Some objectives for an organisation when designing and enforcing security policies are
to a) reduce the number of security incidents and b) improve how staff respond to security
incidents. One metric to understand this would be gathering the compliance attitudes of
all members of staff for security policies. Regardless of what the employee’s attitudes are,
an organisation would want to know how a social influence in the organisation impacts
the global compliance attitude for a particular policy2. Knowledge of how compliance
behaviours of others and social influences impact a person’s compliance attitude would
provide an organisation a clear understanding of the compliance levels towards their security
policies where employees have a choice, which leads us to our final remark:
Remark 3 (Compliance Attitude Prediction). It is useful to predict compliance attitudes
evolving in an organisation.
Assessing the compliance attitudes of a group of people is a complex problem as many
people will have different compliance attitudes (i.e they are heterogeneous). We have estab-
lished that a person’s compliance attitude can be influenced by other peoples’ compliance
behaviour which subsequently impacts their own behaviour and the attitudes of others. Nev-
ertheless, for the organisation, they must understand the implications of how compliance
attitudes evolve towards security policies, which leads us to the aim of this thesis:
Aim: To provide a foundation for an organisation to build tools and methodolo-
gies to predict and analyse the impact social influences have towards compliance
attitudes for security policies.
2A global compliance attitude refers to the compliance attitudes of all employees for an organisation towards
a security policy.
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1.1 Research Questions
In this thesis we identify six research questions. We consider a research question to be some-
thing that we have identified from the current state of literature from psychology, behavioural
economics, risk management and cyber security. Chapter 2 provides the background and
related work for this thesis and supports each of the research questions that we address.
Based on Remarks 1 and 2 we have the following research questions:
Research Question 1 (Propagating Effect). How can we quantify propagating social influ-
ences impacting compliance attitudes?
Research Question 2 (Cyclic Observational Behaviour). How do we model observations of
compliance behaviour?
Research Question 3 (Security Behaviour Profiling). Can we accurately learn compliance
attitudes from public traces of compliance behaviours?
Research Questions 1, 2 and 3 use Remarks 1 and 2 as a foundation. Each question addresses
a slightly different area of the same overarching problem: that social influences impact
compliance attitudes. For instance, Research Question 3 will address the accuracy by which
compliance attitudes can be learned based on traces of behaviour where social influences are
present. Given Remark 3 which focuses on assessing and predicting compliance attitudes,
we have two research questions:
Research Question 4 (User Study). How can we investigate and measure the effect of
behavioural interventions such as social influences on compliance behaviour?
Research Question 5 (Application). Can we design a tool to allow for the prediction and
impact of compliance behaviours towards compliance attitudes?
We offer two approaches for assessing compliance attitudes: a user study where we
collect real world data; and a tool development approach where we use simulation as a basis
for assessing evolving compliance attitudes. Addressing the research questions so far leads
us to our final research question, which is:
Research Question 6 (Validation). How can we ensure that our methods and processes to
address the research questions are valid?
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The confidence that can be placed in our methods and processes is of great importance,
as an accurate and validated method or tool would indicate the trust that an organisation can
place in such deliverables.
1.2 Contributions
We provide six contributions in this thesis. They are 1) modelling of social influences in
Coloured Petri Nets 2) the design of a rule based model to represent agents that observe the
actions of other agents 3) the application of machine learning via decision trees to identify
hidden compliance attitudes 4) a user study with behavioural interventions towards security
policy compliance where participants are asked to swipe their smart card 5) a simulation tool
for assessing how compliance attitudes evolve amongst agents 6) validation of the simulation
tool by comparison to the empirical data from the user study.
The tool presented in this thesis, PCASP (Predicting Compliance Attitudes for Security
Policies), allows an organisation to predict and analyse the impact of social influences
towards compliance attitudes for security policies. We addressed the aim by providing a
holistic approach and by identifying and answering appropriate research questions that we
have perceived from existing literature. In particular, PCASP is a proof of concept whereby
we demonstrated the core principles outlined in Figure 1.1.
1.2.1 Thesis Structure
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the relationships between chapters. Chapters 2 and 9
support and reflect on the work carried out in this thesis. In each chapter we provide an
overview for the purpose of the chapter and the research question it is addressing. We also
provide a conclusion for each chapter and, if applicable, a section about validation of the
models and methods used.
• Chapter 2: Background research. In this chapter we highlight the concepts and work
which provide the foundation for Chapters 3 to 8.
• Chapter 3: Related work. In this chapter we highlight the concepts and work which






Chapter 3: Propagation of social influences
in Coloured Petri Nets [24].
Chapter 4: Building a model for observations
of agent behaviour [23].
Chapter 5: Identifying compliance attitudes
using decision trees [23].
Chapter 6: Assessing the impact of behavioural
interventions on compliance behaviour [25].
Chapter 7: A simulation tool to predict
compliance attitudes towards security policies [26].
Chapter 8: Validation of the simulation tool
against empirical data from user study.
Figure 1.2 Relationships between chapters. Dashed line indicates a discussion between these
chapters. Filled line indicates building contributions between chapters. Chapter 2 serves as
the support for background literature for all other chapters. Chapter 9 is the conclusion and
discusses the contributions of this thesis.
• Chapter 4: We model influence tokens using Coloured Petri nets to assess the impact
an adversary can have with different types of behaviour change effects. The work is
motivated through a tailgating example where the adversary has different amounts
of finite influence tokens. This work targets Research Question 1 by addressing the
notion of influence propagation through which social influences disperse across human
agents [24].
• Chapter 5: We introduce a rule based model to capture influencing behaviour between
agents. We focus on the model development to express agents that are capable of
observing the behaviours of other agents. The focus here is on Research Question 2
whereby we design the model to allow for cyclic observational behaviour [23].
• Chapter 6: We assess the accuracy of Decision Trees over synthetic traces of agent
behaviour. The focus of the Decision Trees is towards identifying hidden markers
for compliance attitudes based on the publicly available information, i.e. traces of
observed behaviours [23].
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• Chapter 7: A user study to show the impact of interventions on human behaviour. The
user study is split into three groups which are the Control, Discrete, and Continuous
groups. We show how the broken-window theory negatively reduces the compliance
attitude of swiping a smart card for subjects. This user study also addresses Research
Question 4 for which we collected a data set containing what we believe to be social
influences from the study leader and social influences amongst participants [25].
• Chapter 8: We introduce PCASP (Predicting Compliance Attitudes for Security
Policies), a tool allowing for the rule based model to be easily utilised and providing
an interface for performing simulation and assessing the compliance attitude of agents
for a given policy. Additionally, we demonstrate the application of PCASP with a
running example to illustrate how one might mitigate against poor compliance attitudes
amongst agents. We envision that future versions of the tool would enable organisations
to make more informed security policy decisions about employee behaviour, such as
the best intervention to use. The tool provides a contribution to Research Question
5 for usable software that an organisation could use to quantify the impact of social
influences [26].
• Chapter 9: We validate PCASP via comparisons of simulated data versus the empirical
data from Chapter 6. We address Research Question 6 with this final contribution.
• Chapter 10: The thesis concludes with reflections about the research questions and
how we addressed the aim. We then discuss the many avenues this area of work could
follow.
1.2.2 Publications
Some chapters in this thesis are formed from four publications. To be clear, I (Peter) am first
author on the papers and the technical contributions come from myself. The role of Charles
Morisset and Thomas Groß was from a supervisory and editorial perspective.
• Carmichael, P., Morisset, C., and Groß, T. (2018a). Interventions over smart card
swiping behaviour. In STAST (Socio-Technical Aspects of Security and Trust). In
publication
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• Carmichael, P., Morisset, C., and Groß, T. (2018b). Simulating influencing human
behaviour in security. In STAST (Socio-Technical Aspects of Security and Trust). In
publication
• Carmichael, P. and Morisset, C. (2017). Learning decision trees from synthetic data
models for human security behaviour. In International Conference on Software Engi-
neering and Formal Methods, pages 56–71. Springer
• Carmichael, P., Morisset, C., and Groß, T. (2016). Influence tokens: analysing adver-
sarial behaviour change in coloured petri nets. In Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on




In this chapter we provide two sections, they are the background and the related work. They
do overlap, however, the background focuses on providing the supporting literature whereas
the related work provides research that is focusing on addressing similar problems to that of
people’s compliance attitudes impacted by social influences.
2.1 Social Influences
2.1.1 Cialdini’s Seven Influence Principles
There are seven well established social influences, most notably from the behavioural scientist
Robert Cialdini [33]. Cialdini is noted for demonstrating compliance psychology [33, 32].
The seven influences as part of his response to how people comply are Reciprocity, Commit-
ment and Consistency, Social Proof, Authority, Liking, Scarcity and Unity. Cialdini based
his first six effects on observations he made towards persuasions and influencing as an under-
cover worker at used car dealerships, fund-raising organizations and telemarketing firms1.
These social influences have been popularised and adopted by the use of the MINDSPACE
framework which we discuss in Subsection 2.1.3.
1The Unity principle was only recently added in 2016 [32].
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Figure 2.1 The value cost exchange matrix, taken from [49]
2.1.2 Nudging
Thaler and Sunstein are credited for impacting the direction of the MINDSPACE from the
book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness which heavily
focused on Choice Architecture, where choices can be presented to people in different ways
in order to influence their final decision [106]. A nudge is a concept in behavioural science
which elicits some re-enforcement for a decision. A topic of debate is when a nudge becomes
shove, Figure 2.1 illustrates the a value cost exchange matrix showing the relationship
between decisions and incentives for hugs, smacks, nudges and shoves.
From Figure 2.1 we can see that a nudge can impact a person’s passive decision mak-
ing [49]. The choices people/agents have in this thesis, such as challenging others for wearing
their badge or choosing to tailgate behind someone can be seen as both active and passive
decisions. From the exchange matrix in Figure 2.1, we can see why a nudge or influence
over a choice can cause a change in a person’s behaviour. In comparison to our work, the
influence affects the compliance attitude which impacts the compliance behaviour.
When discussing passive decision and active decision making, comparisons can be
made to the dual process theory which itself is likely to stem back to the work by William
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James in the late 1800’s where he proposed two different kinds of thinking, associative
and true reasoning [65]. There does exist a number of interpretations for dual process
theory and it became popular culture when the book Thinking fast and slow was released by
Kahneman [69]. The core message of the book is System 1 and System 2 modes of thinking:
• System 1: Fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypical, unconscious. For
example, reading text on a billboard will most likely by fast, automatic and perhaps
unconscious.
• System 2: Slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, conscious. For example,
count the number of times the letter A appears in a sentence will often be slow and
effortful.
A choice to comply with a security policy can be either System 1 or System 2. It would
depend on many factors such as the person, choice to make, environment etc. With this in
mind, it’s the case that sometimes a person’s compliance attitude will be system 1 driven and
sometimes it will be system 2 driven.
2.1.3 MINDSPACE: A Framework of Social Influences
In this thesis we adopt some of the social influences in the MINDSPACE framework. The UK
government launched the Behavioural Insights Team known as the Nudge unit in 2010 [2].
The team used MINDSPACE as their foundation for influencing public policies. For example,
they increased the uptake of people registering to be an organ donor when completing their
car tax registration online [104].
MINDSPACE is an acronym listing nine different influencing effects. They are: messenger,
incentives, norms, defaults, salience, priming, affect, commitment, and ego [44]. According
to the MINDSPACE framework, the nine effects are classified as2:
• Messenger: We are heavily influenced by who communicates information
• Incentives: Our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental short cuts
such as strongly avoiding losses.
2According to the descriptions in the white paper for MINDSPACE [44]
16 Background
• Norms: We are strongly influenced by what others do.
• Defaults: We go with the flow of pre-set options.
• Salience: Our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us.
• Priming: Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues.
• Affect: Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions.
• Commitment: We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and reciprocate acts.
• Ego: We act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves.
In this thesis we mainly use the Messenger, Norms and Priming effects in our work. The
motivation and reasoning for using these different effects is due to the contrasting differences
that they offer. For example, the Messenger effect has strong connections to a person’s belief
about another person whereas the Priming effect relies on some sub-conscious belief that
previously existed when a trigger is engaged. Chapter 4 classifies effects as impacting agents
differently. For example, the use of Priming demonstrates the impact a propagating social
influence can have on the effect of agents’ compliance attitudes.
Whilst we do adopt the use of the MINDSPACE framework, it is important to note that
Cialdini’s body of work is the main inspiration and direction for the framework. For instance,
the Authority influence principle from Cialdini states that people in perceived positions of
power have an ability to change our choices and has a strong connection with the Messenger
effect.
We now discuss two of the seven influences which are seen regularly in this thesis, they
are Authority and Social Norms:
Authority: People follow the lead of credible knowledgeable experts. The credibility is
subjective to how a person perceives others based on some criteria such as their role or
personality. In social engineering, we often see the authority principle exploited by an
adversary as they pose as a worker in uniform to gain the trust of employees [87].
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Social Norms: Cialdini and Trost defined Social Norms as rules and standards that are
understood by members of a group, and that guide and/or construct social behaviour without
the force of laws [34]. Whether or not a security policy is a rule, standard or law is a discussion
we do not have in this thesis, however, it is clear that a security policy could develop its own
social norms. Consider a security policy to stop tailgating, if nobody challenges and there are
no consequences for tailgating or permitting it, then a social norm where everyone tailgates
and nobody challenges may evolve.
2.2 COM-B Model
The COM-B (Capabilities, Opportunities, Motivation - Behaviour) model Section 2.3 con-
ceptualizes long-term behaviour change. Figure 2.3 illustrates the behaviour change elements
COM-B covers. Capabilities, Opportunities and Motivation together can influence a persons
behaviour, which is similar to the concept of compliance attitude in this work. In Chapter 8
we utilise a behavioural intervention in a running example to demonstrate the impact of
restructuring the physical infrastructure that agents operate in. A behavioural intervention in
the context of human behaviour is an event causing a change of behaviour. There are many
behaviour change theories to consider when looking at behavioural interventions [83].
We use the COM-B Model in Chapter 7 as inspiration for the impact analysis that we
perform when using the simulation PCASP to impact the compliance attitudes of agents.
2.3 Understanding the Compliance Attitude of a Person
A persons behaviour is typically governed by the choices they make and can be directly
related to their beliefs and attitudes surrounding the environment they currently occupy. The
likelihood of people’s behaviour varies in systematic ways has been widely investigated in
psychology. We but name a few well-known models to support this point, which apply to
different levels of abstraction.
COM-B. The COM-B model [82] (short for: Capability, Opportunity, Motivation – Be-
haviour) conceptualizes long-term behaviour change and has been related to how
influencers change such behaviour.
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Figure 2.2 Interpretation of how compliance attitudes can be formed.
TPB. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) [8] governs more short term behaviour,
especially how conscious and planned behaviour emerges out of a person’s attitude,
subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control (PBC). Therein, PBC covers the
person’s beliefs in the efficacy of their behaviour. These predictors impact the person’s
intention to act and finally the behaviour itself.
BDI. The Belief-Desires-Intention (BDI) [19] model relates reasoning about beliefs of others
to our own actions.
PMT. The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [17] considers to what extent fear-inducing
messages, such as “You will be fired, if you don’t follow the policy” will induce
behaviour change through a person’s threat and coping appraisal.
Figure 2.2 is an interpretation of how a person’s compliance attitude can be forged based
on some of the aforementioned models around human behaviour. The compliance attitude
as defined here is a culmination of different behaviour models and it is the compliance
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Figure 2.3 The relationship between behaviour change elements from COM-B. Figure taken
from [82].
attitude that will drive a person’s compliance behaviour. From Figure 2.2, which has been
created from reading literature in the Theory of Planned Behaviour and Protection Motivation
Theory, we see different elements which collectively form a behaviour model for compliance
attitude. Assessing and addressing any change to one or more of these elements may have
a resulting impact on a person’s compliance attitude. We discuss this further in Chapter 8
when assessing the complexities of the simulation model and how it can be broken down into
the component level, i.e. an engine to deal solely with an agents compliance attitude.
2.3.1 Variables Impacting Compliance Attitudes
Sommestad et al. performed a systematic review of quantitative studies towards security
policy compliance. They identified thirteen different studies assessing variables impacting a
person’s compliance attitude [101]. Some of the variables they identified towards compli-
ance attitudes as having at least a small effect size are threat appraisal, information security
20 Background
awareness and source competency.
Threat Appraisal: The threat appraisal process encompasses the severity and vulnerability
of a particular situation. Where the severity is the level of harm that comes from the thought
of performing a behaviour and the vulnerability is the probability that a person will experi-
ence some harm [97]. Herath and Rao demonstrate that the perception about the severity of
security breaches and the response costs of having to deal with a breach have a significant
impact on a persons intentions to comply with a security policy [58].
Information Security Awareness: The work in information security awareness builds on
the theory of planned behaviour. In general, it is a holistic overview of how people perceive
security and includes but is not limited to to safety, rewards, intrinsic benefits, intrinsic
costs and and vulnerabilities. These elements form the attitudes towards benefits towards
compliance, the cost of compliance and the cost of non-compliance [21]. Bulgurcu et al.
assessed the impact information security awareness has on compliance attitudes and found
that a more well informed information security awareness campaign has a positive impact on
compliance attitudes [21].
Source Competency: The notion of source competency is the perceived ability that individ-
uals place in the source of information. For example, if a person respects their superiors then
it’s likely that a message from the competent source would be received and accepted [85].
The example of source competency relates to the Messenger effect from MINDSPACE as a
person who is not trusted/respected will struggle to influence a persons decision. The findings
from Johnston and Warkentin towards source competency are consistent with what we would
expect and suggest that positive relationships between source credibility and attitudes and
behavioural intent impacts positively how employees perceive organisational policies [68]3.
3We would expect that behaviours demonstrating the Messenger effect have an impact on a persons
behaviour.
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2.4 Decision Trees
In this thesis we learn Decision Trees in Chapter 6. Typically, decision tree learning uses
decision trees as a predictive model to take some observations of data, say an agent’s
compliance behaviour and to forecast some conclusions about that data, say their compliance
attitude.
Decision trees are often used in data mining and there are two main types which are
classification tree analysis and regression tree analysis. The two are often used together and
is know as CART (Classification And Regression Tree) analysis and it was first introduced
in 1984 [20]. Our focus is on classification trees analysis where the predicted outcome is a
discrete class on which the data belongs. Unlike regression tree analysis where the predicted
outcome is a real number such as a person’s age or the expected shift of shares in a company.
In this thesis any implementation of a classification tree analysis uses the CART algorithm
which is similar to another algorithm known as C4.5. The implementation is done in python
and uses the scikit-learn module. The trees that we produce are binary trees where each
decision point has only two options until a discrete value from a pre-determined class is
forecasted as the prediction.
The research question for the chapter featuring decision trees is:
Can we accurately learn compliance attitudes from public traces of compliance
behaviours?
The motivation for doing this is based on the usefulness of acquiring agents’ compliance
attitudes. If we can accurately assess compliance attitudes from traces then we can establish
the current risk environment that an organisation is operating in. Having a wider knowledge
of the risk environment allows for the organisation to apply its risk appetite and make fully
informed decisions regarding the effectiveness of security policies.
Often, Decision Trees are used in Fraud Detection for classification [80]. There are
similarities in the approach that we adopt here. Instead of identifying a perpetrator for
a crime, we are identifying the compliance attitude of agents for how they perceive their
compliance behaviour towards security policies.
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Figure 2.4 Figure representing how data is split when performing cross-validation. Figure
taken from [92].
2.4.1 Cross-Validation
In Chapter 6, we use cross-validation as our technique for assessing the accuracy of decision
trees. In cross-validation, we typically split a data set D into k mutually exclusive subsets,
which are often referred to as folds {D1,D2, ..,Dk} of usually equal size. A decision tree
is then trained and tested for each data set in D where it is trained on DxDxt and tested on Dxt
where Dxt refers to the test part of the data.
A general rule of thumb for splitting training and test data is 80% as training data and
20% for test data. This is performed each time for the different folds as described above
ensuring that the data is generalised as the decision trees will be exposed to all parts of the
data for training and testing.
Figure 2.4 is taken from the scikit, which is the implementation we use in Chapter 6 to
perform our cross-validation. The figure illustrates that with a number of different folds,
there is test data that is taken out each time, allowing the process to be generalised across
all of the data. For example, in Split 1 and Split 2, the test data is Fold 1 and Fold 2, the
remaining folds in each split are for training the models, in our case, the decision trees.
2.5 Julia and SysModels
In this thesis we create a tool called PCASP which we will discuss later in Chapter 8. The
purpose of PCASP is to allow a security practitioner to enter a set of rules describing agent
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behaviour with regards to a security policy. The tool builds a model given the rules and
performs some simple analysis. In it’s current state the tool is manually mapped from the
rules outlined to the implementation code.
The tool is implemented in a language called Julia and makes use of a package called
SysModels. Julia is a high level programming language which has been designed for
computational analysis. The package SysModels is for creating Systems Models [? ]. In our
use case the Systems Models is the set of behaviour rules defining how agents interact with
each other.
2.6 Petri Nets
We make use of Coloured Petri nets in Chapter 3. We provide an overview of Petri nets in
general here. The use of Petri nets allows us to model the propagation of social influences.
The research question it helps to address is:
How can we quantify propagating social influences impacting compliance atti-
tudes?
A Petri net or a place/transition system is a modelling language to describe distributed
systems. A typical Petri net contains places, transitions and arcs. Arcs connect places and
transitions and can go from place to transition and transition to place. An arc cannot go from
place to place or from transition to transition [88].
Tokens: In a Petri net, tokens are distributed around the places and a particular distribution
of tokens is known as a marking. A marking is essentially a state of the Petri net and from
any given marking, there is a finite number of reachable markings [96] Tokens can migrate if
a transition is fired. In order for a transition to to fire/execute, it must be enabled. A transition
is enabled if there is a sufficient number of tokens in the input places for a transition. If
multiple transitions are enabled, then the Petri behaves in a non-deterministic manner.
We illustrate Petri nets in Chapter 3 with Figure 4.2 and provide the formal rules for how the
extended version of Coloured Petri nets are adopted [66]. We utilise the notion of influence
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tokens to express propagating social influences that exploited by an adversary to increase the
adversary’s likelihood of entering an organisation via tailgating.
We don’t discuss Petri nets any further here as we provide formal definitions and more
descriptions in Chapter 4.
2.7 Multi Agent Systems
We make use of a Multi Agent System in Chapter 4 to model agents that are capable of
observing the actions of other agents. It assists with addressing Research Question 2:
How do we model observations of compliance behaviour?
In the literature, a Multi Agent System is defined as a set of agents that are interacting
with an environment and or each other to achieve some common or individual goals [115].
Often, it is the case that an agent is said to be cognitive and has a reasoning process in order to
perform actions or behaviours. This reasoning process is strongly dependent on the attitudes
of the agent, where the attitudes impacts the choices an agent makes [110].
We utilise the concept of Multi Agent Systems in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 where we
use different models to address the research questions. The agents in our systems are
heterogeneous and do not have a common or individualised goal, they just behave according
to their current context and any observations they have made of other agents compliance
behaviour.
Figure 2.5 is a holistic view of how we see social influences interacting between agents.
We express the notion of a defender that positively influences agents and an adversary that
negatively influences agents. We use Figure 2.5 as a base and build on it within the chapters
to create an observational based system where agents interact with each other and can observe
each others behaviour. The defender is explored in Section 8 where we demonstrate through
impact analysis the success a defender can have with different behavioural interventions. The
adversary is considered in Section 4 where we use Coloured Petri nets to illustrate influence
tokens, where influence tokens can be used by an adversary in this context to increase the
likelihood of tailgating into an organisation.
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Figure 2.5 Holistic view of a Multi Agent System for social influences - A: Actions, O:
Observations, I: Interventions, Green Arrow: Positive Influence, Red Arrow: Negative
Influence
2.8 Statistical Tests
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 we use a range of statistical tests which we introduce in the
chapter and also provide the full list here with a short description.
2.8.1 Planned Comparisons
Planned comparisons are not a statistical test but it is important and applicable to mention
it as this point. We make use of planned comparisons in our work to ensure we focus on
sensible and pre-determined comparisons in our work. Essentially, we specify before an
experiment takes place, what it is that we are looking for in the data we have collected.
The requirements for performing planned comparisons ensures we have pre-specified
what it is we want to compare and the statistical tests of how we are going to compare them.
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For example, in Chapter 7 we pre-specified that we are looking to compare the total number
of smart card swipes and that we would use an Analysis of Variance Testing.
In order to prove that we have performed planned comparisons and not just made the
story up after we have collected the data, we commit a document to the OSF (Center for
Open Science) website before the experiment takes place outlining how the experiment will
run and the planned comparisons that we will do after the data has been collected.
2.8.2 Analysis of Variance
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a set of statistical methods to analyse and approximate
the differences between group means of some samples. We used a one-way omnibus ANOVA
which entails comparing the means of all the different groups and assessing if there is a
difference. In our case, we use the ANOVA in both Chapter 6 and Chapter 8:
Chapter 7: The three groups we measure and compare against are Control, Discrete+ and
Continuous−. The ANOVA will not tell us which groups are statistically significant, just that
at least two of the groups are.
Chapter 9: In this chapter we used a one-way omnibus ANOVA which entails comparing the
means of all the different experiment conditions against simulation conditions and assessing
if there is a significant difference in the means. In total we perform six ANOVAS in Chapter 8.
We provide an overview of how a one-way omnibus ANOVA is performed to assist the reader
with understanding how the results in the chapters are calculated.
An ANOVA is a statistical test for comparisons of mean values. The one way refers to the
test only having one independent variable where the independent variable is something that is
fixed and consistent for that group condition. For example, the experiment in Chapter 7 has
the independent variable of the Discrete+ intervention and the Continuous− intervention.
The dependent variable is a measurement that is dependent on some condition. In the
experiment one dependent variable is the number of total swipes. A null hypothesis for any
ANOVA is that there is no significant difference amongst any of the groups. The alternative
hypothesis assumes that there is at least one significant different among the groups. In our
2.8 Statistical Tests 27
case, the comparisons are the Control vs Discrete+ and the Control vs Continuous−. In
Chapter 7, we do not compare Continuous− vs Discrete+.








Consider Table 2.1 which provides some example descriptive statistics for the experiment
in Chapter 7. The dependent variable being measured is the total number of swipes. Assuming
the experiment has 18 participants where 6 participants take part in only one group then the
result is Table 2.1 which is the raw data to be examined. We now demonstrate each step of
the one-way ANOVA:

































Step 3: Calculate the between-groups sum of squared differences where n is the of data
values per group:
SB = n(Ȳ1 − Ȳ )2 +n(Ȳ2 − Ȳ )2 +n(Ȳ3 − Ȳ )2 (2.5)
= 6(10−10)2 +6(15−10)2 +6(5−10)2 = 50 (2.6)
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Step 4: Calculate the between-groups degrees of freedom:
fb = |Ȳ |−1 = 3−1 = 2 (2.7)








Step 6: Calculate the within-group sum of squares. We do this calculation by centering the
data in each group, see Table 2.2:
Table 2.2 Example Statistics: Within Groups Preparation
Control Discrete+ Continuous−
(10−10)2 = 0 (17−15)2 = 4 (6−5)2 = 1
(11−10)2 = 1 (14−15)2 = 1 (4−5)2 = 1
(10−10)2 = 0 (17−15)2 = 4 (10−5)2 = 25
(11−10)2 = 1 (13−15)2 = 4 (5−5)2 = 0
(5−10)2 = 25 (16−15)2 = 1 (3−5)2 = 4
(13−10)2 = 9 (13−15)2 = 4 (2−5)2 = 9
SW =0+1+0+1+25+9+4+1+4+4+1+4+1+1+25+0+4+9 (2.9)
=94 (2.10)
Step 7: Calculate the within-groups degrees of freedom:
fW = a(n−1) = 3(6−1) = 15 (2.11)
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Step 9: Calculate the F-ratio:





For an ANOVA, the result is testing if there is a significance level, typically at the 5%
significance level. In order for that to be true, the F-ratio must be greater than the F-critical
value which can be calculated using an F-distribution table as a lookup or via many different
tools. For the purposes of this thesis we don’t provide the formula for calculating the F-
critical value but we do provide the value which is F − crit(2,15) = 3.86 at 5% significance
level. As the F-ratio (4) is greater than the F-crit value (3.68) then the results are significant at
the 5% significance level. We would then fail to accept the null hypothesis that the expected
values in the three groups do not differ and that there is a difference in the mean values
amongst them. We therefore accept the alternate hypothesis that the three groups differ. We
use this method to compare means in Chapter 7.
2.8.3 Effect Sizes
We only use effect sizes in Chapter 6. An effect size is a quantitative measure of an
observation made about some metric, such as the correlation between two variables. A rule
of thumb for effect sizes is that the larger the absolute value of an effect size then the stronger
the effect is. We calculate the Hedges’g effect size which tells us the difference between two
groups [57]. The value of the effect size provides an indicator for the magnitude of the effect.
Typically, small, medium and large effects are referred to when the effect size is .2, .5 and .8
respectively [36].
As Hedges’g only permits the comparisons between two groups we perform planned
comparisons. Planned comparisons are pre-specified before the results are collected to avoid
looking for results that may be interesting if the data does not quite add up. The planned
comparisons we perform in Chapter 6 are Control vs Discrete+ and Control vs Continuous−.
The calculation for Hedges’g effect size is the following:
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Step 1: Calculate the pooled standard deviation s*:
s∗ =
√
(n1 −1)s21 +(n1 −1)s22
n1 +n2 −2
(2.14)
















gDiscrete+ = 1.58 (2.19)
The value for the Discrete+ effect size when comparing to Control group is 1.58 which
would be considered a large effect.
We would then perform the same calculation for the Continuous− group against the
Control group. Note that we would not compare Continuous− and Control.
2.8.4 Confidence Intervals
The use of confidence intervals are only used in Chapter 6. A confidence interval is an
interval estimate we compute to outline the range of values that an observed value could take
for some confidence level. Where the confidence level is typically 95%, which is what we
use in this chapter [59]. The confidence interval we provide is over the effect sizes that we
observe.
2.8.5 Chi Squared Goodness of Fit test
The use of a Chi squared goodness of fit test is only used in Chapter 8. The Chi squared
goodness of fit test is used to determine how significantly different some observed data (for
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us, simulation data) is when compared to the expected data (for us, empirical data). For a
Chi Squared Goodness of Fit test there are four assumption criteria that must be met:
Assumption 1 (Categorical Variable). One categorical variable (i.e., the variable can be
dichotomous, nominal or ordinal). Examples of dichotomous variables include gender (2
groups: male or female), treatment type (2 groups: medication or no medication), educational
level (2 groups: undergraduate or postgraduate) and religious (2 groups: yes or no).
Assumption 2 (Independence of Observations). We should have independence of observa-
tions, which means that there is no relationship between any of the cases (e.g., participants).
Assumption 3 (Mutually Exclusive). The groups of the categorical variable must be mutually
exclusive.
Assumption 4 (Expected Frequencies). There must be at least 5 expected frequencies in
each group of your categorical variable.
The assumptions were taken from laerd statistics, which is a website composed of




The TREsPASS project was launched consisting of many research projects into socio-
technical security by means of risk estimation and predictive assessment [6]. The socio
aspect focused on human behaviour in security. In this section we focus in on the work
commissioned by the TREsPASS project and any other sources that are relevant.
3.1 Formal Modelling
Formal methods when applied to human behaviour was demonstrated by the analysis of
insider threat. Probst et al. discussed the inclusion of explicit socio aspects and demonstrated
proof of attacks towards this insider threat by use of a running example consisting of stealing
a baker’s birthday cake [93]. The socio-technical aspect is taken to the next step where
automated verification is performed to produce a framework for insider threat analysis [71].
The formalism we adopt describes the semantics of a Multi Agent System in Chapter 4
where agents can observe the actions of other agents. To the best of our knowledge, we have
not come across another system which models the observations of actions for the purposes of
social influences impacting compliance attitudes. We then take the modelling process one
step further and describe the syntax for the simulation tool PCASP which uses the semantics
of the model from Chapter 4. One possible next step of the work for the semantics would be
automated verification to produce a framework for social influences analysis.
Lenzini et al. addresses whether a security policy together with physical access controls
protects from socio-technical threats [78]. The approach they take deals with reasoning
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about an organisations security when enforces policies. It is an extension of previous work
where they defined a framework for automatic security analysis of socio-technical physical
systems [77]. The automatic security analysis has links with the work we present in Chapter 4
as a natural next step of defining the semantics of the rule based model would for assessing
social influences.
3.2 Security Aware Organisational Culture
One intuition for a person whose compliance attitude falls under the broad definition of being
security aware is that they are able to assess their organisations current risk environment.
Another intuition is that they are fully aware of the costs, benefits and risks of complying
with security policies [15].
Two possibilities, which is not an exhaustive list, for a person that is security aware is
that they a) know about and comply with security policies and b) know an adversary may
attempt to socially engineer them. For option b), if an employee is at risk of being targeted
by social engineering, should the employee be as vigilant towards countering such a threat?
A question such as this raises an aspect of accountability. An option to defend against this
would be to design a work environment supporting the employee to not succumb to a social
engineer [108].
For this thesis, the next stage of security awareness is to discuss influencing security
awareness. Bullee et al. demonstrated that by the use of a priming social influence as an
intervention they could decrease the percentage of people that would hand over their keys
on request at an organisation [22]. In Chapter 7 we demonstrate interventions by social
influences or restricting the observations of agents and the impact this has towards their
compliance attitudes.
Evaluating behaviour with regards to security policies has been noted to be similar to
conducting performance appraisals [111]. Where a performance appraisal analyses behaviour
with regards to some targets or outcomes, a compliance appraisal would analyse behaviour
with regards to the security policies. In essence, it would be a qualitative/quantitative
overview of how much an employee is compliant with security policies. In this method,
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it would heavily rely upon the current compliance attitude of the employee and may only
provide a snapshot of how they behave.
3.3 User Studies Influencing Compliance Behaviour
In Chapter 7 we collect a data set which is the observation of compliance behaviour towards
a security policy where participants in the study must swipe their smart card on entry and exit
of a room. We designed the study using the Cyber Security Room at Newcastle University.
We provide an overview of related work to the study that we performed.
Groß and Coopamootoo demonstrated that strong cognitive depletion impacted a person’s
ability to choose a strong password which indicated that cognitive effort is required to choose
strong passwords. If a rule in a security policy is to choose a strong password and person is
influenced to perform a task that will cognitively deplete them, then chooses a weak password
for a different task, they have been socially influenced. This approach provides a wider scope
for how the simulation tool PCASP could be enhanced, by providing cognitive effort towards
tasks and the impact this has on password selection.
Compliance behaviour for security policies can also be present for information security
policies. One body of work considered that theory-based training achieved positive results
and was practical to deploy when dealing with information security policies [64]. In this
thesis, the security policies we deal with require people to perform some physical behaviour
and would not usually be information security policies. Nevertheless, the theory-based
training is one possibility to assist with improving the compliance attitudes of people for
security policies where they have a choice. Extending the concept of theory-based training
to the application of social influences is something that we do not consider in this thesis,
however, it would provide useful material to the holistic approach we assess, as training
self-awareness could reduce the negative impact social influences can have on compliance
attitudes.
36 Related Work
3.4 Nudging in Security
The majority of the work in nudging towards information security falls under the RISCS
which is Research Institute in Science of Cyber Security in the UK [5]. A central part of this
thesis is focused around the influencing of people’s compliance attitudes. In general, we are
discussing influences that come from other people and where the providers and receivers of
the influence can be unaware. Of course, in the context where an adversary and or defender
is present, then self-awareness of influencing behaviour would be true.
Nudging for positive security was demonstrated by Turland et al. where they present a
first version application promoting the choice of secure wireless network options by use of
colours (green for good, red for bad), and the application targeted users who are unfamiliar
with the wireless networks available in their area. The purpose was to influence users to make
a secure choice when selecting which wireless network to connect to [107]. The research was
taken to the next step in the form of validation. The notion of influence power is introduced
by Yevseyeva et al. to characterize the extent to which an influencer can influence decision
makers and they illustrated their approach using data from the controlled experiment on
techniques to influence which public wireless network users select [116]. In this thesis we
don’t explore the notion of influence power, however, we acknowledge that this would be
potential avenue for a research question in regards to simulation and validation.
3.5 Simulation Tools for Human Security Behaviour
In this thesis we build the simulation tool PCASP catering for the prediction of compliance
attitudes towards security policies. The tool makes use of different behavioural elements that
is built from the semantics of the rule based model in Chapter 4.
One part of the PCASP uses compliance attitudes to inform agent’s actions. A similar
approach was developed by Kothari et al. where they presented DASH, an agent-based
simulation framework that supports the dual-process model of cognition, reactive planning,
modeling of human deficiencies (e.g., fatigue, frustration), and multi-agent interactions [73].
The approach of DASH focused towards password policies and how agents responded to it
and did not consider any observations of agent actions in their framework. Nevertheless,
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the approach for the cognition modelling certainly has similarities towards the compliance




This chapter address Research Question 1 by focusing on the modelling of social influences
where propagation occurs. A social influence is when a person’s attitudes or behaviours are
affected by others [33]. As a reminder the research question is:
Research Question 1 (Cyclic Observational Behaviour). How do we model observations of
compliance behaviour?
To address the research question, this chapter considers the impact and success an
adversary could have using different social influences. We use the MINDSPACE framework
to inform us about different social influences as it provides a collection of different social
influences [44]. For a more comprehensive overview of MINDSPACE, please see Chapter 2.
The MINDPSACE framework is not a complete guide to all social influences, however, it
does provide enough richness when considering the complexity of the problem. When we
refer to complexity we mean that it is computationally intensive to solve.
The notion of propagation or ripple for social influences has similarities to how malware
propagates. For the malware, it embeds itself, makes a copy and distributes itself to local
neighbours [99, 54]. For a social influence, it changes the compliance behaviour of a person
and subsequently, that person can influence other people that surround them resulting in a
social influence that has propagated amongst a group of people.
In this chapter we use Coloured Petri nets to model propagation of social influences. We
do this because Coloured Petri nets allows for prescriptive behaviour, such as the decision to













Figure 4.1 Example of Propagating influence. Initially, Bob tailgates Alice which leads to
Charlie tailgating Bob.
understand the impact an adversary can have towards a security policy based on a given set
of behaviours. One hope of future work in this area would be to understand how to contain
social influences by addressing the opportunities for a given set of behaviours.
We do not consider models that express propagation such as the modelling of infectious
diseases. Our reasoning is based on the assumptions that these models make are generally
tailored towards large populations. Additional assumptions tend to generalise the rate of
physical contact between individuals in sub groups [42]. Our interests are within the medium-
large organisations where the populations level can be small and people may only make
virtual contact (e.g. by phone or email).
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To give an intuition of the problem, consider the following example. An adversary
influences the compliance attitude of one person at an organisation to be more likely to
allow tailgating into the main office building. The behaviour of this one person relaxes the
compliance attitude of many at the organisation. The global compliance attitude descends as
employees regularly don’t challenge anyone tailgating. An adversary can easily tailgate into
the building without being challenged to take equipment. We use Figure 4.1 as an abstract
view of the problem of propagation between compliance behaviours of employees and the
influences this can have on others. In Figure 4.1 the behaviour of Dave tailgating Alice
influences the behaviour of Bob and as a result, Charlie, who was originally not present ends
up tailgating Bob.
Chapter Overview: This chapter is mainly built from a previous publication at the STAST
(Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust) workshop in 2016 [24]. The paper is a more
condensed form of this chapter. The chapter features in addition to the paper a discussion
around the introduction of a concept called Influence Tokens and a more concise introduction
to Petri nets in general.
4.1 Influence Tokens
A token in a Petri net is representation of some unique element which has its own set of
rules. For instance, a person/agent is a token that can move between locations and carry or
distribute other tokens. These other tokens are Influence Tokens which is a term we define
to capture a special set of tokens that will be the focus of this chapter. An influence token
is a representation of a social influence. Recall the MINDSPACE framework, a framework
of social influences. An influence token can take the form of these social influences, in this
chapter they are:
1. Priming a target can change their compliance attitude, such that at a later point in
time, their compliance behaviour can be exploited. As a reminder, priming is to
prepare someone for some behaviour in the future. It is often associated with being
subconscious driven behaviour, i.e. it occurs automatically [45].
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2. Use of the Messenger influence to exploit the current compliance attitude of a target.
A person susceptible to the Messenger influence believes the adversary has a right to
enforce a form of obedience [84].
A person can carry an influence token and distribute it to others. Depending on the policy
for the influence token, it can exhibit many different behaviours. For example, a priming
token can propagate and influence many people. Whereas, a messenger token relies on the
provider of the token to be perceived as the relevant authority. The impact of an influence
token can strongly depend on the context and the compliance attitude of the person receiving
the token.
4.1.1 The Modelling of Influence Tokens
The notion of influence tokens indicates a distributed system where many people can carry
an influence token. In this context, a distributed system refers to many people interacting
with each other.
A Coloured Petri net is a mathematical technique for modelling a system that is distributed
[66]. We adopt it to formally represent the notion of influence tokens. It allows for a number
of different types of objects to be represented. In our case, human behaviour requires us to
not only model the influence, but the person as well.
To express our modelling of Influence Tokens in this chapter we use a running example
based on tailgating:
Scenario: In a building where employees must swipe a smart card to gain entry, we assume
people can tailgate to get inside. We assume the default behaviour of employees is to chal-
lenge tailgaters and to not allow them entry. A social engineer wears maintenance clothing
(Messenger), can try and tailgate, as another measure they can email (Priming) ahead and
interact with different departments to notify them that some maintenance work will take place.
We make a final assumption that employees are also under pressure to make a deadline and
are prone to becoming stressed out which impacts their decision making.
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The goal of the adversary is to gain access to the building. The adversary has two measures
of influence they can deploy; the maintenance clothing (Messenger) and the emails (Priming).
The dynamic behaviour of the employees is outside of the adversaries control, however, it
affects the state of the employees and in turn, can impact if the social engineer is successful.
The adversary in this sense is a risk based opportunist as they have no knowledge about the
compliance attitude of the person they are tailgating, this is hidden information.
We have chosen to use Messenger and Priming in this chapter as they are the social
influences illustrated in the scenario. During the course of this thesis we address different
social influences and whilst we are prescriptive about what those social influences are, it’s
important to ensure they align with the narrative. Without the descriptors in the narrative,
we have no grounding for justifying why a social influence is appearing in our higher level
discussions and analysis.
4.2 Modelling Influence Tokens with Coloured Petri nets
In this section we provide the definitions for Coloured Petri nets, adapt the verification
techniques from Coloured Petri nets towards our problem and then we introduce the running
example that we use throughout this chapter. It is important to note that Coloured Petri nets
make use of tokens as a system evolves, which are not necessarily influence tokens. We also
provide an overview of Petri nets in Chapter 2.
4.2.1 Coloured Petri Nets
A Coloured Petri net is an extension of Petri nets which can be used to analyse a distributed
system providing verification for properties and simulations to identify behaviour trends.
Intuitively speaking, a Petri net is a system where some tokens flow from places to transitions,
and from transitions to places. The main goal of a Petri net is to analyse if, given an initial
distribution of tokens (which is often referred to as a marking), a specific distribution of
tokens can eventually be reached. A Coloured Petri net is a Petri net where tokens can be of
different colours, which allows for a greater range of modelling concepts to be taken in to
account. Different definitions of Coloured Petri nets exist in the literature, and in order to
avoid confusion, we repeat the notion of Coloured Petri nets we use here, inspired from [66].
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Definition 1 (Coloured Petri net). A Coloured Petri net (Coloured Petri net) is a tuple
ColouredPetrinet = (Σ,P,T,A,C,N) where:
1. Σ = {T1, . . . ,Tn} is a finite set of finite and non-empty colour sets, where each colour
set represents a specific type of tokens. In the following, we write T = T1 ∪·· ·∪Tn
for the set of all possible tokens.
2. P is a finite set of places.
3. T is a finite set of transitions.
4. A is a finite set of arcs.
5. C : P → Σ is a colour function and maps a place to its assigned colour set.
6. N : A → P×T ∪T ×P is the node function.
From the node function in Definition 1, we know that a place in a Coloured Petri net can
only be connected to a transition, and a transition can only be connected to a place. We see
this in Figure 4.2 which illustrates a Coloured Petri net with only two colours used for places
where tokens can reside. A token beginning in a red place must end in a red place. A token







Figure 4.2 A Petri net showing places connected to transitions. A marking here would
take the form of {0,0,1,2,1,1} which indicates the distribution of tokens for the places
P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6.
In Figure 4.2, places are depicted with circles, transitions as long narrow rectangles and
arcs as unidirectional to show connections between places to transitions or transitions to
places.
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4.2.2 Motivation for Using Petri Nets
Petri nets are powerful tools to analyse distributed systems. Petri nets provides a user
with a graphical notation which helps to illustrate any processes which are being modelled.
Furthermore, Petri nets generally have tool support allowing for modelling and analysis.
In this chapter we make use of CPNtools which provides a user with the ability to edit,
simulate and analyse Coloured Petri nets. The tool provides model checking through state
based methods[67]. We make use of the tool to explore our running example to express
influence tokens.
4.2.3 Behaviour of Coloured Petri nets
We now cover the behaviour of a Coloured Petri net, where we define how transitions execute.
At a high level view, the arcs directed into transitions are the pre-conditions for the transition
to execute, where a pre-condition indicates that a token must exist in the place that the arc
originates from. A post condition of the same transition is all places where the transition
is directly connected via an arc, it indicates where tokens will go once the transition has
executed. This sequence allows for tokens to migrate throughout a Coloured Petri net. In
order to express Coloured Petri nets, we first recall the notion of multi-sets.
Definition 2 (Multi-sets). A multi-set m, over a non-empty and finite set S, is a function
m : S →N where the integer value is non-negative and represents the number of appearances
of the element s in the multi set m.
A marking is a distribution of tokens over a Coloured Petri net, and represents the state
that the Coloured Petri net is currently in. A token can only be in a place, not a transition.
The transition serves to migrate tokens between places via the arcs.
Definition 3 (Marking). A marking is a function M : P → m(T ) such that:
∀p ∈ P ∀τ ∈ T M(p,τ)> 0 ⇒ τ ∈C(p)
where we used the curried notation for the function M, i.e., M(p, t) refers to m(t) where
m = M(p). In addition, when no confusion can arise, we write M(p) for the number of all
tokens in place p, i.e., ∑τ∈C(p)M(p,τ).
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A Coloured Petri net will have an initial marking M0, which is formed by distributing the
tokens over the net. The main semantic aspect of a Coloured Petri net is that, in order for a
transition to be enabled, there should be enough tokens in the places that are connected to
that transition. In particular, if a place is connected n times to a transition, then there must
be n tokens in that place for that transition to be enabled. For the sake of exposition, we
write in(p, t) for the number of arcs from the place p to the transition t, and out(t, p) for the
number of arcs from the transition t to the place p. More formally, for any place p and any
transition t:
in(p, t) = |{a ∈ A | N(a) = (p, t)}|
out(t, p) = |{a ∈ A | N(a) = (t, p)}|
Definition 4. A transition t is said to be enabled in a marking M, and in which case we write
M ⊢ t, if, and only if:1
∀p ∈ P (∃a ∈ A N(a) = (p, t)))⇒ M(p)≥ in(p, t)
Once a transition is enabled, it is capable of occurring. In its simplest form the occurrence
of a transition changes the current marking M to M′. Intuitively speaking, the value of
M′ is calculated by moving across the transition the tokens that were present in the places
connected to the transition. More formally, we say that the marking M′ can be obtained from
the marking M with the transition t, and in this case we write M ;t M′ if, and only if the
transition t is enabled:
M′(p) =

M(p)− in(p, t) ∃a ∈ A N(a) = (t, p)∧M ⊢ t
M(p)+out(t, p) ∃a ∈ A N(a) = (p, t)∧M ⊢ t
M(p) otherwise.
Finally, the reachability graph from a marking M indicates all the markings that can be
eventually reached from M by triggering enabled transitions. More formally, given a marking
1For the sake of exposition, we use here a simplified version for the notion of enabled transition, which is
enough to present our model for influence tokens. We refer to [66] for further details about the semantics of
Coloured Petri nets.
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M, we define inductively the reachability graph Rn(M) as follows:
R0(M) = {M}
Rn+1(M) = {M′ | ∃M′′ ∈ Rn(M) ∃t ∈ T M′′ ⊢ t ∧M′′ ;t M′}
In the following, we write R(M) to express the unbounded reachability graph of a given
marking M, i.e., R(M) =
⋃
n Rn(M).
4.2.4 Coloured Petri nets Verification
From a practical perspective, if a state of the system or marking in our case exists which is of
interest, then we want to verify that it can exist. An example of something of interest would
be a specific marking indicating that the model is in an bad state.
From a resilience aspect, a Coloured Petri net should not violate any rules set out. We
can do this by deadlock detection to identify how and if a Coloured Petri net deadlocks. As
we are modelling people as agents, a property of interest is that we have no duplication. For
example, if the model begins with n agents, at each marking, n agents will always be present.
The reachability property states that given an initial marking M, is a marking M′ is part
of the reachability graph of a Coloured Petri net. The appeal of this is apparent as it may be
the case that we want to deduce the current state of a set of agents compared to the adversary
to represent some form of distance between the two.
The boundedness property states that a place in a Coloured Petri net is k-bounded if it can
contain no more than k-tokens, this is a property of interest as we do not want to begin with
one adversary and somehow finish with two, unless we consider a case where a cognitive
agent becomes an insider and an adversary is created within the net. Unless we consider the
case where specific behaviour traits can cause agents to become insider threats, for example,
the specific composition of an agent leads their compliance attitude to not only become
non-compliant but malicious [90].
We define the upper and lower bounds of a Coloured Petri net, where given an initial
marking it refers to the number of tokens that exist for a given marking.
Definition 5. Let a place p ∈ P, a non-negative integer n1,n2 ∈ N and all the reachable
markings from M0 be R(M0) , such that:
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• Upper Bounds: ∀M ∈ R(M0) : M(p)≤ n1
• Lower Bounds: ∀M ∈ R(M0) : M(p)≥ n2
For our models, n1 ≡ n2 would indicate that the number of tokens does not change in
any Coloured Petri net. Whether or not this consistency check should hold in our models
depends on the tokens that we are considering. For instance, the type of agent tokens should
always remain constant, however, the number of influence tokens may change as an influence
propagates through agents.
4.3 Influence Model
A Coloured Petri net is capable of having places which are bespoke to holding specific types
of coloured tokens. For example, given a red token, it could only exist in a place designated
to hold red tokens2. A place can hold tokens of different colours if it is assigned to do so. In
this section we introduce the core concepts of how we use Coloured Petri nets to represent
social influences, in particular the focus on defining our different types of coloured tokens.
The modelling approach expresses three core aspects which are the behaviour of influence
tokens, the adversary and the agents. The influence tokens are assigned to the adversary as a
special set of tokens. The adversary must have the capability to distribute influence tokens to
agents by a set of behaviours, which are captured through transitions. The agents have the
capability to interact with the model, other agents and the adversary.
We pre-define the set of behaviours for influence tokens, the adversary and agents. The
influence model described in this chapter captures the three core aspects of our modelling
approach. Firstly, the priming and messenger influence tokens are assigned to the adversary.
Secondly, the adversary gas the capability to influence with the priming or the messenger
token. Thirdly, the agents interact with each other and the adversary. By addressing the
three core concepts for our modelling approach, the behaviour of influence tokens can be
illustrated as propagating between agents.
4.3 Influence Model 49
Figure 4.3 Running Example: Adversary working towards tailgating with a finite number of
influence tokens available.
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4.3.1 Coloured Petri net Influence Model Definitions
Applying our model to the Coloured Petri net, we now explain our meaning of colour sets,
places, transitions, arcs etc. As a reminder of the notation for the Coloured Petri net we
provide our implementation of the Coloured Petri net with regards to the following:
1. Σ is a finite set of colour sets.
2. P is a finite set of places
3. T is a finite set of transitions
4. A is a finite set of arcs
5. C : P → Σ is a colour function
6. N : A → P×T ∪T ×P is the node function;
For each part of the Coloured Petri net, we define our implementation. With regards
to the tailgating running example where agents represent people, the social engineer is an
influencer that has a pre-defined finite set of influence tokens. We illustrate the running
example in Figure 4.33.
1: Colour sets is a term used to capture different types of tokens, the set of colour sets
Σ = {λ ,γ,Aλ ,Φ,U,Env} where:
• λ is the set of behaviour change elements.
• γ is the set of influence tokens and γ ⊆ λ .
• Aλ is the set of agents and Aλ ⊆ P(λ ).
• Φ is the set of influencers.
• U is the set of utility values available to influencers.
• Env is the set of environments.
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Table 4.1 Mapping of Places
Type Example Scenario Text Description
Place Influencer Outside InfOut
Place Influencer Inside InfIn
Place Prime Prime
Place Messenger Messenger
Place Agent Outside AgentOut
Place Agent Inside AgentIn
Transition Tailgate Messenger TailgateM
2, 3 & 4: To assist the reader, we map places and transitions in the example figure to
the places described in this section in Table 4.1. Places P within Coloured Petri nets can
store tokens, where the tokens can have a data value attached to them. An example place
InfOut ∈ P is a place within the net and refers to a physical location. For other places such as
Prime ∈ P and Messenger ∈ P which is of type γ , the place still refers to a physical location
but in relation to the place of the influencer. In the InfOut place, the adversary has access to
tokens in both Prime & Messenger. Once the token representing the adversary changes place
to InfIn ∈ P then access to these social influence tokens is no longer possible.
The set of places must always be finite. Transitions are a finite set and capture how the
models markings change, a transition has an input, output, some internal function and can be
constrained with a guard to ensure it can only be enabled once the guard is satisfied. An ex-
ample transition is TailgateM ∈ T which is connected by arcs to many places. The transition
TailgateM has multiple places connected to, the input places are InfOut ∈ P, AgentOut ∈ P
and Messenger ∈ P. The output places are InfOut, AgentIn and InfIn. A token must therefore,
be in the three input places in order for the transition TailgateM to be enabled, assuming the
guard is satisfied.
5: The colour function C maps a place to its respective colour set. Therefore, for all to-
kens in a place p, the token must have a colour set which belongs to C(p). For example,
C(InfOut) = Φ and indicates that any token in InfOut must be of the colour set Φ, that is it
2We don’t use red tokens, this is just provided as an example.
3The arcs here are bidirectional, this is breaching the rules previously set out, however, we only do this for
illustrative purposes.
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must be an influencer.
6: The node function maps each arc into a pair where the pair is of type P×T∪T×P where
the first element is the source node of the arc and the second element is the destination node.
Several arcs can exist between the same ordered pair of nodes. In the running example the
places InfOut ∈ P and InfIn ∈ P and transition TailgateM ∈ T are matched by many nodes.
Consider the arcs which connect them i1, i2 ∈ A, where:
N(i1) = ((InfOut,TailgateM),(⊤,⊥)) (4.1)
N(i2) = ((InfOut,TailgateM),(⊤, InfIn)) (4.2)
The use of ⊤ refers to the same transition already used and ⊥ is for the same place used.
The two arcs i1 and i2 come from the same place but i1 returns to InfOut and i2 goes to
InfIn. This allows for a transition to send tokens to either place but also to control when the
token goes to a specific place. If the adversary fails at tailgating then they should not end up
inside the building, similarly if they succeed they should not remain outside. An arc should
only be unidirectional, however, we breach this convention for simplicity. An arc which is
bidirectional simply refers to two unidirectional arcs.
4.3.2 Model Behaviour
Implementing the example into a Coloured Petri net provides us with the colour sets outlined
in Section 4.3.1 where we have agents and each agent is a set of behaviour change elements.
An influencer with some finite value can generate influence tokens to distribute amongst
agents and use tailgating to achieve their goal and gain access to the building.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the example implemented in CPNTools, which is the tool used
to implement the running example [67]. The ovals refer to the places, the rectangles are
for transitions and the arcs connect places to transitions. In Figure 4.3 the colour sets are
captured by INFTOKENS for γ , AGENT for Aγ , UTILITY for U and INFLUENCER for Φ.
This was from the restrictions CPNTools provided for naming colour sets. In Figure 4.3,
each place is assigned its respective colour set which can be identified near the place, such
as the place Influencer Outside which is captured by INFLUENCER. The transitions mostly
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have an internal algorithm which deals with the input arcs and produces the appropriate
output arcs. The transition Tailgate Agent takes tokens of a colour set (a1, i1) which refers
to one agent and one influencer respectively. It can output (a2, i2, i3) where (i2, i3) are both
influencers and refers to whether or not the adversary as an influencer managed to tailgate
into the building. The transition TailgateM has an internal function that takes an agent, an
influencer and outputs an agent, an influencer and another influencer. For clarity we shorten
TailgateM to TAMsg as the transition requires the use of the messenger token. Note that in
the transition TA an influence token is required, however, we do not include it in the function
definition as the token is only required to enable and allow the transition to occur, it does not
capture the internal function which is the following:
TAMsg : Aγ ×Φ → Aγ ×Φ×Φ
TAMsg(a, i) =
(a, i, /0) Stressed ∈ a ∨Primed ∈ a(a∪Aware, /0, i) otherwise
The return of the function TAMessenger will always return one empty set, where the empty
set refers to the success or failure of the adversary, the second element in the tuple indicates
a success if it is not an empty set and the same is true for the third element. The adversary
also has the option to tailgate without using the messenger token:
TANoin f luence : Aγ ×Φ → Aγ ×Φ×Φ
TANoin f luence(a, i) =

(a, /0, i) Aware ∈ a
(a, i, /0) (Stressed ∈ a ∨Primed ∈ a)∧Aware /∈ a
(a∪Aware, /0, i) otherwise
The initial marking of the net is captured by the distribution of the tokens over the places.
In this example the initial marking is as follows:
• Allowance = 1′1000;
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• In f luencerOutside = 1′10;
• AgentOutside = 100′();
The notation above is in the format y′x where y refers to the number of tokens for that
Colour type, e.g. there is one influencer and x refers to the initial value. For Allowance and
In f luencerOutside, the values are integers so they must take a numerical format. For the
place AgentOutside it is a list, and in CPNtools that is represented by () to show an empty
list of elements, in this case strings.
Where the initial marking indicates the influencers allowance is of one thousand. There
is only one influencer who is the adversary, indicating that the adversary has ten attempts
at tailgating and there are one hundred agents who are outside of the building and are all
subject to no behaviour change elements or influence tokens.
Transitions that can occur without the adversary still impact the success rate, even though
the adversary has a small impact towards this. An agent that is carrying a Primed token, can
duplicate the token and allow another agent to carry a Primed token. This allows the token
to propagate throughout the net, which creates the uncertainty for the adversary, as it is not
clear when tailgating, if the agent being tailgated is carrying the Primed token.
4.3.3 Token Types & Internal Transition Guards
In this model we exploit two types of functionality that is offered by CPNtools. They are
token types and internal transition guards.
Token Types
A type token in CPNtools can be assigned to many different types. In the example we run,
we exploit three types which are; integer, string, list. We use the adversaries allowance as a
type integer. We use the influence tokens as type strings. Finally, we capture each agent as a
list of strings which collects influence tokens as they traverse the Coloured Petri net.
Internal Transition Guards
We use internal guards to capture token behaviour during a transition. An internal guard in
CPNtools can permit or deny tokens to progress along from an outgoing arc of a transition
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to a place. Therefore, the earlier definition for how a marking updates is true, however, an
internal guard can prevent the marking from being updated.
We use these internal guards at decision points in the Coloured Petri net. For example,
the decision to permit the adversary to tailgate is dependent upon an agent have the correct
influence tokens. The guard handles this query and if the tailgate is successful, the adversary
will progress to a new place or they will return along an outward arc from the transition
to their starting place. For simplicity, figure 4.3 does not show all of the arcs connecting a
transition to a place and vice versa but they are there.
One intuition that a normal Petri net user would have about the CPN in figure 4.3, is
that the number of tokens increases as transitions occur. However, this is not the case as the
guards prevent an increase of tokens based the queries they check and the results each guard
produces.
4.4 Analysis
In this section we provide our analysis where we consider six test case experiments to identify
the success rate of the adversary under different conditions. At the end of this section we
provide a discussion to summarise our findings.
4.4.1 Analysis: Verification
The two properties we wish to satisfy are the reachability and boundedness property. The use
of CPNtools allows us to perform these verification checks to identify if the properties are
satisfied. The reachability property to ensure that the adversary can reach their goal, as in a
marking M(In f In)> 0 and the boundedness property of the following:
U pperBounds : ∀M ∈ R(M) : M(In f In)≤ 1
LowerBounds : ∀M ∈ R(M) : M(In f In)≥ 0
For each test case experiment we ran the verification checks to ensure that the properties
were met. The outputs of verification confirmed that the lower and upper bounds were met
and that the place was reachable. We consider the same verification for agents and influence
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Figure 4.4 Running Example: Marking showing the adversary inside the building.
tokens to ensure that the same properties are true with regards to each type of token in the
net. An agent in the place AgIn ∈ P refers to the physical location of an agent being inside
the building. The upper and lower bounds are captured by the following, assuming there are
multiple places for agents to transition to and where n is the number of agents:
U pperBounds : ∀M ∈ R(M) : M(AgIn)≤ n
LowerBounds : ∀M ∈ R(M) : M(AgIn)≥ 0
One of the benefits of using CPNtools is the ability to calculate model checking properties.
We have discussed the use of the upper and lower bounds for a marking where we want
to ensure that a specific place can be reached by a specific token. We can use CPNtools
to manually verify this property. We can generate a state space tree illustrating all of the
reachable markings from our initial marking. We then step through manually the tree
following the markings of interest until we reach a marking showing the desired result.
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the verification of CPNtools. We have constructed a subset of
the reachability graph from the initial marking in the running example. We have reduced the
number of agents and the number of attempts the adversary has to increase performance of
producing the reachability graph.
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Each box within Figure 4.4 contains the three numbers. The first number is the number
of the node. The two numbers at the bottom of the node are the number of predecessors for
that node and the number of successors that have been calculated. In the case of the last box
which is 554:2 , it is node 55 with 4 predecessors and 2 successors. If we expand the marking
of node 55 it will display the marking which shows the distribution of tokens across the
Coloured Petri net. Node 55 in Figure 4.4 states that the place InfInside contains one token.
That one token refers to the adversary who has successfully entered the building.
4.4.2 Influence Tokens and Propagation: Test Case Experiments (1-4)
In order to quantitatively analyse the performance of the adversary in the running example,
we compare the success of the adversary reaching their goal based on four test cases. We
consider a range of agents within the net and a range of utility values for the adversary. When
we calculate the success rate of the adversary, we measure it between 0 and 1 where 1 is a
guaranteed success for the adversary and 0 is the adversary failing. For each trace in the
simulation, the adversary will either fail or succeed meaning we calculate a success rate





We are only considering the two influence tokens of messenger and priming, the first four
test case experiments are the following:
1. An adversary with no allowance and therefore, no influence tokens and must try to
tailgate without any influencing:
2. Considering the messenger token where the adversary does not invest into the priming
token:
3. Considering the priming token where the adversary does not invest into the messenger
token:
4. Influence token propagation, the likelihood that the adversary can tailgate after allowing
the priming token to propagate.
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Figure 4.5 The Messenger token used in the running example compared to using no influence
tokens. The difference in the impact of the number of tokens is clear when ten Messenger
tokens are used.
We are only considering these two influence tokens within this context. The inclusion of the
current two influences is to show the comparisons that two influence tokens can have within
our model, where the priming token can propagate from agent to agent and the messenger
token, where it is more likely for someone to be convinced by the one delivering the content.
The adversary was allocated ten attempts to tailgate into the building before stopping the
attack. The following experiments were simulated under that constraint, to ensure that the
adversary does not keep tailgating until they succeed.
Experiment 1 - No Influence Tokens: In Figure 4.5 and 4.6 the use of no influence tokens
showed that the adversary in this context of tailgating has a greater likelihood of achieving
their goal when fewer agents exist. This is mainly down to the constraint that the adversary
can only tailgate successfully if an agent is stressed or primed. As the priming token is not
used in this experiment, the adversary must wait until an agent is stressed to gain entry. As
this is a behaviour change element out of their control, the adversary must risks uncertainty
by not knowing the compliance attitude of the agent.
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Figure 4.6 The priming token used in the running example compared to using no influence
tokens. Without the priming token being given the opportunity to propagate throughout the
agents, the strength of the token becomes limited where using five tokens is no different than
using ten.
Experiment 2 - Messenger Token Figure 4.5 shows the use of the messenger token. Where
the adversary is still restricted to ten attempts of tailgating. The use of the messenger token
over twenty agents with a utility value of ten tokens yields the greatest likelihood for the
adversary with a value of .63. The messenger token initially reduces the success rate when
compared against no influence tokens when only one messenger token is used, indicating that
investing a small amount into this influence token would be counter intuitive in this context.
Experiment 3 - Priming Token: The use of the priming token requires that an agent is
primed, then at a later point a transition occurs which triggers the prime, in this case the
trigger is the tailgating. Figure 4.6 shows the results of using priming based on a utility value
of deploying a certain number of priming tokens. The prime improves the success rate of
the adversary but does not continue to scale it consistently for more primes. Using five or
ten primes has very little difference on the outcome an adversary will have in this scenario.
The point of the prime is to pass an influence token into place for later use where the token
can propagate amongst agents. The obvious weakness in this experiment is in the purpose
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Propagation: 200 Agents; 10 Tailgating Attempts;
No Influence Tokens
10 Priming Tokens
Figure 4.7 The priming token used in the running example compared to using no influence
tokens with ten attempt at tailgating. This shows how ten attempts can negate the impact of
the priming token. Because the adversary has so many attempts, the increase in success rate
because of priming is almost insignificant
of the prime, which is to propagate throughout the net. By not delaying the adversaries
attacks, the prime has no chance to circulate amongst the agents and therefore, the adversary
is sometimes tailgating with no influence tokens. This creates a clear strength for the initial
use of the messenger token.
When simulating the Coloured Petri net the questions asked so far refer to simulating from
the initial marking and identifying the chances for a specific result to occur over a number of
simulation runs.
Constrained transitions for a number of steps can open up a new range of attacks where
we consider propagation. By propagation we mean the transfer and duplication of behaviour
change elements within the net. The priming token in the running example is a propagating
token. In the example, once an agent is primed, the transition Meeting can cause the priming
token to duplicate and be passed from agent to agent.
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If the influencer waits after priming an agent, they can allow the token to propagate
throughout the net and perhaps improve their success rate.
Experiment 4 - Priming Token Propagation (Part 1): Figure 4.7 shows the success rate of
the adversary after delaying their attack when two hundred agents are in the initial marking.
As the initial marking of this net includes agents who are not subject to any behaviour change
element then the more the net is allowed to run, the more likely it is that the distribution of
agents are subject some behaviour change that is outside of the adversaries control. Therefore,
the use of no influence tokens and just waiting for some time increases the success rate. The
use of ten priming tokens shows a clear difference against the use of no influence tokens as
the success rate after 500 steps when using the priming tokens is 94.9% compared to 84%
when using no influences.
Experiment 4 - Priming Token Propagation (Part 2): Figure 4.8 shows the success rate of
the adversary after delaying their attack when one hundred agents are in the initial marking.
Initially, a wait of one hundred steps yields very little difference but as the adversary delays
more and more, the success rate improves significantly when using the priming token. It
shows the propagation that an influence token has throughout a system over time. We only
considered 1000 simulation runs here and at a delay of 800 the token has already propagated
enough to provide a 63% success rate for the adversary.
4.4.3 Combination of Influence Tokens (Test Case Experiments 5 & 6)
We have considered influence tokens independently, the separation between messenger and
priming has shown that sometimes it is better to use one token over another, or that investing
more in an influence token yields no further reward for an influencer. Furthermore, we have
considered the propagation of behaviour change elements in a system, one which considered
no influence and out of bounds for control of an influencer and the other where priming was
introduced and left to grow and propagate amongst agents.
Now, we will consider the combination of influence tokens, allowing the influencer to
have a range of priming and messenger tokens at their disposal to quantify the strength of
exploiting these tokens. We deploy two further experiments:
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Propagation: 100 Agents; 1 Tailgating Attempt;
No Influence Tokens
10 Priming Tokens
Figure 4.8 The priming token used in the running example compared to using no influence
tokens with only one attempt at tailgating. This shows the true power of the Priming token
when only one attempt at tailgating is provided. The success rate is proportional to the delay,
where, the longer the delay, the better the success rate.
5. This experiment will consider the combination of five priming and five messenger
tokens with no delay to identify the impact they have with a maximum of ten attempts
over a range of agents.
6. The last experiment will consider the same combination of influence tokens as experi-
ment 5, however, their will be a delay on the use of the messenger token to allow the
priming token to propagate where one hundred agents are present.
Experiment 5: The purpose of this experiment is to identify the impact of a combination
of influence tokens towards the success rate of an adversary. Figure 4.9 shows that the
combination of tokens yields a strong output for the lack of physical presence required by
the adversary. The combination only considers five attempts at tailgating where those five
attempts use the messenger token. Although the investment is in ten influence tokens, the
number of actual attempts to tailgate is reduced. As this is just a small example, we can see
the usefulness of combining influence tokens to reduce the overall effort for an adversary.
Looking back at Experiment 3, investing in more than five priming tokens where there is no
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Figure 4.9 The comparison of a combination of influence tokens with no delay against
singular and no influence tokens. The combination provides a slight increase to the success
rate of the adversary, especially when fewer agents are in the net.
delay did not yield a significant gain for the success rate.
Experiment 6: Figure 4.10 shows the impact of combining the influence tokens with a delay
and only considering five tailgating attempts. It compares against using five priming tokens
with five attempts at tailgating without any messenger tokens. The results show that the
priming tokens impact the most as the use of messenger when coupled with priming and a
delay does not provide a strong impact.
4.4.4 Test Case Experiments - Conclusion
The six experiments show the varying impact of influence tokens and how it might be better
at one point to use one token over another. For example, if the adversary is short on time,
then the best option would be to use the messenger token. If the adversary can wait, allowing
a priming token to propagate throughout the system would yield a greater success rate than
the messenger token. These experiments show the impact of influence tokens, the strength of
the messenger token and the propagation of the priming token. The adversary may have used
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Combination; 5 Tailgating Attempts; 100 agents;
Combination
Priming 5 Tokens
Figure 4.10 Combination of influence tokens when a delay is included, this shows the strength
of the Priming token and that with so many attempts, the adversary has a high success rate,
provided that they have delayed the attack for certain amount of time.
a priming token, but there is no guarantee that the agent they are tailgating is a direct result
of the prime that they distributed. This creates an element of risk for adversary, where they
are unsure about the compliance attitude of the agent.
These preliminary results from the experiment show that influence tokens alter the success
rate a considerable amount compared to using no influence tokens. It now opens the path to
allow us to consider other influence tokens. For example, the use of an Incentive token, which
intuitively, would be a token that an agent holds for some time until they choose to accept or
deny the incentive, where the output would be some positive or negative repercussions. A
contextual example of an incentive would be blackmail. Another example of an influence
which could be a token is Reciprocity where both adversary and agent mutually exchange
information, with the hope of the adversary getting the required information to further or
complete their attack [117].
In regards to the computation time, we managed to simulate the largest experiment, which
consisted of two hundred agents, ten influence tokens, ten tailgating attempts, simulated for
one thousand steps and the simulation ran one thousand times. The time for computation was
on average thirty five seconds on a windows machine with 8GB of RAM and an i7 processor.
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4.5 Influence Tokens: Validation
When we refer to Petri nets in this section we also refer to Coloured Petri nets, as an
unravelled Coloured Petri net is a Petri net.
4.5.1 Are Influence Tokens Subject to Diminishing Returns?
The modelling of influence tokens in this chapter has made certain assumptions about how
the behaviour of the tokens are formulated. For example, both the priming and messenger
instantiations as influence tokens had a consistent impact on an agent’s behaviour. However,
we know from literature in psychology that influences can have diminishing returns, such as
the impact of incentives towards consumer behaviour for purchasing products [102].
4.5.2 Petri nets Allow for Reachability and Deadlock Detection
When analysing any Petri net, properties about that Petri net can be quickly established which
are reachability and deadlock detection:
Reachability: We described reachability in Section 4.2.3 where we defined a reachability
graph that given an initial marking, the possible markings that can be reached. For the appli-
cation of influence tokens used by an adversary or a defender for that matter, reachability
allows for specific properties to be assessed. For example, assessment of whether or not all
agents are non-compliant towards a security policy would be a property of interest.
Deadlock Detection: When describing agent behaviour reflects artefacts of human be-
haviour, we would not expect to see a deadlock where agents cannot move or perform actions.
The validation a user
4.6 Influence Tokens: Conclusion
An adversary using influence tokens can improve their success rate through the impact of
an influence token, by exploiting the features of a specific influence token such as priming,
they can allow the token to propagate throughout the system to further improve the success
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rate. The key components of this chapter are (1) the notion of influence tokens which can
propagate, alter and impact a system, (2) the modelling of a social engineering scenario in
Coloured Petri nets where influence tokens are present, (3) the verification of the model to
ensure that properties such as reachability are satisfied, and (4) an analysis to consider a wide
variety of test cases allowing for an in depth look at influencing techniques.
The success rate of the adversary depends upon the influence tokens used, furthermore,
depending on when the adversary wishes to get inside the building, it may be better to use
the messenger token over priming. Of course, if a delay is possible, then priming becomes
the best choice if only one token is being used. These preliminary results provide us with the
foundation to consider other influence tokens and the impact those would have within more
complex scenarios.
For addressing Research Question 1, we have demonstrated that if the quantification
of the social influence is known, we can analyse its impact when considering compliance
attitudes, and furthermore, it would allow for the prediction of compliance attitudes evolving.
Currently, we have not validated this approach, as we do not know if the quantification used
in this chapter reflects the accuracy of social influences in the real world.
The key takeaway message from this chapter for the reader should be that social influences
can be captured through modelling techniques. The results themselves provide an illustration
of how propagation can improve the adversary’s success rate for entering the building,
however, assessing and understanding the necessary building blocks for a social influence
model is the foundation that this chapter provides.
The successes of this chapter reside in it’s focus on the representing the social influences.
By implementing them as their own colour, the analysis of propagation for the social
influences was intuitive and straightforward to perform. The model itself in CPNTools was
easy to execute and we recommend any repeat experiments to make use of the tool when it
comes to simulation and validation.
This chapter could be considered to be a stand alone chapter in the thesis as the modelling
aspects shift later on in the thesis. However, it is important to acknowledge that without this
piece of work we would not have the insights to build a more refined model focusing on
agent behaviour.
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A limitation of this chapter is that we did not identify any optimal costings for an
adversary. For example, it would be interesting to understand how many tokens an adversary
needs to distribute before it makes no difference for propagation. Should they distribute one
more token it does not improve their success rate. Answering a question such as the optimal
number of influence tokens would be a great contribution to this chapter.
Any insights towards understanding validation of this method is an area that we did not
improve on in this chapter. Improving confidence in a model that is designed to be faithful
toward human behaviour is crucial to ensuring it has any applicability in the real world.
Unfortunately, this chapter did not provide us any insight into validation techniques. Whilst
it was never the aim to validate within this chapter, we did hope that ideas or opportunities to
validate would appear, for example using real world data in the chapter.
The use of Coloured Petri nets allows for the behaviour of influence tokens to be demon-
strated but it does not force the use of Coloured Petri nets for influence tokens. One could
use other tools of implementation such as PRISM which is a probabilistic model checker to
model a Markov Decision Process or a Markov Chain [75]. However, the limitation of the
tool tends to be around the number of agents/people that can be represented. In a Markov
Decision Process or Markov Chain adding additional agents can be exponential and lead to
state explosion.
This choice to use Coloured Petri nets came from the appeal of the simulations offered
by the tool. The ability to formally represent our problem and run simulations consisting of
many agents can demonstrate the power of social influences.
We did include some validation, however, even a large number of tokens in CPNtools
would struggle to render a reachability graph. This is a limitation with our approach but we
are confident validating for a small number of tokens would provide confidence in the model
even when the number of tokens is increased and we can’t validate due to limited processing
power. This needs to be done cautiously and we feel that the example chosen was applicable
to provide that confidence through validation.
The next stages of this work should consider the optimality of an adversary and the
validation. By establishing how much investment an adversary requires we can begin to
understand what sort of defence mechanisms work. In parallel, improving the confidence in
the model through user validation is crucial to ensuring that this work can gain some traction.

Chapter 5
Building a Rule Based Model
This chapter addresses Research Question 2 by focusing on building a model which allows
for observations of compliance behaviours:
Research Question 2 (Cyclic Observational Behaviour). How do we model observations of
compliance behaviour?
If we consider breaking this research question down we can identify four key elements
for observing behaviour:
1. People must have some sort of context/beliefs in order to perform a behaviour [52].
We have defined this as the compliance attitude.
2. There is the actual behaviour that a person exhibits.
3. We know that behaviours can be observed by other people.
4. The observation of other peoples’ behaviour could cause a person’s compliance attitude
to change [33, 44, 43].
The research question is not trivial to address, as the people performing behaviours and
those observing are not static. They move and the neighbours of one person can easily change
as that person’s location changes. By dissecting the research question into four categories
we can then begin to address each category on its own. This allows for greater refinement
should the literature in the area change and we need to redesign a model.
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A model to express social influences towards compliance attitudes will touch on the notion
of behaviour change. Michie demonstrated that there are over 83 different types of behaviour
change models [83]. Unfortunately, these models offer no guidelines for dealing with the
complexity of different influences or interventions. In general, they tend to be focused at the
individual level. If we consider the COM-B Model, which is discussed in Chapter 2, then
applying it to our research question does not take into account a person’s location, who they
interact with or other conflicting interventions [82]. Furthermore, the compliance attitudes
of individuals is a variable which may be different for the many individuals. Assessing the
composition of these different attitudes with regards to their behaviours and social influences
towards others is something a behaviour change model does not cater for.
When we consider interactions that have complexity such as many people interacting
with each other, individuals moving locations and capturing social influences then a direct
comparison to the literature is the notion of Multi-Agent Systems [115]. A Multi Agent
System demonstrates a number of individually driven agents that are capable of interacting
with each other, sometimes this is to achieve a common goal. Often it’s the case that a Multi
Agent System is deterministic and the output of a Multi Agent System is strictly related to the
initial input. In Section 2.7 we provide some background research to Multi Agent Systems.
As with any system that comprises of agents or people, one starting point is to ask the
relevant questions. For this chapter, there are three we ask:
• What is required to build a system for human security behaviour?
• How do we formally describe how a human behaves and is socially influenced?
• What are the properties of such a system?
Chapter Overview: To the best of our knowledge there is no model that currently deals
with the complexity of social influences for many people and the effects this has on their
compliance attitudes. Therefore, this chapter addresses each of the questions in turn. In
section 5.1 we introduce the building blocks of our model. In Section 5.2, we describe the
formalisms of our model, we make use of operational semantics to describe our interactions.
We extend this description to cover adversarial behaviour in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we
address the properties of the system and what we can measure. The work reflects some of
the material from the publication in 2017 at DataMods: From Data to Models and Back [23].
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Figure 5.1 Multi Agent System: Overview of agent interaction.
5.1 Building a Cyclic Observational Agent Based Model
A socio-technical system is often used to describe a physical system where people are
described as agents [77]. The model we present is classified as a socio-technical system.
The building blocks for our model require that people can interact with each other and are
capable of executing actions in a representation of a physical environment.
5.1.1 Model Requirements
From here on in and for this chapter, we refer to an agent or agents when discussing human
behaviour. An agent within the model has a context, which is their internal state or their
compliance attitude. A similar concept is explained in the belief-desire-intention model,
where a belief shares similarities to a context [52]. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of how
we define the agents interactions. An agents context informs the actions they can execute and
actions influence the context of other agents. Traditionally, these are concepts from Multi
Agent System’s (Multi Agent Systems) and ABM (Agent Based Modelling). For our model
we have the following:
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• Action - Agents have the capability to execute actions which may or may not include
other agents.
• Observation - Agents can observe other agents actions and perceive what has hap-
pened.
• Context - Often referred to as beliefs, agents have internal metrics which guide their
actions [52].
• Behaviour change - An agent’s behaviour changes due to an influence of the observa-
tions they have witnessed.
• Location - Agents have a physical presence and can observe the actions of others who
are nearby.
Actions: An agent, which is similar to a process, has a series of actions they execute. Once
an agent executes an action, they still remain as the same agent [86]. Certain actions, much
like human behaviour can occur simultaneously. For example, an agent can both move
location and interact with another agent within one executable action. Depending upon the
context and location of an agent, specific actions for an agent may be restricted.
Observation: Actions performed by agents can be observed by other agents. An observation
is stored as part of the agent. Therefore, an agent builds up a unique trace of observed actions
as a system transitions.
Context: In its simplest form, the context of an agent drives the action they execute. These
actions can be observed which can modify the context of themselves or other agents. An
agent’s context and possible actions that have been modified is said to have had its behaviour
changed. Decisions to enforce or circumvent security policies are individual to each agent.
Typically, attitudes towards policies can be impacted by personality, past experiences and a
productivity trade-off, to name a few [14]. In this chapter we focus in on compliance attitudes
by means of altering the context of an agent.
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Behaviour Change: To influence an agents behaviour is to change it. An influence relies on
a psychological effect, such as the use of Messenger or Social Norms effects. We know that
humans are influenced with varying degrees of success. Therefore, not all agents will have
their behaviour changed due to an influence. We see this regularly in self influence towards
efficacy when people who have achieved more are able to motivate themselves more than
those who have achieved less [12]. It is common in phishing emails or social engineering
attacks to use an influence to effect a change of behaviour [87]. For an agent, a behaviour
change may result in different choices for actions when the opportunity for those actions is
presented.
Location: If an agent represents a person, then an observation of an agent action is one
person witnessing another do something. In order for an agent to observe, it must have a
physical location. An agent can’t observe another agents action when line of sight is not
present, unless aided by a third party device such as a camera. Some security policies rely
upon physical locations. For example, tailgating relies on locations are connected by some
entry system such as a door, corridor and so on. Furthermore, employees express unique
behaviours for moving between multiple locations. In recent work, it has been shown that
malicious insider behaviour can be detected using historical data from a building access
control system [31]. The data allows for suitable models to be learned surrounding movement
behaviour. Using such techniques, Hidden Markov Models have been successfully used to
predict with up to 92% accuracy, the next movement of someone given some historical data
[51]. The context of such work could allow for future models that we build to consider using
real data with predicted movements to have a better understanding of agent’s interactions
between locations.
5.2 Agent Based Model for Human Security Behaviour
In this section we introduce the formalism for our Rule Based Model. To motivate it, we use
a tailgating example taken from previous work [23]. This is a similar to the example used in
Chapter 4.
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Scenario 1. Agents arrive at the back of the workplace reception and there are two possibili-
ties. Firstly, if nobody is at the front of the reception, the agent must progress to the front
of the reception. Secondly, and dependent upon the agents security preference (usable or
secure), if less than five agents are at the front of reception and about to enter, and the newly
arrived agent is usable, they will attempt to tailgate. A perfectly secure agent will never
attempt to tailgate. If an agent is being tailgated, they can either permit or deny the action,
where a permit would allow both agents into the main building, a deny would force the
tailgater to the front of the reception. A perfectly usable agent will always permit tailgating,
a secure agent will deny tailgating.
We now introduce the model incrementally and build up the rules to demonstrate how
agents interact with each other.
5.2.1 Location Based Agents
Agents exist in a physical space and can move between locations. As an agent moves between
locations, they are associated with a context.
Definition 6 (Location Based Agents). Given a set of agents A, a set of locations L, and a set
of contexts C, we define the set of location agents as LA =C×L. We define a state of location
based agents LBA as a set of pairs {(a1, ls1), . . . ,(an, lsn)} where ai ∈ A and lsi ∈ LA
Definition 7 (Location based Actions). Given an agent a and two locations l and l′, a
location based action is defined as m(a, l, l′), indicating that a moved from l to l′. A location
based action does not modify the context of the agent.
In general, there could be many different ways to capture the concrete set of location
based actions in a system, for instance by going through the actual logs of a smart card
system. For the sake of simplicity, we consider here a set of links Link ⊆ L×L where (l1, l2)
indicates a physical link between the location l1 and l2. Intuitively speaking, any agent can
move from a location to another as long as there is a link between them. We characterise this
with the following rule:
(l, l′) ∈ Link
(a,(c, l))
m(a,l,l′)−−−−−→ (a,(c, l′)) (5.1)
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The action 5.1 is defined as an inference rule at the atomic level expressing that one agent
moves from one location to another, provided the two locations are connected. In general,
we write (a1,(c1, l1)) | . . .(an,(cn, ln)) for a set of location based agents. We utilise Rule 5.1
in Rule 5.2 to express how an agent can move with respect to all other agents.
(a,(c, l))
m(a,l,l′)−−−−−→ (a,(c, l′))
(a,(c, l)) | LBA m(a,l,l
′)−−−−−→ (a,(c, l′)) | LBA (5.2)
Let us consider that a context of an agent refers to their security preference, where a
preference is simply usable or secure. To be usable is to permit a breach of a security policy,
to be secure is to deny a breach of a security policy. Whilst it is not the case that an agent
is usable or just secure, for now, we use these polar opposites to express our model. In the
tailgating scenario, a breach of the policy would be an agent permitting tailgating.
We introduce two actions, tgp(a1,a2, l, l′) and tgd(a1,a2, l, l′), indicating that a1 tailgated
a2, and that a2 denied a tailgate from a1, respectively. Intuitively speaking, a usable agent is
permitted as they tailgate a usable agent. A usable agent is denied as they tailgate a secure
agent. Formally:
(a1,(c1, l))
m(a1,l,l′)−−−−−→ (a1,(c1, l′)) (a2,(c2, l))
m(a2,l,l′)−−−−−→ (a2,(c2, l′)) c1 = c2 = usable
(a1,(c1, l)),(a2,(c2, l)) | LBA
tgp(a1,a2,l,l′)−−−−−−−−→ (a1,(c1, l′)),(a2,(c2, l′)) | LBA
(5.3)
(a2,(c2, l))
m(a2,l,l′)−−−−−→ (a2,(c2, l′)) c1 = usable c2 = secure
(a1,(c1, l)),(a2,(c2, l)) | LBA
tgd(a1,a2,l,l′)−−−−−−−−→ (a1,(c1, l)),(a2,(c2, l′)) | LBA (5.4)
The rules introduced so far explain how agents with a context move between locations.
They can either just move, or they can tailgate and be permitted or denied. A permit moves
them into the tailgated location, the denied leaves an agent in the same location before the
action occurred.
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5.2.2 Observing Agents
In an organisation, when an action happens, people may notice. In our example, this translates
to agents observing the compliance behaviour of other agents. Much like in the workplace, if
someone is challenged for tailgating, people within close proximity will notice. One report
recorded that users security sensitivity for other peoples security behaviour was prominent in
a working environment [39]. We know that people have security awareness in the workplace,
particularly when policies are regularly followed [39].
We began with Location Based Agents, where the interactions of agents are restricted
by physical locations and the security preference of each agent. We extend this notion and
introduce Observing Agents:
Definition 8 (Observing Agents). We define SOA = C×L×P(Θ) as the set of observing
agents states where C is the set of contexts, L is the set of Locations and Θ ⊆ A×Actθ . We
introduce a set of observable actions Actθ , where any act ∈ Actθ can be observed by an
agent.
Definition 9 (System State). Given a set of agents A, a set of observing agents state
SOA, the set of states are ∆ = {δ1,δ2, ...,δn}, a state δ of the system is a set of pairs
{(a1,s1), . . . ,(an,sn)} where ai ∈ A and si ∈ SOA and:
∀a ∈ A,∃s ∈ SOA,(a,s) ∈ δ ∧ ((a,s) ∈ δ ∧ (a,s′) ∈ δ =⇒ s = s′)
The above states that for any agent (a,s) ∈ δ , there will not be another agent (a,s′) ∈ δ
where the agent id a is the same and the state of the observing agent s is different. Essentially,
we don’t want to duplicate an agent with the same identifier.
Let us consider that Actθ = {permit,deny}, which refers to the permitting or denying
of tailgating. An observing agent during the course of their interactions, may accumulate
observations of other agents permitting or denying tailgating. As it is currently defined, an
agent can only observe and store one observation for each agent. At the atomic level, an
inference rule for an observation would take the form:
(a,(c, l,Θa))
obs(θ)−−−−→ (a,(c, l,Θ′a ∪θ)) (5.5)
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Intuitively, an agent a1 with the action obs(a2, permit) would indicate that they have
observed a2 permitting tailgating.
For an agent observing a particular act, such as tailgating, we must consider all agents in
the observable area. We provide the following definition:
loc : SOA → LA
loc(c, l,θa) = (c, l)
Therefore, the observable actions for tailgating are as follows:
(a1,(c1, l,Θa1))
obs(a2,permit)−−−−−−−−→ (a1,(c1, l,Θa1 ∪ (a2, permit)))
∀(a′,(c′, l,Θ′a)) ∈ δ ⇒ (a′,(c′, l,Θ′a))










obs(a2,deny)−−−−−−−→ (a1,(c1, l,Θa1 ∪ (a2,deny))
∀(a′,(c′, l,Θ′a)) ∈ δ ⇒ (a′,(c′, l,Θ′a))









The rule in Equation 5.6 consists of three layers. The bottom layer states how the two
agents a1 and a2 are engaged in the previously defined action tgp(a1,a2, l, l′, permit) which
states that a1 tailgated a2, so a2 is the agent who permitted the action. The middle layer
describes how this occurs with respect to all agents. Finally, the top layer describes how
agents who are in the same location as the action will observe the action and update their set
of observable actions. This is then repeated for the rule in Equation 5.7, however, it is for the
action of denying tailgating.
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5.2.3 Behaviour Change Agents
The concept of behaviour change as a body of research contains many different models.
Not all of the models are fit for our purpose. However, the COM-B model splits behaviour
change into three elements; Capabilities, Opportunities and Motivation [82]. In this chapter,
we focus on the aspect of Motivation, which can be changed by influencing effects. Such
effects as Messenger and Social Norms are of interest to us [44]. The former relates to those
people/agents we perceive to be in a position of authority, the latter is all about those people
around us in our immediate vicinity [33]. For more background on these topics look at
Chapter 2 where discuss them in more detail.
In our model, a behaviour change would be a change of context. A secure agent can




bchange(c′)−−−−−−−→ (a,(c′, l,{})) (5.8)
In the previous chapter we used messenger and priming which was targeted towards an
adversary exploiting agents that were susceptible to an influence. In this chapter, the scenario
allows for agents to enter multiple times and this provides a notion of social norms whereby
agents become culturally defined with how to behave. This is different to priming in the
previous chapter where the adversary pro-actively sought to prime agents for tailgating. To
the best of our knowledge, for the influencing effects Messenger and Social Norms there does
not exist a strategy to quantify formally these effects. Unsurprisingly, an effect is unique to
each agent. Nevertheless, we provide a definition to demonstrate how we have interpreted it:
Definition 10 (Influencing Agents). The set IA ⊆ A×A captures Influencing Agents, where
any (a,a′) ∈ IA indicates that a′ can influence a and a ̸= a′.
The influencing agents is for the purpose of defining inference rules for the messenger
effect. The following rules capture this:
(a,(c, l,Θa))
bchange(usable)−−−−−−−−−→ (a,(c′, l,Θa)) (∃(a′, permit) ∈ Θa ∧ (a,a′) ∈ IA)
(a,(c, l,Θa))|δ
messP(usable)−−−−−−−−→ (a,(c′, l,Θa))|δ (5.9)
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(a,(c, l,Θa))
bchange(secure)−−−−−−−−−→ (a,(c′, l,Θa)) (∃(a′,deny) ∈ Θa ∧ (a,a′) ∈ IA)
(a,(c, l,Θa))|δ
messD(secure)−−−−−−−−→ (a,(c′, l,Θa))|δ (5.10)
For social norms, we care about the number of agents that have been observed for a
particular action. Given a set of observations, we can establish how many agents have been
observed performing a particular action. This is then a different interpretation of how an
agent can be influenced due to the observations they have made. Instead of it relying on the
agent observed performing the action, the influence is the number of times the action has
been observed, regardless of the agent who performed it.
5.3 The Adversary
Defining an adversary in this rule based model is done by isolating one agent to take the role
of the adversary. We use adv as the agent id to specify that the agent takes on the role of
adversary.
5.3.1 Influencing Adversary
Where as the previous rules defined were general rules for all agents, for the adversary, we
define specific rules. We define an influencing adversary that has the power to change another
agents context:
ladv = l1 ∧adv ̸= a
(adv,(c, ladv,Θadv))(a,(c1, l1,Θa))|δ
inf(usable)−−−−−−→ (adv,(c, ladv,Θadv))(a,(usable, l,Θa))|δ
(5.11)
For Rule 5.11, it states that an adversary agent labelled as adv can influence another
agents context to be usable providing both the adversary and agent are in the same location.
In this chapter we don’t explore the adversary beyond the assessment of properties, however,
for future work it would be useful to understand how the influence tokens methodology from
Chapter 4 aligns with the model defined in this chapter.
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5.4 Rule Based Model: Properties
Traditionally, a security property is often associated with a set of protocol actions. For
example, Perfect Forward Secrecy is a security property commonly associated with com-
munication protocols, such as the TLS protocol [38]. In access control, the properties of
a model are related to the policies, such that an access request to protected resources or a
physical area is evaluated with regards to that policy [37]. An associated property for access
control would be to ensure that only authorised access requests are permitted.
In a socio-technical system, a physical security property is associated with a breach of
a policy. Whilst our model is not a socio-technical system a physical security property for
a policy breach would be an unauthorised agent entering the building (In the example of
tailgating). This can occur in many different settings, to list a few:
1. An unauthorised employee tailgates an authorised employee.
2. An adversary tailgates an authorised employee.
3. An adversary authorises themselves and enters - In our scenario this would not occur
as the adversary has no capability to authorise themselves. In reality this could be
achieved by taking/cloning a smart card to enter an access controlled building.
5.4.1 Formalisation of Security Properties
Establishing the validity of a security property can sometimes be captured as a reachability
problem. We wish to know, given some initial state, if another state where a property is
always true or eventually true can be reached where the conditions for that property have
been satisfied or maintained. For example, will a state exist where all agents would comply
with a security policy (i.e. it is a secure state).
In the model, a state represents all of the internal states of all agents. These internal states
include the context, location and observations of agents. Table 5.1 is an example of how a
state is defined for agents.
Definition 11 (Transition Relation). A transition τ =(δ ,δ ′) where δ ∈∆ and δ ′ ∈∆ indicates
that a state change from δ to δ ′ can occur, a transition relation is therefore, defined as
T ⊆ δ ×δ .
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Table 5.1 Rule Based Model: Internal States of agents
A δ0









alice (secure, inside, /0) (secure, inside, /0) (secure,hall, /0)
bob (usable,outside, /0) (usable, inside, /0) (usable,hall,(alice,p))
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
eve (secure,hall, /0) (secure,hall, /0) (usable,hall,(alice,p))
Table 5.2 is an example of state transition, where in this example, the agents alice and
bob eventually move into the location hall and in τ ′, we see that the observation (alice,p) was
acquired for alice,bob and eve. The observation alice,p refers to the agent alice permitting
tailgating, and as a result, the agent eve has their context changed to usable.
As part of our design we have elected to include actions, observations and behaviour
changes as one transition. We do this to avoid any obvious problems such as the ordering
of transitions, for example, should an observation occur before or after an action which
increases the complexity of the model.
Definition 12 (Model ). A model M = (∆,T,δ0, IA,L) where δ0 ∈ ∆ is the initial state of the
system.
The model dictates how the compliance attitude (context) of the agents and their behaviour
evolves. Let us consider some examples of how a system can evolve dependent upon the
constraints placed upon it. We consider three different models that are slightly differentiated
by the configuration of the influencing agents. Let us consider a set of fixed locations.
L= {(outside, inside),(inside,outside),(inside,hall),(hall, inside)} (5.12)
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alice (secure,hall, /0) (secure,hall, /0) (secure,hall,(eve,p))
bob (secure,outside, /0) (secure, inside, /0) (usable,hall,(eve, tgp))




(secure, inside, /0) (secure, inside, /0) (secure,hall, /0)
(usable,hall, /0) (usable,hall, /0) (usable,hall, /0)




(secure, inside, /0) (secure, inside, /0) (usable, inside, /0)
(usable,hall, /0) (usable,hall, /0) (usable, inside, /0)
(secure, inside, /0) (secure, inside, /0) (secure,hall, /0)
τ9−→ δ9
τ10−→ δ10
(secure, inside, /0) (usable,hall,(bob, tgp))
(usable, inside, /0) (usable,hall, /0)
(secure,hall, /0) (secure,hall,(bob,p))
Example 1: Cyclic Influencing
Consider the set of influencing agents in this example to be:
IA1 = {(bob,eve),(eve,alice),(alice,bob)}
The current set IA1 states that eve,alice and bob can influence bob,alice and eve respectively.
Given this set of influencers and set of rules governing how agents tailgate and challenge
each other then the collective compliance attitudes of the agents can be cyclic if the correct
transitions occur. Table 5.3, which was computed manually demonstrates how even agents
can influence each other. For the purposes of this example, we have introduced a new rule
for agents that usable who convince others to act insecurely and tailgate behind them1.
1This is why bob can tailgate eve in τ2
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alice (usable, inside, /0) (usable, inside, /0) (usable,hall, /0)
bob (secure, inside, /0) (secure,hall,(alice,p)) (usable,hall, /0
eve (secure,outside, /0) (secure,outside, /0) (secure, inside, /0)
τ3−→ δ3
τ4−→ δ4
(usable,hall, /0) (usable,hall, /0)
(usable, inside, /0) (usable,hall, /0)
(secure, inside, /0) (usable,hall,(bob,p))
Example 2: Influence by Propagation
Consider the set of influencing agents in this example to be:
IA2 = {(bob,alice),(eve,bob)}
The current set IA2 states that alice and bob can influence bob and eve respectively. By
this configuration of influencers, the agent alice can influence the agent eve by propagation.
Table 5.4 provides an example to demonstrate how this influence can propagate from the
agent alice.
5.4.2 Example 3: Influence by Observation
Consider the set of influencing agents in this example to be:
IA3 = {(bob,alice),(eve,alice)}
The current set IA3 states that alice can influence both bob and eve. By this configuration of
influencers, the agent alice can influence by observation the agents bob and eve. Table 5.5
provides an example to demonstrate how this influence can be observed from the agent alice.
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Table 5.5 Influence by Observation - Agent alice influencing eve by observation.
OA0 δ0
τ1−→ δ1
alice (secure, inside, /0) (secure,hall, /0)
bob (usable, inside, /0) (secure, inside,(alice, tgd))
eve (usable, inside, /0) (secure, inside,(alice,d))
5.4.3 Computation Tree Logic
A transition of tgp ∈ T where tgp= (δ ,δ ′) is an example of how a model can change state.
We have defined these as rules and expressed them as δ
tgp−−→ δ ′.
Given a Model M, we use CTL (Computation Tree Logic) to define our security properties
[55]. In CTL we define φ which is a state formula. These formulas in logic form are
represented by Backus-Naur form:
φ ::=⊥|⊤|p|(¬φ)|(φ ∧φ)|(φ ∨φ)|(φ ⇒ φ)|(φ ⇔ φ)
|AXφ |EXφ |AFφ |EFφ |AGφ |A[φUφ ]|E[φUφ ]
(5.13)
The logical operators in CTL are the usual ones of ¬,∨,∧,⇒ and ⇔. Additionally, CTL
formulas make use of boolean constants true and false.
The temporal quantifier operators are the following when evaluating all paths:
• Aφ - All: The condition φ has to hold on all paths starting from the current state.
• Eφ - Exists: There exists a minimum of one path starting from the current state where
φ holds.
In CTL, it is useful to assess a specific path, in which case we use the following:
• Xφ - Next: The condition φ has to hold at the next state.
• Gφ - Globally: The condition φ has to on the entire subsequent path.
• Fφ - Finally: At some point on the subsequent path, the condition φ has to hold.
• φUψ - Until: φ has to hold at least until at some state ψ is true.
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• φWψ - Weak Until: φ has to hold until ψ holds.
Given these definitions, we construct security properties for our example.
Property 1. Weak Unauthorised Entry: "Is it possible from an initial state δ0 ∈ ∆, such that
another state can be reached where an unauthorised employee has tailgated an authorised
employee?" This property is expressed as the following:
P1 ::= F [∃(a,(c, l,Θ)).(a,(c, l,Θ))∧ ((a,p) ∈ Θ)] (5.14)
Property 2. Strong Unauthorised Entry: "Is it possible from an initial state δ0 ∈ ∆, such
that another state can be reached where an adversary has tailgated an authorised employee?"
This property is expressed as the following:
P2 ::= F [∃(a,(c, l,Θ)).(adv,(c, l,Θ))∧ ((adv,p) ∈ Θ)] (5.15)
Property 3. Exploited Authorised Entry: "Is it possible from an initial state δ0 ∈ ∆, such
that another state can be reached where an adversary has entered as an authorised person?"
This property is expressed as the following:
P3 ::= F [∃(a,(c, l,Θ)).(adv,(c, l,Θ))∧ ((adv,p) /∈ Θ)∧ (l = inside)] (5.16)
The three properties P1, P2 and P3 are focusing on the possibility that the property is
violated, i.e. it returns true. One would expect that if P2 is true then P1 must also be true,
however, it may be the case that only one agent exists that permits tailgating. If this was the
case, P1 would evaluate to false.
5.5 Rule Based Model: Validation
5.5.1 The Model Does Not Express the Ordering of Agent Actions
We do not explicitly state that the model is non-deterministic for selecting which agent
will perform an action. However, in Chapters 6 and 8 we utilise the model in simulation
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and use an engine known as SysModels which deals with action selection for human based
agents [27].
5.5.2 The Model Does Capture Agents Observing Other Agents
The model captures agents observing other agents, which addresses the research question
in this chapter. The framework of an agent that observes an action of another agent which
impacts their context and a deterministic behaviour change policy dictates their actions post
observation.
5.5.3 A Context is Not a True Representation of a Person’s Internal
State
The context in this chapter is the compliance attitude that we refer to in the rest of the thesis.
We discuss in Section 2.3 that the compliance attitude is not trivial and can be impacted by
many different vectors. For example, the COM-B model of behaviour change demonstrates
that a person’s behaviour can be changed by their interactions with others, their environment
that surrounds them and their abilities to perform tasks [82].
In this chapter we defined a binary context for agents which does not reflect reality,
however, it was all that was needed to express our model for an observational based multi
agent system.
5.6 Rule Based Model: Conclusion
In this chapter we have compartmentalised the different elements for observing a behaviour.
By defining a rule based model we have split the research question of observing behaviours
into actions, observations, context and behaviour change. At the beginning of the chapter we
posed three questions which were:
• What is required to build a system for human security behaviour?
• How do we formally describe how a human behaves and is socially influenced?
• What are the properties of such a system?
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Firstly, for the what is required to build a system for human security behaviour we
addressed the concept of compliance towards security policies. By given a state of an agent’s
compliance status, it informed there compliance behaviour. Secondly, we formally describe
how a human behaves and is socially influenced by means of the rules outlined in this
chapter. We have offered no means of validation in this chapter that it is a true reflection
of reality. Instead we compartmentalised different aspects of human behaviour into actions,
observations, context and a behaviour policy as depicted in Figure 5.1. Thirdly, we addressed
the properties that such a system could express such as cyclic influencing where multiple
contradictory social influences co-exist. We also considered influence by propagation which
was a core aspect of Chapter 4.
We have addressed Research Question 2 by designing a model allowing for human agents
to observe the behaviour of others. In particular, the model allows human agents to be
dynamic and move location which is an important requirement for the overall aim of this
thesis. This chapter will be used later on to form the basis of the model for Chapters 5 and 7.
It will provide the building blocks necessary to create a model that we will use in simulations.
Furthermore, we will then extend the model slightly as we implement in a tool called PCASP
which provides a usable method for utilising this formal model.
The separation into the four elements of action, observation, context and behaviour
change ensures that each element can be improved individually as the literature evolves. It
then allows for the Multi Agent System to be composed by each element which has been
designed to be as faithful as possible to the current state of the literature.
The decisions for those four elements of action, observation, context and behaviour is
partly captured in the remarks in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Particularly remarks 1 and 2 which
focus on compliance attitude and compliance behaviour. Our research into the state of the
literature created those remarks which we have demonstrated with our modelling approach.
Of course, there are areas which would require refinement, but one of the purposes of each of
the chapters within this thesis is to provide proof of concepts. To the best of our knowledge
there exists little research into this area and we must start have some ground to build our
proof of concepts on.
A key insight of this chapter is the fundamental modelling aspects that were chosen.
Those aspects are action, observation, context and behaviour policy to capture an agent’s
88 Building a Rule Based Model
nature. The relationship between action and observation is crucial to ensuring that an agent’s
context can be influenced by their behaviour policy.
The manual traces defined earlier in this chapter demonstrated that two conflicting
influences could co-exist in the same system. Whilst it may be possible for these to both
exist in one agent, we did not explore that option of uncertainty.
The successes of this chapter remain in those modelling aspects where we can clearly
demonstrate how an agent’s behaviour can be influenced by the observations they make of
other agents. Without this relationship this chapter would not be relevant to the thesis as
that was the research question we identified at the beginning of the thesis. We phrased this
as How do we model observations of compliance behaviour? and by ensuring a model can
capture observations we ensured that we could create a model that represented influencing
behaviour.
A clear limitation is the extent to which the behaviour policy reflects human nature. We
understand that a person does not have a policy stating that if they observe an action multiple
times contrary to their belief, they will then change their belief. We know this isn’t always
the case as some people may use the perceived incorrect actions of others to validate their
own beliefs. For example, observing a robbery would not always influence a person to steal,
one would hope it would be the latter and that it would re-enforce their belief that stealing is
not in their nature.
In this chapter we never addressed or managed to solve the problem of agent sequencing.
For example, which agent should go first was something we did not address or solve. Even
after doing the work it is still not clear how to resolve this issue.
In the future for this work, it should address correctness and completeness. Without this,
any model would be lacking confidence and trust.
For the correctness, there is validation and verification. Firstly, does the model reflect
the real world elements it is trying to replicate. Secondly, does the model behave in the way
it’s supposed too with regards to those elements. For example, we would not want to see an
agent’s behaviour change without any observations, unless we are considering an ambivalent
agent.
For the completeness, we would like to understand if we have captured all of the necessary
elements. For example, does the behaviour policy have elements which are missing? Most
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likely because we use a very simplified approach in this thesis. Providing that completeness
will allow us certainty to know that the elements we are representing is the complete set and
nothing more.
By ensuring completeness and correctness in this manner we can have certainty that this
top layer model is faithful to the real world. Furthermore, we would not risk and errors being
transitioned to implementations of this model, which is likely in it’s current state for the
tooling and user experiments we discuss later in the thesis.

Chapter 6
Learning Decision Trees from Synthetic
Human Behaviour
In the other chapters of this thesis we work on building and validating models expressing
social influences towards compliance behaviour of security policies. Whilst this chapter does
still build a model, the direction is focused on assessing the output/traces that the behavioural
models are capable of generating. Furthermore, if we can provide a basis for understanding
and successfully analysis synthetic data then we have more reliability should we ever gather
real world data. The chapter addresses Research Question 3, as a reminder the research
question is:
Research Question 3 (Security Behaviour Profiling). Can we accurately learn compliance
attitudes from public traces of compliance behaviours?
The hidden information being the compliance attitudes would provide motivation for
agent’s publicly observable behaviours with regards to security policies. The marker we
target in this chapter is an agent’s compliance attitude towards their compliance behaviour.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates how someone monitoring their employees’ behaviour could only
ever observe public behaviours. Private compliance attitudes is the hidden information that
we aim to identify based off the public compliance behaviours we observe.
One method of assessing the compliance attitudes of agents is to watch their behaviour.
This behaviour could come in one of two forms. We could build a classifier from actual
traces observed within an organisation. This can be costly and time-consuming and it can be
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Compliance Attitude = ?
BP
Observing
Figure 6.1 Lack of knowledge for compliance attitudes.
difficult to select the best classifier, e.g. which is the best attributes to classify on. This would
require some form of surveillance and monitoring equipment to record how agents behave.
In a recent study, researchers observed via CCTV people entering a building where a secure
door was replaced with a turnstile. Over 1800 sequences of behaviour events were logged
over one working day for approximately 600 employees and visitors where they calculated
the individual cost of security placed upon employees [28]. In this chapter, we perform a
methodical assessment of decision trees to predict the impact of human behaviour on the
security of an organisation, by learning them from different sets of traces generated by the
rule based model defined in Chapter 5. The simulation used to generate the traces allows
agent behaviour to be distributed by time, that is, agent synchronisation is not deterministic.
Chapter Overview: This chapter is inspired by work carried out in the research paper
submitted to DataMods: From Data to Models and Back [23]. We generate synthetic data
from a simulation environment using the rule based model defined in Chapter 5. We then
assess the accuracy of the decision trees models towards identifying hidden markers which
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we deemed as the compliance attitude. In this chapter, the compliance attitude is considered
to be binary, i.e. 0 or 1.
6.1 Building Synthetic Traces
In this chapter we make use of synthetic traces that are based on the model from Chapter 5.
The previously defined rule based model which focused on actions and observations provides
a base in this chapter for us to define a parameterised instantiation of said model where
agents perform actions and make observations.
We don’t use a real world data set for two reasons. Firstly, we could not find a data set
which is suitable to represent the model we proposed. Secondly, because it is not yet clear
how we could capture all of the information that we would need in order to build a reliable
data-set. For example, uncertainty will be present in the compliance attitudes of people and
this lack of information would find it’s way into the data set.
We now provide two subsections to support building synthetic traces. The first is a
discussion on the uncertainty of compliance attitudes. The second is on the methodology
used to build the synthetic traces.
6.1.1 Compliance Attitude Uncertainty
Within an organisation, a global compliance attitude exists for how individuals and groups
respond to security incidents. Depending on the type of security incident and those involved,
it could become a security violation or it could be prevented. We hope that individuals trained
to perform tasks are security aware, but we regularly find that they circumvent organisational
security policies [16].
Consider working with a company for a short period of time in order to identify the
compliance attitudes of employees. We could ask them, where responses from interviews
have led to popular theories such as the compliance budget [15]. Of course, respondents
could lie, answer honestly but not behave consistently, or even fail to acknowledge that their
behaviour is insecure.
Even if survey respondents answer honestly, it does not mean that this holds for the future.
A secure employee interacting with a usable (non-secure) employee may be influenced
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towards usable behaviours, creating an insecure compliance attitude. Of course, this is
bi-directional where secure behaviour could inform more secure behaviour.
From an organisation’s perspective, they only have so many tools to establish the global
compliance attitude. For example, they could interview employees, then manually ob-
serve them via CCTV recordings to establish if their compliance attitudes matches their
behaviour [28]. This is of course, costly and time consuming, where we would need to
manually record the exact behaviour of each employee.
To add further complexity to the uncertainty of a global compliance attitude, someone
who is secure may make a judgement of error causing a security incident. For example, Zhu
et. al. showed they could get more information from people simply by providing them with
information up front, exploiting a concept known as reciprocity where people who believed
they were generally secure acted in an insecure manner [117]. They were able to influence
people to sacrifice more information than they would usually part with.
The global compliance attitude of a company can be changed, for example, via training
employees [100]. This behaviour change impacts how people respond to security incidents,
for example a recently trained employee may have more awareness for spear phishing emails,
and is less likely to click suspicious links.
6.1.2 Implementing to Build Synthetic Traces
We manually coded rules based on the model in Chapter 5 in the language Julia. We used
the Sysmodels package which provided a management tool for deciding when agents would
perform actions and so on [30, 27]. The model in Chapter 5 provides no basis for ordering
agent’s behaviour, as such we used a library in Julia to do this for us. It does raise the question
that a different library or controller for action sequences would produce different outcomes.
However, this is not in the scope of the work for now and could lend itself to future work.
We added parameterisation to the agent’s profiles to model a range of situations. We
introduce and discuss these parameters in this chapter in 6.3.1.
In the future we would desire a tool which would automatically build a model and
transform the rules defined in Chapter 5.
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6.2 What Can We Learn?
An organisation observes employee behaviour and accumulates information about security
incidents. Using this data, the organisation wants to learn the compliance attitudes of
employees. One possible solution is machine learning.
The data generated from observing employees forms a trace, where an entry in a trace
describes who did what and when. It is similar to an intrusion detection system, where the
logs of what happened are the entries, a collection of logs/entries forms a trace. The problem
is, given a trace of interactions, can we use machine learning techniques to correctly identify
the compliance attitudes of agents?
Table 6.1 Example Trace of Agents: A collection of entries forming a number of violations
and preventions for four agents. Each agent is accompanied with a known compliance
attitude.
Agent Violations Preventions compliance attitudes
Alice 4 1 Usable
Bob 2 3 Secure
Charlie 1 0 Usable
Dan 2 5 Secure
Let us consider a simple example, where an agent’s compliance attitude can be usable
or secure. A usable agent is more likely not to follow a policy, whereas a secure agent is
more likely to follow the policy. Table 6.1 lists four agents, the number of violations and
preventions for a policy and their compliance attitudes. Given this data, the Decision Tree in
Figure 6.2 can be formed. It is deterministic and will resolve to a value of usable or secure
dependent on the entry being evaluated. In this case, an entry is the log of violations and
preventions for an agent. The decision returned is the classification for an agent’s compliance
attitudes.
Table 6.1 is a small sample, however, an accurate tree has been learned in python using
a machine learning algorithm with 100% accuracy for the training data1. A decision tree
offers predictive power and, given an agent with some information, we wish to predict their
compliance attitude. This is complex, as the decision tree from Figure 6.2 can be easily
1For more of a background on decision trees, refer to Chapter 2.











Figure 6.2 Learned Decision Tree from the data in Table 6.1. A diamond is a decision point,
an oval is a decision.
fooled. For example, an agent with ten preventions and five violations will return as usable,
even though they have acted securely for the majority of the time.
Establishing which features to consider could provide meaningful results for observing
the global compliance attitude of employees in an organisation. Unfortunately, the problem is
of greater complexity than what we identify here, as human behaviour is complex in itself and
leads us to the previously introduced research question can we accurately learn compliance
attitudes from public traces of compliance behaviours?
6.3 Multi Agent System - Simulation
We provide traces of agent’s behaviour which is simulated on the semantics of the model
described in Chapter 4. We provide further details of the simulation as a tool PCASP in
Chapter 7. For now, it’s important to know that traces of agent behaviour can be generated
for the purpose of assessment via decision trees.
The use of rules for transitions are explained in Chapter 5. For clarification, we ac-
knowledge that at times, certain rules within the system can be executed asynchronously.
For example, choosing which agent will move location. In the case of two similar rules
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conflicting with each other, we let the simulation use a random number generator to address
this.
6.3.1 Model Parameters
We need to generate traces from a behavioural model in order to assess the accuracy of
decision trees. The model and example we used is the one described in Chapter 5. As a
reminder, Scenario 1 focuses on tailgating and the compliance attitudes of agents towards
tailgating.
For the simulation, we reflect behaviours and attributes that we know exist. We understand
that, whilst we will not have a model that truly reflects human behaviour, we at least can
parameterise concepts that we know exist from the literature. Our parameters are as follows:
• p1: Expected Arrival Rate - Agents arrive stochastically to the workplace reception,
the arrival rate follows a normal distribution, agents can arrive at any point within
some bounds. For example, if a start time for work is 9AM, we might expect some
agents to turn up early, just before, just after, late or precisely on time. The value of
this is implemented as an integer based on a probability density function where agents
all arrive within one hour of each other.
• p2: Probabilistic Decision - Assumptions have been made towards individuals as being
homo economicus, where we make decisions based on personal gain or internal heuris-
tics for guiding behaviour which look to maximise some reward [48]. Additionally,
each day, experience is slightly different and for an agent, this could be the difference
between a secure agent acting usable and vice versa, which is what we capture with our
probabilistic decision, the ability for agents to act against their compliance attitudes
[105]. The value for this is set at 0.8 for secure agents and 0.2 for usable agents
respectively. We have no grounding for these values.
• p3: Social Norms Influence - Social proof, where individuals assume the actions of
those they have observed in order to reflect the interpreted cultural norms is apparent
in many societies [95]. This is a boolean which is either true of false.
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• p4: Messenger Influence - Authority, is influencing by social/professional status, those
we perceive to be in a position of power or responsibility can influence our behaviours
[43, 33]. This is a boolean which is either true or false.
• p5: Personality - Different personalities react differently to the same influences. We
implement personality traits for agents as a string to refer to which personality, each
personality is then subject to different influences:
1. Conscientiousness - influenced by Messenger.
2. Agreeableness - influenced by Social Norms and Messenger.
3. Extroversion - influenced by Social Norms [109].
In a model, there is a distinct set of actions and observations recorded for agents. A trace
generated from a model records agents moving between locations, tailgating being permitted
or denied, agents successfully tailgating, agents failing to tailgate and agents observing
tailgating being permitted or denied. This is all public information, the private information,
such as the model parameters and agent contexts are not in a trace. A trace does not contain
information such as if an agent can be influenced. The trace does not contain information
such as the compliance attitude of the agent, which in this case is the hidden marker that we
wish to observe from the publicly available information.
In Chapter 5 we did not discuss or introduce the notion of an expected arrival rate, a
probabilistic decision and a personality. However, the implementation allowed us freedom to
test these different parameters which we believe are crucial to capturing human behaviour.
It does mean that the model from 5 has a lot of scope for future work by considering these
potential avenues. We only provide a snapshot of what needs to be done for each parameter
and it is at a very high level. Each of these parameters would require a significant amount of
time and investment to replicate something that could be comparable to a real world data set.
6.3.2 Assessment Methodology
We define a model with a set of parameters such that each model contains a different set of
parameters. However, the initial state of each model is identical in terms of agent context
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and agent location. We then run a number of simulations for each model and generate a trace
for each simulation run. A model will therefore, be associated with many traces.
A trace contains the number of entries equal to the number of agents, where an entry
contains all of the features for an agent and is accompanied by the final compliance attitudes
of that agent. The features of agents are the number of violations, preventions, attempts at
tailgating and the number of times an agent is in close proximity when tailgating between
other agents occurs.
Given all of the traces for a model, we use cross validation to construct and assess the
accuracy of learning decision trees for each model. The cross validation consists of a training
and testing phase, where the training is inclusive for the compliance attitudes of an agent and
the testing phase is exclusive of the compliance attitudes.
A prediction from a decision tree in this chapter is either usable or secure. If we consider
secure as our target value then a true-positive (tp) is a correct prediction for secure, true-
negative (tn) is a correct prediction for usable. False-positive (fp) is an incorrect prediction
for secure and false-negative (fn) is an incorrect prediction for usable. From these we can
calculate the error rate, precision and recall:
err( f p, f n, t p, tn) =
f p+ f n
t p+ tn+ f p+ f n
(6.1)
pr(t p, f p) =
t p
t p+ f p
r(t p, f n) =
t p
t p+ f n
(6.2)
The cross validation creates a number of decision trees for each parameterised model.
Given a set of Decision Trees D where a set of testing traces T are present. A testing trace
contains a set of entries E excluding the compliance attitudes, where a function f : D×E →O
takes a decision tree, an entry and returns an outcome O where O = { f po, f no, t po, tno}.
g : N×N×N×N×D×P(E)→ N×N×N×N (6.3)
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g(i, j,k, l,d,E) =

g((i+1), j,k, l,d,(E \ e)), ∃e ∈ E where f (d,e) = f p0
g(i,( j+1),k, l,d,(E \ e)), ∃e ∈ E where f (d,e) = f n0
g(i, j,(k+1), l,d,(E \ e)), ∃e ∈ E where f (d,e) = t p0
g(, j,k,(l +1),d,(E \ e)), ∃e ∈ E where f (d,e) = tn0
(i, j,k, l) otherwise
(6.4)
Using the function g which is a counter function we can calculate the number of different
types of outcomes a decision tree produces. We can then use the function calc to assess the
accuracy of a decision tree:
calc : D×P(P)→ [0,1]
calc(d,E) = err(g(0,0,0,0,d,E)) (6.5)
Once we can calculate the error rate for one decision tree, we can then assess the accuracy





We do the same for the precision and recall of the decision trees, however, we do not
provide the notation for this as it is follows the same principles. Each model is associated
with a set of decision trees. Therefore, for each model we calculate µerror to identify the
accuracy of decision trees for a given set of parameters.
A simplified overview of Functions 6.4 and 6.5 is that they count the number of appear-
ances for true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative respectively.
6.4 Analysis - Case Study
In this section we discuss the use of parameterised models and make remarks surrounding
the results for three different amounts of simulated agents which are fifty, one hundred and
two hundred.
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Table 6.2 100 Agents: p1: Expected Arrival Rate; p2: Probabilistic Decision; p3: Norms
Influence (Social Proof); p4: Messenger Influence; p5: Personality; µ(error): Average error
rate of a model; pr(s): The precision of the model towards secure; r(s): The recall of the
model for secure;
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 Model µ(error) σ(error) pr(s) r(s)
m1 0.255 0.067 0.659 0.830
X m2 0.001 0.002 1.000 0.997
X X m3 0.234 0.028 0.697 0.712
X X m4 0.073 0.019 0.963 0.953
X X m5 0.160 0.024 0.884 0.898
X X X m6 0.094 0.018 0.928 0.938
X X X m7 0.114 0.016 0.904 0.910
X X X m8 0.271 0.024 0.724 0.731
X X X m9 0.367 0.031 0.634 0.624
X X X X m10 0.027 0.012 0.975 0.969
X X X X X m11 0.277 0.028 0.675 0.675
The number of possible parameterised models is 25, however, we only consider eleven of
these thirty two. The expected arrival rate is included in the majority of the parameterised
models, as we do not consider too many models where all agents always arrive at the exact
same time, of course this could happen, but it is very unlikely. The personality parameter is
dependent upon a behaviour change parameter being present, therefore, it does not add to
a model if Social Norms and/or the Messenger parameters are not included. These are the
motivations for considering only eleven parameterised models.
We used the Julia programming language to implement our case study and made use of
the SysModels package [30, 27]. We generated synthetic data on a Toshiba laptop with a 2.4
GHz i5 processor and 8GB RAM. To generate the data for eleven models with two hundred
agents it took twenty two minutes which is roughly two minutes per model. Each model is
generated with ten traces each starting from an identical initial state for each model.
For the analysis we performed three test cases and used fifty, one hundred and two
hundred agents. Table 6.2 is the results for the one hundred agents, the results for fifty and
two hundred agents in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 respectively.
For each test case, we calculated the average error rate, the standard deviation, the
precision and the recall of each parameterised model, where Table 6.2 shows the parameters
for each model. We now make remarks regarding the results we have obtained.
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Remark 4. The average error rate for model m1 is significantly more accurate with fifty
than one hundred or two hundred agents.
With regards to Remark 4, as the expected arrival time is not set, all agents arrive at the
same time. The majority of agents don’t ever permit, deny or attempt to tailgate, therefore, a
decision tree will make inaccurate predictions for some agents, particularly when more than
fifty agents are used.
Remark 5. If the probabilistic parameter is set, then the average error rate significantly in-
creases. In particular, it impacts more than both the Messenger and Social Norms parameters.
The use of the probabilistic parameter significantly increases the average error rate of the
decision trees. Due to the uncertainty of agent behaviour, i.e. secure agents acting usable and
vice versa, a secure agent could have always behaved as usable. A classifier model would
always conclude that they are usable when they are in fact secure. Whilst Remark 5 is not
surprising, the impact of uncertain behaviour against social influences is a useful result for a
security practitioner. In the real world, some people will always be secure or usable, some
hover between the two and some are slightly more secure or slightly more usable, some
insight towards these numbers would allow us to calculate the impact of agents towards a
model.
Remark 6. The Messenger influence has a slightly more of an impact to the error rate,
precision and recall of a model than Social Norms. It is true for all four of the test cases.
They both impact the error rate, precision and recall of every model.
The influences themselves differ in how they are implemented. The Messenger relies
on an agent observing a behaviour of another agent that they consider to be an authoritative
figure. The social norms is a cumulative influence, where the number of observations of a
particular action can trigger the compliance attitudes of an agent to change. For Remark 6,
the interest is that they are not probabilistic behaviours, they are private behaviours. We have
defined very simple rules for our influences. We wish to know if decision trees are capable of
generating rules to deal with these simple behaviour changes. Given the data for our number
of agents. We can see a slight improvement when 200 agents are present. However, the
decision trees still perform poorly for these basic implementations of influences.
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Remark 7. On average, the models for two hundred agents are more accurate than the
models for fifty or one hundred agents.
A trend emerged for the accuracy of models as we increased the number of agents. Whilst
some of the models were more accurate for 50 agents, in general Remark 7 holds, in particular
for the complex models where influences and probabilistic decisions are present. This is due
to an increase number of entries to train decision trees, improving its accuracy.
Overall, we can see that with some basic aspects of human behaviour such as an uncer-
tainty of decisions between secure and usable agents, the decision trees perform poorly. Even
more so that we are just considering the polar opposites for compliance attitudes. Whilst
the influencing effects implemented are relatively simple, we believe as they increase in
complexity, i.e. become heterogeneous for each agent, this would reduce the accuracy of
decision trees even more. On another note, and mainly due to processing limitations, it’s not
clear if the accuracy can be improved by generating thousands of traces to use in the cross
validation analysis.
Table 6.3 50 Agents; See Table 6.2 for column definitions.
Model µ(error) σ(error) pr(s) r(s)
m1 0.070 0.037 0.896 0.943
m2 0.018 0.010 0.974 0.980
m3 0.279 0.035 0.658 0.642
m4 0.050 0.025 0.947 0.950
m5 0.162 0.029 0.853 0.867
m6 0.031 0.018 0.955 0.977
m7 0.091 0.030 0.893 0.937
m8 0.266 0.039 0.701 0.686
m9 0.365 0.051 0.694 0.656
m10 0.017 0.012 0.976 0.986
m11 0.325 0.056 0.622 0.581
6.5 Discussion
The decision trees constructed in this chapter was on a boolean case for compliance attitudes.
An agent that is usable would in general, act differently to an agent that is secure. We
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Table 6.4 200 Agents; See Table 6.2 for column definitions.
Model µ(error) σ(error) pr(s) r(s)
m1 0.201 0.135 0.861 0.912
m2 0.006 0.003 0.996 0.998
m3 0.170 0.013 0.910 0.888
m4 0.014 0.006 0.993 0.993
m5 0.050 0.009 0.976 0.972
m6 0.024 0.007 0.984 0.990
m7 0.047 0.011 0.976 0.973
m8 0.140 0.021 0.933 0.912
m9 0.277 0.029 0.833 0.812
m10 0.040 0.008 0.975 0.980
m11 0.161 0.016 0.920 0.892
acknowledge that this is not a complete model representing human behaviour, instead it is
characterising elements that we see in the real world.
Figure 6.3 is an overview of the rate when comparing fifty to two hundred agents.
Intuitively, one would expect that the more data points a ML algorithm has, the more accurate
it should become. In general, this does tend to be the case, however, the parameters for m1
show that a decision tree for fifty agents is more accurate than the decision trees for one
hundred or two hundred agents. We suspect that this is due to the clash of more agents
appearing at once and queuing as a result of the parameter p1 which is the expected arrival
rate of agents.
6.6 Validation
In this chapter we utilised cross validation as a method to assess the accuracy of decision
trees for the traces generated by simulation. The traces used could have been collected by
real world data, however, collecting the data for compliance attitudes would have been a
much more complex process.
The decision trees used in this Chapter is a model built on a trace output from the
simulation of a synthetic data set. In Chapter 7, we collect a data set which focuses on just the
compliance behaviour, which itself is complex and does not include the compliance attitudes.
6.6 Validation 105















Figure 6.3 Overview of the mean error rate for 50,100 and 200 agents.
However, if we knew the compliance attitudes of the participants in the user study then we
could apply the machine learning techniques to assess how accurate decision trees are for
real data as opposed to synthetic data.
In this chapter we have presented a model which is based on the model from Chapter 5.
The model from Chapter 5 is one step away from reality meaning its not clear how at the
present time how accurate or truly reflective the model is of human behaviour. Adding
another model on top of this is to be puts the DT model two steps away from reality. Any
effects or results that we are seeing could be amplified by errors in the first model and errors
in the second model. The work in this thesis and chapter is a starting point and for any
confidence in the models to be established, future work must iterate over and improve the
current models.
This stacked model approach of a first layer consisting of the model from Chapter 5 and
the decision tree model as the second layer creates a set of four possibilities. Firstly, both
models in both layers are a true reflection of reality, in which case further work is required
to increase confidence. Secondly, the first layer is accurate and the second layer is flawed,
meaning that machine learning applied to human behaviour is no further forward. Thirdly, the
106 Learning Decision Trees from Synthetic Human Behaviour
original model is incorrect and the decision trees are correct which would require a complete
overhaul of both models to ensure accuracy of reality is truly reflected. Fourthly, both models
are incorrect which would require a completely new approach to build a foundation in this
area.
6.7 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter focused on addressing Research Question 3 and that of identifying the com-
pliance attitudes from publicly observable behaviours. With very simple model traces to
analyse we saw a relatively high success rate but as the complexity of the traces increased,
the accuracy of the decision trees decreased. This was particularly apparent when dealing
with randomised behaviour.
It may be the case that the decision trees are biased and lend themselves towards latching
onto specific values [113]. Even with identifying a binary compliance attitude we had a mean
error rate of nearly 40% on one of the decision trees. This is very close to the flip of a coin
when considering just usable or secure behaviour.
For an organisation, this method offers little in guarantees towards identifying compliance
attitudes behind agents behaviours for security policy compliance. Nevertheless, it does
open up an avenue for future work where we can assess at what point does a decision tree
become accurate if any, and what behaviour observations are necessary to identify compliance
attitudes.
A key insight from this chapter is the relationship between complex traces and the
accuracy of decisions trees. As the complexity of the traces increased, the accuracy of the
decision trees decreased. A question arises as to what data would be required in order to
maintain the accuracy of the decision trees.
The success of this chapter is how the different parameters impacted the complexity of
each trace. A parameter such as expected arrival time had enough of an impact to change
agent’s observations which subsequently impacts how they are influenced. As a comparison
to reality, if a person arrives after or before a security policy breach then they will not witness
it and as such, will not be influenced by the breach and any subsequent actions.
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One of the parameters not discussed was the number of days for observations. In the
simulations, they would run for five working days, so there would be at least five opportunities
for tailgating to occur. Had we have extended the parameter for number of days to be ten
or one hundred it’s not clear whether or not this would have improved the accuracy of the
decision trees. Nevertheless it is something to note for future work. Is there a point where
enough data will ensure accurate decision trees.
Some of the models were more accurate for 50 agents than the larger populations. It is
most likely caused by the lack of a probabilistic decision and the expected arrival time not
forming a queue of people to enter. Without a queue of people waiting to enter it’s likely that
tailgate happens less in the simulations when there are fewer agents. However, we do not
know this for certain and more work is required in this area to understand if it is the case.
A clear limitation of this work is the lack of evidence for smaller groups. In the later
Chapters we discuss experiments consisting of 4-6 participants which means it is unreasonable
to assume we can offer some comparison. If we performed a study to simulate for smaller
groups it may offer insights into key influencers within the system. Furthermore, a range of
participants would demonstrate if an influencer strength decreases or increases with regards
to a given set of agents.

Chapter 7
Social Influences Towards Compliance
Behaviour
This chapter address Research Question 4, as a reminder the research question is the follow-
ing:
Research Question 4 (User Study). How can we investigate and measure the effect of
behavioural interventions such as social influences on compliance behaviour?
To address Research Question 4 we consider that a social influence of the Messenger
effect or the broken-window effect has an impact on people’s compliance behaviour for
security policies.
We conducted a study with three conditions in a between-subjects design on a sample of
N = 54 university students owning a university-issued access-control smart card. In all three
groups, participants were asked to complete a set of Capture the Flag challenges in our Cyber
Security Room where they had no Internet access. Outside of the room, the participants
could access the Internet. Thereby, participants were compelled to leave and enter the room,
without disclosing the experiment purpose.
We asked participants to swipe their smart card on entering and exiting the Cyber Security
Room. The Control group had no intervention. The Discrete+ experiment group was exposed
to a Messenger influence [44]. The Continuous− experiment group was exposed to a an
untidy Cyber Security Room, which was inspired by the broken-window Theory [114]. The
broken-window theory states that visible signs of crime or anti-social behaviour encourages
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further crime and anti-social behaviour. We use this theory as a basis to decrease compliance
behaviour.
We measured swiping behaviour on entry and exit, computing total swipes and swipe rate
ratio as key metrics subjected to an Analysis of Variance. We found a statistically significant
large effect of the Continuous− intervention, that is, the broken-window effect impacting the
total swipe rate negatively, Hedges’ g =−1.04, 95% CI [−1.78,−0.28].
While having observed a negligible effect size between the Control and Discrete+ groups,
we acknowledge that the swipe rate was high for both of these groups. From the effect size
of the Control group and Continuous− group, we offer evidence towards an untidy area and
lack of compliance for security policies.
One of the social influences from MINDSPACE is the Messenger effect which is strongly
related to Cialdini’s Authority principle. The Messenger effect states that a person in authority
can influence the decisions that other people make [44]. Social influences feature regularly
when discussing social engineering and it is commonplace to hear that wearing a uniform
will get you past the front door [87]. Social influences are one example of a behavioural
interventions [81].
The broken-window theory states that an area left in disrepair can increase the crime rate
in the surrounding area [114]. The theory goes on to discuss how the perceptions from people
that nobody is taking care of the area also contributes to an increase in crime [114]. To the
best of our knowledge, no one has taken this concept and applied it to the compliance of
security policies. The broken-window theory is an example of one behavioural intervention.
An organisational requirement such as no unauthorised personnel in the building can be
implemented with a security policy where employees must swipe their smart cards to access
certain rooms and help to record where they are, where they are going and where they have
been. The information can be used for assessing who could be responsible for permitting
unauthorised personnel entry should a breach occur. Depending on the compliance intentions
of employees, they may not always comply with the policy [15]. We pose the question can
behavioural interventions can change their behaviour for how they interact with swiping their
smart card? Which leads us to the aim for this chapter:
Aim: We investigate the effect of socio-environmental interventions on smart
card swiping behaviour.
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Chapter Overview: This chapter addresses Research Question 4 and offers a user study
where social influences impact compliance behaviour. The chapter is formed from a paper at
Socio-Technical Aspects of Security and Trust 2018, which at the time of thesis submission,
is currently in the process of publication [25]. This data set also offers up speculative
work which we carry out in Chapter 9 towards the social influences within each group that
participated in the study. The data set was collected via a user study at Newcastle University
with 54 participants.
7.1 Preliminaries
In this section we provide a brief overview of the methods and metrics used in this chapter to
familiarise the reader.
7.1.1 Analysis of Variance
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a set of statistical methods to analyse and approximate
the differences between group means of some samples. In this chapter we used a one-way
omnibus ANOVA which entails comparing the means of all the different groups and assessing
if there is a difference. In our case, the three groups are Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−.
The ANOVA will not tell us which groups are statistically significant, just that at least two of
the groups are.
7.1.2 Effect Sizes
An effect size is a quantitative measure of an observation made about some metric, such as
the correlation between two variables. We calculate the Hedges’g effect size which tells us
the difference between two groups [57].
As Hedges’g only permits the comparisons between two groups we perform planned
comparisons. Planned comparisons are pre-specified before the results are collected to
avoid looking for results that may be interesting if the data does not quite add up. The
planned comparisons we perform in this chapter is Control vs Discrete+ and Control vs
Continuous−.
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Figure 7.1 Study Structure: An overview of what study participants were exposed too.
7.1.3 Confidence Intervals
A confidence interval is an interval estimate we compute to outline the range of values that
an observed value could take for some confidence level. The confidence level is typically
95%, which is what we use in this chapter [59]. The confidence interval we provide is over
the effect sizes that we observe.
7.1.4 The Broken-Window Theory
When crime is quantified, the environment by which a person lives or resides in can impact
the level of crime for that area [18]. Social disorganization theory focuses on the relationship
between neighbourhood structure, social control, and crime [74]. An intervention in a
neighbourhood structure could change the resulting crime rate.
One study explored the possibility that academics are messy. By creating an environment
where mess was present, they found that people were more likely to litter [94]. They state
that when academics observed that others are violating the social norm of keeping the
room clean then the probability of littering increases by roughly 40% [94]. This work is an
example interpretation of the broken window theory where the researchers adapted it for the
workplace.
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7.1.5 Social Influences - Messenger
When considering COM-B the Behaviour Change Framework which is discussed in more
depth in Chapter 2, the motivational element can be targeted by social influences [81]. The
term social influence refers to the ways in which a person’s beliefs, attitudes and subsequent
actions change as a result of social interactions with people [50]. One example is that
normative beliefs regarding the expectations of colleagues has an impact on employee
security behaviours. Not only the expectations of others, but also the perceived behaviour of
others was found to contribute in employee attitudes towards security policy compliance [58].
Consider it a form of exchange between two or more individuals.
MINDSPACE is a behaviour change framework that lists many different types of social
influences and is discussed more in depth in Chapter 2 [44]. One social influence they
describe and one that is repeated throughout this thesis is the Messenger effect which is
derived by the work carried out by Cialdini [33]. The Messenger effect states that:
"A person in authority or one that is trusted has an influence over the decisions that other
people make" [44].
The effect is not described as having a positive or negative impact, just that it can alter
the decision a person makes.
In the context of security, Zhu et al. demonstrated by mutually exchanging information,
they could utilise another type of influence which is reciprocity. By providing different
types of information, they were able to increase the amount of personal information that
people reciprocated [117]. As an influence mechanism, reciprocity along with others are
well established, most notably from the behavioural scientist Cialdini [33]. We often see
poor security decisions in Phishing, where social influences are common (e.g. an email
impersonating a bank is a form of social influence) [41]. Phishing attacks are one example
of how a social influence can nudge a persons decision. On the physical side, where people
interact face to face, it has been shown that top level management can significantly increase
policy compliance rates at lower levels [62]. When comparing top level management as a
social influence we can see similarities with the Messenger effect from MINDSPACE [44].
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The social influences can target on an individual basis, such as the study by Zhu et
al. on reciprocity [117]. In the context of influencing a group, one can consider that
social conformity could play a vital role [9]. It has been shown that social conformity
can be dependent on different cultures as they vary in the amount to which they nurture
conformity [35]. Should an influence be targeted at the group, it can very well depend on
which participants respond to it, as they could be key to creating conformity amongst others.
A social influence over a persons attitudes can often come from interactions and obser-
vations of others [34]. As such, it may be the case that the social influence propagates in a
group and a particular behaviour establishes itself as the social norm [24].
7.2 Chapter Aims
We provide sub research questions and the hypotheses that form this chapter:
Sub Research Question 1 (Messenger Effect). To what extent does a Messenger effect have
on the swipe rate of participants?
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the operationalisation for this research question. As an
independent variable (IV), we have selected the use of the Messenger effect [44].
Sub Research Question 2 (Broken-window Effect). To what extend does the broken-window
effect have an effect on the swipe rate of participants?
Table 7.1 also provides the info for the second research question. As the IV for this case,
we consider a messy (‘untidy’) room as the intervention.
For both sub research questions, we intend to compare them against a Control group which
has no experimental treatment. For all three groups (Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−),
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we will measure the dependent variable (DV) by use of a video camera and smart card logging
system. Using both of these metrics, we will generate an event log for all participants.
Hypotheses on Total Number of Swipes The overall null hypothesis for this experiment
is HT,0 : There is no mean difference in the total number of swipes for participants exposed
to an intervention.
We have subordinate null hypotheses for each condition:
HT,0,D+: The Discrete+ intervention does not impact the mean total number of swipes.
HT,0,C−: : The Continuous− intervention does not impact the mean total number of swipes.
We have these as alternative hypotheses.
HT,1,D+: The Discrete+ intervention (Messenger effect) impacts the total number of swipes.
HT,1,C−: A Continuous− messy (‘untidy’) room (broken-window effect) impacts the total
number of swipes.
Hypotheses on Swipe Rate Ratio The overall null hypothesis for this experiment is HR,0 :
There is no mean difference in the swipe rate ratio for participants exposed to an intervention.
The subordinate null hypotheses for each condition are:
HR,0,D+: The Discrete+ intervention does not impact the mean swipe rate ratio.
HR,0,C−: The Continuous− intervention does not impact the mean swipe rate ratio.
HR,1,D+: The Discrete+ intervention (Messenger effect) impacts the swipe rate ratio.
HR,1,C−: A Continuous− messy (‘untidy’) room (broken-window effect) impacts the swipe
rate ratio.
7.3 Method
For reproducibility and scientific integrity, the study has been registered and updated with
statistical analysis procedures before proceeding with any tasks at the Open Science Frame-
work (OSF) 1. Tables for descriptive statistics, ANOVA results and effect size graphs were
generated from the data by R. We also provide a copy of the pre-registration in Appendix A.
1https://osf.io/3jsc7/
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Figure 7.2 Floor Plan of the office space used for the study.














The experiment is setup as a between-subjects experiment, with one IV (condition), with
three levels (Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−).
We ran all groups as morning, afternoon or evening sessions randomly distributed over
conditions. At no point did we raise awareness to the existence of any other group types.
The study itself had to be conducted with physical presence as we required participants to
engage in a physical behaviour, that of swiping their smart card. An overview of the study as
experienced by participants is provided in Figure 7.1.
7.3.2 Sampling
The survey population was students of Newcastle University. We chose this population as
all students are issued a smart card during induction, which we use in this experiment. In
the study, only undergraduate and postgraduate students were recruited. No members of
staff took part in this study. The participants were recruited through an emailing list with in
the University, flyers and announcements in lectures and seminars. Overall, we classify the
sampling process as convenience sampling.
The participants for all groups were recruited as one big cohort under the offer of a Cyber
Security Study.
7.3.3 Grouping & Assignment
Participants are randomly assigned to three groups:
• Control: Our first group is our baseline where participants perform a set of tasks over
fifty five minutes. No intervention is in place here. The room is set in a defined ‘tidy’
state.
• Discrete+: The first experiment group is exposed to a discrete intervention. By
discrete we mean at one time point the group is exposed to some intervention. The
purpose of this intervention is to positively influence group behaviour around swipe
compliance. The room is kept in a defined ‘tidy’ state. We anticipate that this will
increase participants swipe levels.
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• Continuous−: The second experiment group is exposed to a continuous intervention
present in the offline Cyber Security Room. The intervention is specifically to set
the room in a defined ‘untidy’ state. The purpose of this intervention is to negatively
influence group behaviour around swipe compliance. We anticipate that this will
decrease participants swipe levels.
In each group we will ensure a short break is in place at the 25 minute mark. At this point
we will gather all of the participants in the Cyber Security room and ask them how they are
getting on. The instructor will swipe their smart card as they enter and say "How is everyone
finding the tasks?". The instructor will then swipe their smart card then leave the room. Each
groups session time will be fifty five minutes (±20s).
7.3.4 Experimental Environment
The experiment was conducted in a purpose-built environment for cyber-security capture-the-
flag tasks. We offer a floor plan of the environment in Fig. 7.2.
In the experiment, we designated offline and online areas. The offline area had no Internet
connectivity, which would be considered a high-security clean-room, which in this study is
the Cyber Security Room. The online area had Raspberry Pis provided to allow for Internet
connectivity. Subjects must swipe their student smart card as they enter and exit the offline
area.
Offline Area: The offline area includes a Cyber Security Room and contains sensitive
experimental equipment. During the building’s construction, the room was not fitted with a
smart card reader. We make the following changes to this room:
• Using a Raspberry Pi we design and program an Adafruit PN532 RFID Card Reader
to work with Newcastle University Smart Cards.
• We fit a Video Camera to record the experiment. The camera is inside the offline room,
points at the door, and observes the smart card reader.
Online Area: Subjects will use this area to collect supporting information to assist the
completion of the Capture-The-Flag challenges in the cyber security room. This area has
Raspberry Pis with a mouse, keyboard, monitor and wireless network connection.
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7.3.5 Procedure
For all the groups, a mass email was sent out to all students. A potential participant responded
showing interest was randomly assigned to a group (Control, Discrete+, Continuous−). A
response was then sent to each potential participant with the choice of three sessions (morning,
afternoon, evening). In the response, the potential participants are made fully aware that
they will need a university smart card, the study will be partially filmed and that the study
will take place with other participants. Participants would then respond selecting either a
morning, afternoon or evening slot. We send a confirmation receipt to them informing that
they are fully booked in for the group and should turn up at a specific time. One day before
each session we sent a reminder confirming that the session is still going ahead.
Registration & Welcome
Upon arrival, participants were met at the entrance of the study area. Participants were
provided with a random number they select from a box upon arrival. They were asked to
read through documentation and sign in the appropriate places. We made it clear that they
could opt out and ask any question at any point.
Once all participants had arrived and had read through the documentation and signed
to agree to participate, we briefed them. We explained they would be completing Capture
the Flag (CTF) challenges in the Cyber Security Room. In the Cyber Security Room, they
would have no Internet connection and it was an offline room and are not permitted to use
any device capable of a Internet connection. Should they wish to gather information on a
challenge, they can leave the Cyber Security Room and make use of machines connected to
the Internet in the hallway. These machines were Raspberry Pi 3’s with a mouse, keyboard,
monitor and connected to the University Wireless Network. We state that when entering and
exiting the room, participants swipe their smart card. We provide them with an example
Adafruit PN532 smart card reader and demonstrate how swiping takes place. It should be
noted that all participants are familiar with swiping their smart cards at the University, albeit
not on entry and exit of a room where the door is open. Participants then ask any questions
and we instruct them to leave in a specific order at fifteen second intervals to enter the Cyber
Security Room. The specific order refers to the number they selected and also indicates the
number desk they will sit at in the Cyber Security Rooms.
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Capture the Flag Tasks
Participants were provided with CTF challenges which took on a jeopardy format. A
challenge in CTF that is jeopardy requires the participant to find a flag in whatever security
puzzle is presented to them. In total there were nine challenges for them to solve. They
were instructed to solve the first eight then move onto the additional challenge which was in
place should a subject finish the first eight challenges. No participant successfully completed
all nine challenges. Each participant was given a desktop which matched the number they
originally selected upon arrival.
Each challenge consisted of an encrypted file alongside a puzzle. When the puzzle
is solved it revealed a password that could be used to decrypt the encrypted file. Once
decrypted the participant is rewarded with a success message. One of the challenges was
called BASE64ME and users were presented with:
The password for this challenge is : dGhhdFdhc0Vhc3lUb1NvbHZlMQ==
Once the participant identifies that this is in the data format of Base 64 and converts it they
are given the following password:
thatWasEasyToSolve1
After the password is used to decrypt the file the participant is presented with a file that says
congratulations and they have completed the challenge. The challenges were presented in
no particular order, allowing participants freedom to choose which order they wished to
solve the challenges. Albeit, we advised they should complete the first 8 challenges before
moving onto the additional 9th challenge. Challenges were designed to be random amongst
participants ensuring they couldn’t copy the final answer.
7.3.6 Manipulations
Experiment Group One – Discrete+: The goal of the discrete intervention is to create a
positive outlook on swiping a smart card for participants. The re-enforcement from the
instructor provides that authoritative message that this is the behaviour we expect.
During the short break, once all subjects are in the clean room we will provide our discrete
intervention. As the instructor, I will swipe my card as I enter and say to all participants "Just
7.3 Method 121
a reminder to make sure you all are swiping as you enter and exit the Cyber Security Room.
How is everyone finding the tasks?"
Experiment Group Two – Continuous−: The goal of the continuous intervention is to reduce
the swiping of individuals by creating a untidy environment. The continuous intervention
will consist of making the clean room untidy. The break at the 25 minute mark will still
take place. As the instructor I will swipe my smart card as I enter and say "How is everyone
finding the tasks?". We offer Figure 7.3 as an overview of the messy items that were placed
around the room.
7.3.7 Measurements
In all of the studies we measure the total number of swipes per participant and the swipe rate
ratio per participant. Total swipes is the cumulative number of swipes for both entry and
exit combined. For swipe rate ratio, a value of 1 would indicate that the participant swiped
every time they entered and exited the Cyber Security Room. A swipe rate ratio of 0 would
indicate that the participant never swiped when entering or exiting the Cyber Security Room.
7.3.8 Controlling Confounding Variables
Controlling Intervention Side Effects
Experiment Group One – Discrete+: We pre-specify the exact wording of the message used
at the short break. The method for delivering the message will be consistent. The instructor
will be the same for all studies and will wear very similar clothing for all studies to ensure
there is no bias or unintended intervention.
Experiment Group Two – Continuous−: The placement of items around the cyber security
room could restrict or obstruct a persons ability to swipe. As a counter measure we will place
the items around the room, entered and exited to and from each desk to ensure no physical
blockade has unintentionally appeared. We can confirm that this is the case and none of the
items will impact a participants ability to swipe. Additionally, we will make a log of all items
used and their location within the cyber security room.
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Controlling Measurement Error
We deploy our own method to ensure that when reporting the final data set we are ensuring
rigour and accuracy for each event that occurs. We deploy the following technique:
1. Synchronise the times from the video footage and smart card logs.
2. Correlate the visual initial swipe of a subject with the hashed smart card log for that
swipe.
3. Generate the list of events for the timed part of the study, i.e. where subjects are
completing challenges.
Synchronise: The clock on the video footage begins at 00:00 and the smart card logs time
as per Greenwich Mean Time. For each experiment, the study leader swiped their smart card
after the camera is switched to record mode. From this we can gather the exact timings of
swipes with regards to the smart card logs. It also assisted when generating the logs for the
visual logs data set, as it provides an absolute time.
Correlate: As all participants smart cards are hashed, we have no association between the
names of subjects and their smart card number. To ensure that the visual logs can be generated
we correlate the initial swipe of a subject with visual features. We use the following metrics
to classify a subject and address conflict resolution:
• Are they wearing glasses?
• What colour top/t-shirt/coat are they wearing?
• What colour hair do they have?
• If these three features clash with another participant in that group, do they have any
unique features that are easily identifiable?
• What is the hash of their smart card?
We should know the hash of each user’s smart card, they also entered in a specific
















Figure 7.4 Process for recording an event, where Swipe refers to the expected behaviour
of someone swiping, !Swipe is someone entering or exiting without swiping. Finally, error
refers to someone swiping where either the logs are incorrect or they are using a different
smart card.
before the timed section of the study began and was used to correlate their features to their
smart card hash value.
Generate: In order to generate visual logs we used the video footage to gather information
for each event that occurs. An event is a person entering or exiting the room.
Figure 7.4 describes the process for recording an event so that it could be logged in the
visual logs data set. An outcome created a log with the timestamp and user number/smart
card hash for the event. After all events were processed, the visual logs provided the ground
truth for what occurred. We make the following assumptions for the data:
Assumption 1 (Multiple Swipes). If the smart card log contains identical user swipes within
1 seconds of each other, these are removed and treated as the card reader being too sensitive
or the subject tried to swipe for too long of a period.
Assumption 2 (Accurate Smart Card Logs). We assume that the smart card reader is
infallible and does not produce an incorrect log when a smart card is swiped.
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Assumption 3 (Accountable Smart Card Logs). We assume that the smart card reader only
produces a smart card log when a RFID card is presented. It will not create phantom logs
when no RFID is present.
7.3.9 Ethics
The study followed the institutions ethic guidelines and were approved by its ethics process.
We provide the ethics and all supporting documentation for the study in Appendix B.
Informed Consent and Opt-Out Participants were informed of the requirements for each
group in advance. This consisted of seventy five minutes of their time, a university smart
card and that they would be filmed.
Participants received a consent form and could ask questions before, during and after the
experiments. They were informed that they could withdraw at any point. All participants
were able to exercise informed consent.
Deception The participants were deceived in the fact that we did not disclose the main
intention of the study, which was to monitor the number of total swipes for each participant.
We used a cover story of wanting to understand how users manage data when faced with a
quarantined (offline) area and having access to an area of Internet connectivity (online).
Compensation Participants were reimbursed for their time spent in the experiment by
means of a £10 Amazon voucher. This was given to them after the study took place. We
would have honored this for participants that withdrew during the study, however, none did.
Data Protection We ensured data protection and privacy of the participants. Their smart
card numbers on swipe were hashed ensuring anonymity and the video recordings are kept
on one memory card in a locked room at all times. At the end of the study, this information
will be deleted to ensure there is no chance of reverse engineering should the algorithms used
to protect the data be compromised.
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7.4 Results
Table 7.2 User Study: Participant Demographics
Gender 18-21 22 - 25 26-29 Total
Male 28 6 5 39
Female 10 4 1 15
As a general rule, statistics were computed with a significance level of α = .05. We used
an omnibus ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) with planned contrasts to assess the difference
in mean number of total swipes between the three groups. Should an effect be apparent (a
difference in means), we then calculate the size of the effect if a difference is present.
7.4.1 Participants
The total sample size consisted of N = 54 students. The Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−
groups had n1 = 14, n2 = 21 and n3 = 19 participants, respectively. Each group ran in sessions
and a session would consist of 4-6 participants.
7.4.2 Outcomes of Data Preparation
Outcome of Consistency Check
We planned to exclude event observations that are inconclusive, that is, cases in which the
observations from the RFID and CCTV1 sensors are contradictory and cannot be resolved
with our decision algorithm. No event turned out inconclusive in our consistency check.
Exclusion Criteria Evaluation
We also planned to exclude participants who do not exit the room during the time of the study.
That is, they never swipe. This occurred for two participants and they were subsequently
removed from the sample.
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7.4.3 Metric 1: Total Swipes
The measure total number of swipes is the number of times a participant swiped when
entering and exiting the Cyber Security Room during each session.
Descriptive Statistics
We have analysed the data for univariate outliers with the Outlier Labeling Rule. We found
one case with extreme values of total number of swipes. We capped the outlying value with
the 5th percentile, instead of removing it. Table 7.3 shows the mean and standard deviation
of the three groups in the study.
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics: Total Swipes
Control Discrete+ Continuous−
M 9.08 8.55 5.53
SD 4.48 3.75 2.29
ANOVA
Table 7.4 ANOVA Results: Total Number of Swipes (with Planned Contrasts)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F−Value p-Value
condition 2 143.28 71.64 6.18 .004**
Discrete+ v. Control 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 .982
Continuous− v. Control 1 143.27 143.27 12.35 .001**
Residuals 49 568.28 11.60
We conducted an omnibus Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) across conditions on the total
number of swipes. We used with planned contrasts between (Discrete+ v. Control) and
(Continuous− v. Control). The omnibus ANOVA shows a statistically significant difference
between means on of the conditions, F(2,49) = 6.18, p = .004. We thereby reject the overall
null hypothesis HT,0 that the condition does not impact the mean total number of swipes.
Examining the planned contrasts, we find that the Continuous− condition (M = 5.53,SD=
2.29) has a statistically significant negative impact on the total number of swipes compared to
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Table 7.5 Effect Sizes: Total Number of Swipes
Comparison Hedges’ g 95% CI
Continuous− v. Control -1.04 [−1.78,−0.28]
Discrete+ v. Control -0.13 [−0.83,0.57]
the Control condition (M = 9.08,SD = 4.48), F(1,49) = 12.35, p = .001. We, hence, reject
the subordinate null hypothesis HT,0,C−.
The impact of the Discrete+ condition on the total number of swipes was not statistically
significant. We failed to reject the subordinate null hypothesis HT,0,D+.
Effect Sizes
The overall effect observed in the omnibus ANOVA was η2 = .175 (ω2 = .139). The
corresponding Cohen’s f 2 (derived from the less biased ω2) is: f 2 = ω
2
1−ω2 = .161. Cohen
classified that as medium effect.
We calculate Hedges’ g as effect size for the planned contrasts: 1) (Discrete+ v. Control)
and 2) (Continuous− v. Control). We provide an overview over all effects in Table 7.5 as
well as a corresponding forest plot in Fig. 7.5.
With respect to the alternative hypothesis HT,1,C−, we find the Continuous− condition
yielded a large negative effect, Hedges’ g =−1.04, 95% CI [−1.78,−0.28].
7.4.4 Metric 2: Swipe Rate Ratio
The Swipe Rate Ratio is the rate at which participants successfully swiped their smart card
on entering and exiting the Cyber Security Room. A swipe rate ratio of 1 indicates that the
participant swiped every time they entered and exited.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 7.6 is an overview of the mean and SD for the swipe rate ratio values. The data here
contained three outliers, two in the Control and one in the Discrete+ observations. These
were all capped at the 5th percentile as per the Outlier Labelling rule used with Metric 1.
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Figure 7.5 Effects of interventions on total swipes.
Table 7.6 Descriptive Statistics: Swipe Rate Ratio
Control Discrete+ Continuous−
M .92 .90 .81
SD .15 .17 .24
ANOVA
We computed an omnibus analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the swipe rate ratio. We
specified planned contrasts between the conditions (Discrete+ v. Control) and (Continuous−
v. Control).
The omnibus ANOVA was not statistically significant, F(2,49) = 1.51, p = .231. We
thereby failed to reject the null hypothesis HR,0 that the conditions impact the mean swipe
rate ratio. In turn, we failed to reject the subordinate hypotheses HR,0,D+ and HR,0,C−.
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Table 7.7 ANOVA Results: Swipe Rate Ratio (with Planned Contrasts)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
condition 2 0.11 0.06 1.51 .231
Discrete+ v. Control 1 0.04 0.04 1.03 .316
Continuous− v. Control 1 0.07 0.07 1.99 .164
Residuals 49 1.84 0.04
Table 7.8 Effect Sizes: Swipe Rate Ratio
Comparison Hedges’ g 95% CI
Continuous− v. Control -0.50 [−1.21,0.22]
Discrete+ v. Control -0.12 [−0.82,0.58]
Effect Sizes
The overall omnibus ANOVA yielded an effect size of η2 = .058 and Cohen’s ω2 = .019.
Based on the ω2, this constitutes a Cohen’s f 2 = .019, less than the threshold of a small
effect.
We offer parameter and interval estimation on the effects, found in Table 7.8. Fig 7.6
offers a forest plot of the same data. In the Continuous− condition, we observe an estimate of
a medium (yet statistically non-significant) effect, Hedges’ g =−0.50, 95% CI [−1.21,0.22],
which asks for further examination in another experiment.
7.5 Discussion
7.5.1 The broken-window effect has an effect on how users respond to
a security policy
In the Continuous− group we altered the Cyber Security Room to be messy with the intentions
of reducing the swiping behaviour of participants. It was our interpretation of the broken-
window theory [114]. It yielded a large effect size and the confidence interval, whilst being
very wide suggested that we would see an effect most of the time should we repeat the study.
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Figure 7.6 Effects of interventions on swipe rate ratio.
Clearly, a messy area should more likely impact the behaviour around a security policy.
There are additional policies that one could consider. For instance, wearing identification
badges and the impact a messy room has on participants challenging each other.
The omnibus ANOVA was not statistically significant for metric 2 (Swipe Rate Ratio)
indicating that there is no clear differences in the means between the groups. However, the
Hedges-g effect size indicates there is a possibility of seeing a medium effect but this is only
speculation as the confidence interval does not support this.
7.5.2 The Messenger effect had no observable measurable impact on
total number of swipes or the swipe rate ratio
Our interpretation of the Messenger effect was a reminder from the study leader at the twenty
five minute mark of the Discrete+ groups [44]. In both metrics, the effect showed no report
of an effect size. This does not mean that an effect does not exist, just that we did not observe
one in this instance.
We do acknowledge that the swipe rate ratio is very high (0.9 and above) in both the
Control and Discrete+ groups. The margin to increase the swipe rate ratio was less than
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the margin to decrease it. A perfect swipe rate ratio of 100% would have given us at most
a medium effect size for the Messenger effect had all participants always swiped. This
would also have required participants to have swiped every time before the intervention was
delivered.
7.5.3 Recommendations
The observations made in this study that the broken window effect does have a negative
effect on how users respond to swiping a smart card. Additionally, we don’t know if the
broken window effect applies to other security policies. We would err on the side of caution
and advise that office space mess should be minimal to ensure that there is no risk of any
other security policies being negatively impacted.
7.5.4 Limitations
Generalisability
The participants were recruited from university students, limiting generalisability.
Subjects were exposed to a diversion about how they manage solving tasks when faced
with a clean area and dirty area. However, it is clear that students were aware of the camera
recording them. What is not clear is how much this changed their behaviour if they were not
being observed.
Ecological Validity
Participants in this study were all students and were all accustomed to the principle of
swiping. However, at the University, participants on a day-to-day basis swipe their smart
cards to unlock doors, confirm attendance and to print documents.
The swipe card reader used for this study was an Adafruit PN532 RFID smart card reader.
The ones in place at the University are supplied by an external company and look and react
more professional than the makeshift reader we provided.
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Statistical Power
The statistical power of the omnibus ANOVA employed in the experiment was limited at
a sample size of N = 54. In terms of sensitivity, the ANOVA could detect large effects of
Cohen’s f = .435 at 80% power.
Future experiments testing for a medium effect size hypothesized for the swipe rate ratio
(Hedges’ g = 0.5) would need at least 128 participants to reach 80% a priori power under
ideal conditions.
7.5.5 Reflection on Effects
We originally planned to have two effects that would be considered a pure social influence.
In the end we only had the one social influence which was that of an authoritative figure
trying to increase the swipe rate. We were not able to have a social influence that influence
swipe rate negatively.
Our original idea for a negative social influence was to have an actor participant in the
group who vocally stated that they were not going to swipe at regular intervals. Unfortunately,
due to constraints and availability of people we could find no one to take up this role.
Furthermore, it would have been very difficult to maintain consistency with this sort of social
influence. For example, who does the actor talk too when they declare their non-compliance
with the swiping policy.
If this experiment is to run again, then performing some sort of involved actor, perhaps as
a discrete intervention, similar to the discrete positive in this one, it would be interesting to
understand and investigate the outcome.
For the continuous intervention, which consisted of deploying our own version of the
broken-window effect, it would have been interesting to have actually had a broken window.
However, we did not explore this option as it would not have received much traction from
building management. Our alternative to the messy room was to consider a poster that
depicted some sort of anti-social behaviour towards security policies. Unfortunately, we
could not source or design an appropriate poster.
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7.6 Collecting Data Set: Conclusion
We offer the first study of behavioural interventions on smart card swiping behaviour in a
security context. We conclude that the broken-window effect has a strong impact on how
people swipe their smart card. It is an interesting observation that the mess created in a
room has an impact on how users respond to a security policy. It potentially has far-reaching
consequences as this may translate to how people digitally behave, e.g. selecting a password.
We did not verify the messenger effect which we expected to see an increase in swiping
from participants. We do recognize that study participants in general swiped on a regular
basis which may impact the chance of observing a positive effect.
The data set we have collected in this chapter is the collection of the group behaviour
towards security policy compliance behaviour. We have already demonstrated that identi-
fying hidden markers such as compliance attitude is difficult. The purpose of this data set
allows us to understand if any, the relationship between observations of people and their
compliance behaviours. Furthermore, the data set provides a starting point for us to validate
the implementation of our Rule Based Model which we introduce in Chapter 7 and assess its
accuracy in Chapter 8.
A key insight into this work is that the environmental influence had a strong impact on
how people swipe their smart card. Therefore, we would need to establish what human
influences have a strong impact on how people swiped their smart card. Although the
significance of the data focuses on the total number of swipes as opposed to the swipe ratio,
there is a clear change of behaviour. Perhaps it is the case that the broken-window effect
stifles productivity and participants were not as motivated to engage in the tasks because of
the messy room. Unfortunately, we have no evidence to support this theory and we would
need to run the experiment again and change our surveys to understand if this was the case.
What went will with this chapter was the process from start to finish. By submitting
the pre-registration to the open science framework we committed ourselves to a robust
methodology. It meant we were not looking or cherry picking for any results. By pre-
specifying our analysis, we could only consider that small domain. Now that the work is
completed, it would be appropriate to perform that cherry picking but we would need another
experiment or user study to verify what it is we seek.
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A limitation with this chapter is the compliance level of the participants. By successfully
engaging with the task it meant the human influence of an expert coming in at mid point
to improve the swipe rate had little wiggle room. Whereas the negative effect of the messy
room had a lot more to work with. On reflection, it would have made sense for us to have a
human influence that was negative, for example, a senior not swiping or a user within the
group being vocal about not swiping. We then could have compared the impact a positive
and negative effect of the same type of delivery (by a person talking) would have on people’s
compliance rate.
Additionally, this experiment only consisted of 4-6 participants per run. When compar-
ing this to the simulations where we are considering a population of up to 200 agents in
some chapters, it creates a problem around comparisons. We most likely have generalised
behaviours that can be drawn out of a population, whereas a small group will have little
statistical power on their own. It’s for that reason why we put all the data together to form a
large set of observed data in the subsequent chapters. A clear limitation with this is the lack
of cross influences that would have occurred had all of these groups co-existed at the same
time.
7.7 Collecting Data Set: Future Work - Data Observations
From the empirical data set gathered in this chapter, we identify some final observations
about the data that could inform future work.
Data Observation 1 (Behaviour Traces). The collection of the smart card logs and the video
cameras allows for a set of behaviour traces to be yielded describing when people swipe or
do not swipe when entering and exiting. This is the data set used in this chapter.
Data Observation 2 (Observation Traces). Classifying events and logging the location of
participants, we can document who was where when a particular event occurred. There may
be a relationship between being in the Cyber Incident Room when someone swipes or does
not swipe.
Data Observation 3 (Timings). The data set documents events to the second. As such, we
can understand when participants swipe within moments of each other and the effect this has
on their swipe rate.
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These data observations offer a new layer of complexity for assessing the compliance
behaviour of participants. In particular, do social influences occur because of observations or
the timings of swipes. This area of research is one that can be delved into a lot deeper and




This chapter address Research Question 5, as a reminder the research question is:
Research Question 5 (Application). Can we design a tool to allow for the prediction and
impact of compliance behaviours towards compliance attitudes?
Assessing security policies where people have a choice to comply is complex. Particularly
when observing compliance behaviours can directly impact a person’s compliance attitude.
For example, a manager not complying with a policy could affect other people’s compliance
attitudes. For an organisation, they have no clear method to assess the impact this compliance
behaviour has on other employee’s compliance attitudes.
We present PCASP (Predicting Compliance Attitudes for Security Policies), a tool evalu-
ating global compliance attitudes of human agents. PCASP simulates behaviour for security
policies where social interaction is present. It is built from conclusions in literature surround-
ing subjective norms, attitudes and beliefs which impact an agent’s context and subsequently,
the decisions they make. PCASP takes as input, a list of behaviour parameters describing
agent behaviour and returns the global compliance attitude from a set of traces formed
through simulation. Additionally, we demonstrate the application of PCASP with a running
example to illustrate how one might mitigate against poor compliance attitudes amongst
agents. We envision that future versions of the tool would enable organisations to make more
informed security policy decisions about employee behaviour, such as the best behavioural
intervention to use.
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Chapter Overview: The chapter is split as follows. In Section 8.1 we describe the high-
level requirements our tool must satisfy. In Section 8.2 we present PCASP, in Section 8.3
we provide an impact analysis towards a running example and finally, we finish with a
discussion on PCASP. This chapter is formed from a paper at Socio-Technical Aspects of
Security and Trust 2018, which at the time of thesis submission, is currently in the process of
publication [26].
8.1 Modelling Security Behaviour
In this section, we describe the high-level requirements a tool simulating social influences
would need to satisfy, and we illustrate them with the example of an organization where
employees must wear ID badges, and where employees should challenge employees not
wearing an ID badge. In this discussion, we are interleaving observations on the example
scenario with methodological considerations.
Scenario 1 (ID Badge Policy P). An organisation states the following policy:
1. At enrolment time, each employee is issued a personalized ID badge, with photo
identification.
2. If an ID badge is lost or misplaced, the employee must report this loss and be issued a
temporary ID badge.
3. Every employee must wear their ID badge visibly at all time.
4. Every employee should challenge and report to security persons not wearing an ID
badge.
Observation 1 (Choice to Comply). Each employee in an organization can be in a situation
to decide to comply or not to comply with the currently enforced policy P.
Employees are decision-making actors in this scenario. They can choose to comply with
Policy P or choose to ignore it.
Example 1. An employee can observe another employee not wearing an ID badge, and can
decide to either report them or not. For ignoring the policy there may legitimate exceptions,
such as in case of an emergency.
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Observation 2 (Likelihood of Compliance). The likelihood of an employee complying with
the policy will depend on their internal traits and state.
The likelihood of people’s behaviour varies in systematic ways has been widely investi-
gated in psychology. We but name a few well-known models to support this point, which
apply to different levels of abstraction1.
COM-B. The COM-B model [82] (short for: Capability, Opportunity, Motivation – Be-
haviour) conceptualizes long-term behaviour change and has been related to how
influencers change such behaviour.
TPB. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) [8] governs more short term behaviour,
especially how conscious and planned behaviour emerges out of a person’s attitude,
subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control (PBC). Therein, PBC covers the
person’s beliefs in the efficacy of their behaviour. These predictors impact the person’s
intention to act and finally the behaviour itself.
BDI. The Belief-Desires-Intention (BDI) [19] model relates reasoning about beliefs of others
to our own actions.
PMT. The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [17] considers to what extent fear-inducing
messages, such as “You will be fired, if you don’t follow the policy” will induce
behaviour change through a person’s threat and coping appraisal.
Example 2. An employee with a strong subjective norm in favour of security is more likely to
wear an ID badge at all times and to challenge someone not wearing one than an employee
with a very high belief in usability.
Observation 3 (Influencing Behaviour). The internal state of an employee depends on the
observed behaviour from other employees.
Observations persons make have been shown to have different effects on a person’s
beliefs (incl. attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, threat and coping
appraisals). Similarly, the context of the current situation may affect the decision, as well.













Figure 8.1 Influencing behaviour - Employee Alice challenging Bob, Charlie observing and
being influenced towards a compliant attitude. Com - Compliant; !Com - Non-compliant;
N-Neutral;
The aforementioned COM-B model [82] repeatedly yields evidence to that effect. Similarly,
compliance psychology, such as the influencing work done by Cialdini [33] offers mecha-
nisms by which people’s behaviour is influenced by others. Such research has been surveyed
and systematicized in the MINDSPACE framework [43], yielding, for instance, how social
norms impact subjective norms and resulting behavior. Another example from compliance
psychology and MINDSPACE entails how authority figures can influence others.
Example 3. An employee who observes a person in an authoritative position challenging
someone not wearing their ID badge may be more likely to wear the ID badge and challenge
others.
We make the assumption that a person observing an authoritative figure challenging a
person not wearing their ID badge will be themselves, more like to challenge other people not
wearing their badge. We assume this compliance from existing literature where MINDSPACE
and Cialdini’s work demonstrate that individuals behaviour changes based on the behaviours
they have been exposed too [82, 33].





Figure 8.2 Floor plan of organisation, the agents are defined as: No subjective norms
to security and negative attitude to compliance, Positive attitude to compliance,
Negative attitude to compliance, Fear-induced protection intention and positive attitude
to compliance.
8.1.1 Modelling Challenging Behaviour
Figure 8.1 is an overview of how we define the problem. The employee Alice challenges
Bob, where Charlie observes this occurring. As a result of Charlie’s observation, the
compliance attitude of Charlie changes to compliant. This is a problem that can quickly
become computationally intensive. With many employees and many compliance attitudes,
it’s unclear how this particular collective security compliance attitude would evolve because
of social influences.
Consider the example in Figure 8.2 where employees are distributed across locations
and have different attitudes towards policy compliance. If all employees with an attitude
of non-compliant were located and remained in off1 and those with a compliant attitude
remained in off2 then these employees could never influence or interact with each other. For
the organisation, a solution would be to simply target behavioural interventions toward those
in off1. However, this is not the case that employees remain in a particular isolated room will
behave in a particular way, it is much more complex. Employees have different compliance
attitudes therefore, different behaviours that all interact with each other.
In Observations 1, 2 and 3, we have seen (a) that actors have a choice on following
the policy or not, (b) that the likelihood to engage in a certain compliance behavior has
been modelled in a number of psychological frameworks, and (c) observations made of and
interventions made by others influence agents.
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To model Scenario 1, we consider challenging people not wearing a badge as response
variable. Moving forward, we will abstract from individual psychological models and
consider the different aspects of internal state affecting an agent’s behaviour as this agent’s
context. For instance, for the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), the context would model
the agent’s attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control as well as the
resulting behavioural intent as part of the context. Consequently, in our modelling the context
will either output a resulting likelihood for a consequent behaviour or a decision from {0, 1}
on said behaviour.
8.2 PCASP
The purpose of PCASP is to evaluate the compliance attitude of a set of agents for a particular
security policy. The tool performs simulations where a distinct set of actions allow for agents
to change state. From here on in, we refer to actors/humans/people/employees as agents.
At each state, the tool evaluates for a specific action, how an agent would behave if they
were in that situation. For example, knowing the compliance attitude of an agent who is in
the location hall for the challenging policy is an action we can evaluate for each state. The
tool evaluates by assuming that the conditions to challenge someone are true, then returns
the global security compliance attitude for that action for all agents. It uses the parameters of
each agent to assess whether or not for a pre-specified action, how that agent would behave.
The pre-specified action could be an expected behaviour for a security policy, for example,
challenge when you see a person not wearing their badge.
Figure 8.3 is an example of how the tool simulates a state change. The global security
compliance attitude is looking at a particular policy which is very specific. Consider the
example in Section 2 where we defined four different types of contexts an agent can be in
when faced with the opportunity to challenge. In Figure 8.3, the values associated with the
state represents the global compliance attitude of all agents. A value of 1 would indicate that
all agents are either having their context impacted by their fear compliant attitude or they
simply believe that complying with the policy is in the best interest of all parties.
Each state change occurs due to an action performed by an agent or a group of agents.
In Figure 8.3 we have three actions which are chall, move and noChall. Depending on the
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Figure 8.3 Three possible traces from an initial state s0. Each trace calculates the global
compliance attitude of all agents, where the red s7 and s9 are global compliance attitudes
where all agents will act as non-compliant and the green s8 is a global compliance attitude
where all agents will act as compliant. This rate is displayed next to each state where 0 is no
global compliance attitude, that is all agents have a non-compliant security attitude and 1 is a
complete global compliance attitude, where all agents have a compliant attitude.
current state and the action executed, the compliance attitude is impacted accordingly.
Definition 13 (Agents). The set of agents is defined as the following: A ⊆ I ×C×S×P(Θ)×L
where ID’s are defined as I = {i1, . . . , in}, C is the set of Contexts, S is a set of statuses, the
set of observations are Θ ⊆ I ×Act and L is the set of locations. The set Act refers to a set of
actions2.
We will discuss the attributes of agents later in this section, for now it’s important to know
that agents exist with these attributes. However, the observations mentioned here refer to
different observations than the ones outlined in Section 8.1. Agents perform actions which
change the system state. The tool automatically and randomly assigns timings to when an
agent will perform an action. As such, given some initial state, a trace for one simulation
may be completely different to a previous trace where the initial state was identical, as shown
in Figure 8.3. In Figure 8.3 we can see the action move occurs which leads to one of three
states where the global compliance attitude is identical in each state. The different states
2This is an extension of the definition for location based agents introduced in Chapter 5
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here refer to the fact that different agents have moved and the distribution of agents across
locations is now different in each of these three states. This distribution of agents can have a
strong impact on how compliance attitudes are influenced.
The modelling language in PCASP is based of PRISM the Probabilistic Model Checker [75].
In PRISM, modules can be defined which express how transitions can occur. These transitions
can be the state transitions in a Markov Chain or a Markov Decision Process. Each module
is independently defined but can interact with other modules. The agents and later on the
actions in PCASP are set out in a similar syntax to the modules. The main difference between
PCASP and PRISM is any new states in PCASP are prepended to the attribute it refers too.
This will become apparent later on when we cover actions. We could have followed the
same style of using a right arrow (→) as in PRISM but this would be quite verbose as we
have labelled names for locations, contexts and attributes. Therefore, the decision to use a
new line to define it was an appealing aspect from a usability perspective. It now reflects
something similar to JSON or YAML for data structures.
8.2.1 Agents
An agent has a unique identifier which distinguishes them from other agents. We define
the internal traits and state of an agent as a context. Agents also display their public status,
such as wearing an ID badge or not, where other agents can perceive this status. Agents can
observe actions executed by other agents, as such agents keep a record of these observations.
At any time an agent must exist in a physical location, we associate an agent as having a
location which they are occupying. Multiple agents can occupy the same location.
All agents must be defined and provided with all the relevant information. We adopt an
object-oriented style description of entities in PCASP, such that an agent is defined by the









The context and status of agents contributes to the global state of the system. The context
represents the internal state of an individual agent. The status is the publicly available
information that other agents perceive about that agent, for instance, are they wearing their
ID badge or not [29]. The contexts and statuses of the agents in this example are (As they
must also be defined in the tool):
C : normsNonCompliant,compliant,nonCompliant, fearCompliant
S : wearingID,carryingID,noID
The observations of agents are acquired as a model progresses. They are provided for an
initial state of the agent, however, in this example we initialise all agents with no observations
(empty). Finally, the location of where the agent is initially located must also be provided.
8.2.2 Actions
We have introduced agents which have an id, context, status, observations and a location. An
action will change an agent. The id of an agent is static. The status and location can change
directly because of an action. The context and observations of an agent are impacted by an
action, however, we discuss this more in depth later in this section. For now, it is important to
mention that actions cause observations. An action typically changes the attributes of agents
and causes observations. In PCASP, we represent the change of an attribute in an action as







Agents exist in a location and can move between locations. It is an example of one such
action. When we define an action, we provide the conditions required for an agent to satisfy
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the action. Additionally, we provide any observations that occur as a result of the agent







The action offToHall changes the agent’s location attribute to a new location attribute hall.
We write the following transition to express the exact meaning of the action offToHall:
a.loc = off1
a offToHall−−−−−→ a[loc = hall] (8.1)
Not all elements of an agent need to be provided, in the case of a move action, the
start and finish location may be the only requirements. To increase usability of the tool,
physical links for all the locations can be given. All of the links are a defined as a set where
Link ⊆ L×L and in the tool, the example for all links takes the form:
Link : (hall,off1)(off1,hall)(hall,off2)(off2,hall)(hall,sec)(sec,hall)
Note that we do not assume Link to be symmetrical, i.e., given two locations l and l′,
if (l, l′) belongs to Link, it does not automatically imply that (l′, l) also belongs to Link.
Once given the set of links, PCASP automatically generates all actions movel1l2 . We write
(i,c,s,Θ, l)[loc = l′] = (i,c,s,Θ, l′) as a pointwise operation in Equation 8.1 to express that
an agents location has changed. Formally, a move takes the format of a transition rule:
(a.loc, l) ∈ Link
a
movel1l2−−−−−→ a[loc = l] (8.2)
The context of an action can impact the choice an agent makes towards their public status.









An action can involve multiple agents, in which case they need to be all independently
specified within the action. Each agent is self-contained and the requirements and observa-














Agents involved in the same action synchronise. We write the following: a1||a2
act−→ a′1||a′2
indicating that agents a1 and a2 have both been a part of the action act. Formally the action
chall becomes the transition where we provide an assumption that all agents are always
carrying their ID card:
a1.loc = hall∧a1.con = compliant∧a2.loc = hall
a1||a2
chall(a1,a2)−−−−−−→ a1||a2[status = wearingID] (8.3)
Given the action chall, the agent a1 does not change, agent a2 goes from not wearing an
ID to wearing it.
We have defined the challenging behaviour, however, agents can perform the action of
















From the action noChall we can see that the ID of the agent challenging must be id1 or id2. It
is often the case that a person/agent in a position of authority will have their actions noticed
more by others [62]. It is one interpretation of the Authority principle from the work by
Cialdini on social influences [34]. It has strong connections to the Messenger effect from the
MINDSPACE framework which states "A person in authority or one that is trusted has an
influence over the decisions that other people make" [44].
8.2.3 Observations
We previously defined the set of observations as Θ, where an observation is a record of the
executed action and the ID of the agent that executed the action. Agents keep a record of
observations, it is very much a personal trace for each agent’s interactions with each other.






The observation occurs for all agents satisfying the location and context provided. The set
of observations for an agent include the new observation if the agent is in the correct location
and has the correct context. An observation cannot occur without an action. Therefore, the
observation is part of the action. We express this with regards to all agents as:
x ∈ Act a x−→ a′
a||A x−→ a′||A[θ = (a.id,x)|a.loc] (8.4)
(i,c,s,Θ, l)[θ = y|l′] =





upd : C×P(Θ)→C (8.6)
Equations 8.4 and 8.5 are stating that for all agents in the same location as an action, update
there own set of observations and update their context if applicable. We provide the behaviour
change policy for the upd in the next subsection.
The function upd changes the context of an agent when they observe a new action. We
will discuss this function more in Section 8.2.4. Again, we make use of the pointwise
operation to express that an agent’s observation is updated for observing an action. Given the
action chall, which includes the observation obsChall, we express it as the following:
chall ∈ Act a1||a2
chall−−→ a1||a2
a1||a2||A
chall−−→ a1||a2||A[θ = (a1.id,chall)|a.loc] (8.7)
Equations 8.4 - 8.6 are the transition rules at the fundamental levels e.g. how the
transition occurs without any context to an action. Equation 8.7 which is a transition is
context specific as it is statically bound to the action chall and it can happen in any location.
The implementation in PCASP later on will define what that location is for the running
example. The transition in equation 8.7 is not neccesary but it does show how we can focus
transition rules towards certain actions.
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8.2.4 Behaviour Change
Once an agent has collected observations, the context of that agent can change. The work
mentioned earlier by Cialdini offers mechanisms by which behaviour is influenced, where
such a mechanism is authority [33]. This translates to the tool by which an agent’s context
can change if the agent has observed another agent who they classify as an authority perform
a specific action.
A behaviour change tests the current observations against the conditions for the behaviour






Recall the function upd which takes a context, a set of observations and returns a context.
The tool expresses this function by checking behaviour change functions and updating the








Given Equation 8.8, behaviour change functions can encompass a range of observations.
For example, if we consider subjective norms where it is often described as a feeling of
pressure to perform a behaviour, if an agent then observes many other agents performing a
specific action, then their context could be influenced. It has been shown before that people
may psychologically and culturally attach themselves to a group be behaving in an expected
manner [7].
8.2 PCASP 151
8.2.5 Evaluating Policy Compliance
The model expressed so far describes agents moving independently and interacting with each
other over a set of behavioural elements. An agents context, status and location can change
depending on the action they take or the observations they have recorded.
Definition 14 (Properties). We define the set of properties as P = {p1, . . . , pl} where a
property refers to a set of conditions.
The global compliance attitude for a policy is proportional to the number of agents at
any given point that would be compliant with the policy should they be presented with the
opportunity to comply. To evaluate the global compliance attitude we define properties which
take a set of logical conditions for an agent and return all agents that meet these logical
conditions. A specified property is a snapshot of a model at a given time point. As the model
progresses, a snapshot of each state is taken. We use this method to evaluate the global
compliance attitude. These snapshots form a trace describing how the global compliance







A property is assessing for all agents, how many of them meet the proposed criteria.
Based on the behaviour set we have defined, we know that an agent will definitely challenge
when they have a context as compliant and a status as wearingID.








1 c = compliant∧
s = wearingID
1 c = fearCompliant∧
s = wearingID
0 otherwise
Equations 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11 demonstrate how PCASP evaluates a behaviour. It returns the
global compliance attitude for the logical conditions provided. It does this for all states in the
model formed through simulation, i.e. every time an agent performs an action. We do not
consider a change to the context or an observation as a state change, all state changes are due
to an action.
Another property which we can evaluate is the global compliance attitude of agents who
also challenge when faced with the norms pressure of others in the vicinity. We define this









1 c = compliant
1 c = fearCompliant
1 c = normsNonCompliant
0 otherwise
(8.11)
Based on the distribution of agents in Figure 8.2, the initial strong compliance attitude is
45%. Whilst there are 11/22 agents (see Figure 1 for number of agents) who are compliant
or fearCompliant, we defined one to have the status as carryingID and therefore, would not
satisfy the strong compliance property. The initial weak compliance attitude is 88%.
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Figure 8.4 Average run of traces when comparing a weak compliance attitude VS a strong
compliance attitude. The tool ran for ten traces over each property.
8.2.6 Implementation
The parameters provided to PCASP by a user is translated manually into Julia where the
SysModels package is used as an engine to run the models [? ]. The SysModels package
allows for agent based simulation. PCASP provides a clear and concise language for a user
to create and evaluate social influences. It is a platform to utilise the SysModels engine.
We ran the tool evaluating the two properties which are the strong and weak compliance
attitudes of agents for challenging behaviour. Figure 8.4 shows the results of PCASP for the
two properties. PCASP shows that from the behaviour set provided, agents will usually end
up being compliant with the policy.
We used a Toshiba Portege laptop with 8GB of RAM, an Intel i5 processor and a trace of
the model took approximately 3-4 seconds. The results shown are based on the average of 10
traces from the same initial state.
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8.2.7 Discussion: Global Compliance Attitude
PCASP analyses the global compliance attitude of the employees by assessing and quanti-
fying their attitudes towards particular security policies. For the organisation, we believe
that this information would be relevant. However, we also see the appeal of measuring the
number of security incidents.
In general, one would assume that as the global compliance attitude of employees
improves, the number of security incidents decreases. However, it may be possible that
a decrease in global compliance attitude increases the number of security incidents. For
the organisation, this would be a major cause of concern when considering behavioural
interventions.
The relationship between global compliance attitude and security incidents is one we
will be addressing in future versions of PCASP as the tool. For now, we simply identify this
relationship as an area of interest.
8.3 Impact Analysis
PCASP assesses the global compliance attitude of agents in a system. Given a model which
contains a set of interactions and agents, a state by state value for the global compliance
attitude for an action can be established. A change to the composing parts of the model
can impact how the global compliance attitude evolves. Impact Analysis or Change Impact
Analysis is often used to describe the effect a change has on a system.
When discussing human or agent behaviour change, we refer to the vast array of behaviour
change models [83]. Mentioned earlier and in Chapter 2, the COM-B Model classifies
human behaviour change as targeting towards a person’s Capabilities, Opportunities or
Motivation [82].
We base any changes in our model with regards to COM-B. In our Impact Analysis, we
consider two behavioural change elements; 1. A change of Physical Opportunities which is
the availability of actions and/or the availability of observations for an agent; 2. A change of
Motivation, which is targeting the agent’s context.
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Figure 8.5 The impact analysis for two different interventions in comparison to the original
behaviour of the model.
8.3.1 Impact Change Analysis
If perfect compliance (all agents complying at all times) is not being achieved, some change
may impact the global compliance attitude. For example, if an organisation enforced that all
employees had to attend mandatory training, they would want to assess if the training had
an impact, or at which point in time is the training no longer useful. We now consider two
changes or interventions in the example.
Impact Change 1 (Physical Restructure). Changing the physical structure of an organisation
such that observations in specific areas become no longer possible.
Support: The opportunities from the COM-B model discusses physically restructuring an
environment as a behavioural intervention that causes behaviour change [82].







Impact Change 2 (Positive Re-enforcement). People of high influence who act in a positive















Support: We know that certain people have more power than others when we consider
their likelihood to influence. This power that they hold can be used to create a positive
environment. We draw upon the Messenger effect from MINDSPACE as inspiration for the
behavioural intervention used in the impact analysis [44].
Example: Staging an authoritative employee to challenge someone not wearing their ID
badge. We still leave the action for challenging behaviour in the model, however, we define
an additional challenge that forces agents of a particular ID to challenge. Consider the
authoritative employees as hired actors to improve the global compliance attitude.
The results from Figure 8.5 show that both the interventions positively increased policy
compliance. For a user of PCASP, measuring the relationship between the simulated changes
and proposed changes in reality would ideally have some form of correlation which we
don’t yet know without sufficient validation. In the example in Figure 8.5 the Noint (red









Figure 8.6 PCASP : Relationship between compliance attitude and compliance behaviour.
line) increases as the compliance attitude of agents increases due to the observations agents
make of each others compliance attitudes. In this model it tends to be the case that as agen’t
interact the global compliance attitude always increases even without intervention.
8.4 Simulation Tool: Validation
8.4.1 PCASP is a Proof of Concept
We see PCASP as paving the way for assessing evolving compliance attitudes in an organi-
sation. We have sought in the literature and drawn conclusions about observing compliant
behaviour influencing compliance attitudes. Figure 8.6 which is the same as Figure 1.1 is a
concrete example of how PCASP replicates this concept of influencing behaviour amongst
agents, especially when the contexts of the agents are heterogeneous.
8.4.2 PCASP Responds to Intervention as Expected
When using PCASP to enforce a positive behaviour intervention as we did in Section 8.3, it
responds as expected. That is, what we perceived to be a positive intervention produced a
positive change to the compliance attitudes of agents.
An area which PCASP paves the way for is to explore perceived positive behavioural
interventions which cause a negative impact towards the compliance attitude. Conversely,
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does there exist a negative behavioural intervention which positively influences compliance
attitudes? As a behavioural model evolved and trust/relationship between agents is integrated
a scenario where poor compliance behaviour from an untrusted source improves compliance
attitudes could be designed.
8.4.3 PCASP is Contextual and Does Not Generalise
At the moment, the tool provides little insight towards the power of social influences and
what that means for other contexts. It’s a very focused tool in that a user must design and
work with one use case at a time.
Future versions of the tool would allow for estimations about the impact certain types
of influences would have. For example, assessing the general impact of a Messenger effect
would allow us to understand how effective it is across the board in a range of scenarios.
A combination of PCASP and machine learning techniques would assist and support the
establishments of base metrics for different social influences as more use cases are evaluated.
8.4.4 The Accuracy Between the Tool and the Formal Model
Validation techniques ensuring that the tool accurately reflects the formal model in terms of
behaviour. The verification of properties associated with the model would provide certainty
that it is behaving as expected. For example, a model that contains a different amount of
locations during the course of a trace where the model clearly specifies fixed locations would
identify that the tool or implementation is inconsistent.
8.5 Simulation Tool: Conclusion
In this work we presented PCASP which provides a platform for simulation of human
agent behaviour assessing the security culture. The tool demonstrated its application by
modifying behaviour via interventions as impact analysis. The tool PCASP differs from the
implementation in Chapter 6. In Chapter 6 we hardcoded the implementation without any
guidance which would lead to inconsistencies. The tool provides that platform for ensuring
that models are reproducible and readable. The language used is not complex and the PCASP
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translates this simple syntax into the Julia language. The syntax defined allows for a system
to be modelled, simulated and analysed. These three features of the tool are the foundation
of the tool.
A takeaway for this chapter is that the we established a baseline tool by which we can
determine the security culture for a given set of agents. Albeit the translation between the
tool and the simulation was manual, it would be possible to create a translator that takes the
syntax of the code, checks for errors and performs simulation whilst returning some analysis.
Unfortunately, we don’t know the accuracy of the simulation. Is it a faithful representation
of the model and does it hold to the model outlined in Chapter 5. This tool takes us two and
three levels away from the model. The second level is the syntax for PCASP, the third level
is the simulation code. Any errors that come from the initial model may be exponential in
the second and third level. We currently have not assessed this and acknowledge that it is a
clear limitation of this work.
The choice to implement PCASP in the manner we did was reflective of PRISM, the
probabilistic model checker. By separating agents and actions we can clearly define the
system. It does have its disadvantages as a large model would make it difficult to see the
global picture.
Exploring this work in the future, the focus should be on creating an automatic tool that
translates the syntax of PCASP into the simulation code to ensure that many different use
cases can be compared. Ideally, we should be able to build the simulation code then go back
to the syntax to ensure there is correctness. Without that level of implementation, the tool
will remain a manual process which takes away from its intention.
Additional future work should consider Chapter 4 and use of the Coloured Petri Nets. If
PCASP can provide visualisation for connected processes/behaviours then illustrating this to
the user could provide further insights. It would also assist with any model checking where




The research question for this chapter is:
Research Question 6 (Validation). How can we ensure that our methods and processes to
address the previous research questions are valid?
We provide a brief overview of the chapter in the form of a structured abstract to inform
the reader about how we address the research question.
Chapter Brief: To validate PCASP by comparing simulated data against the empirical data
from Chapter 6.
Objective: In traditional statistics tests, we would aim to reject a null hypothesis. However,
in this chapter, failing to reject the null hypothesis is the objective as we seek to provide
assurance that PCASP has some validity when comparing against real world data. An
assumption of model fitting is that the expected data and observed data have no variance.
Ideally for a χ2 test we would want to claim that the null hypothesis is true, however, we
can never claim a null hypothesis is true, we can only assert with some confidence that it is
true [61]. Therefore our null hypothesis will consist of comparing simulated data against real
world data and the null hypothesis for this would always be that they are not significantly
different.
Method: For each group in the user study, we created a model and implemented it in PCASP
for N = 54 agents to generate the synthetic data. The synthetic data in this chapter too
is referred to as the observed data and the data from the user study is referred to as the
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expected data. We initialised N = 54 agents reflecting a high swipe ratio overall and for each
model selected a unique set of these agents to participate in either the Control, Discrete+, or
Continuous− simulation to generate the observed data.
Results: The observed data was simulated in PCASP and compared to the expected data.
Initially, we used an ANOVA for each group to assess if there was a mean difference between
the observed and the expected data sets. We then performed a Chi-Squared Goodness of Fit
test for both the total number of swipes and the swipe ratio. The results for the total swipes
was χ2(2) = .465, p = .792. The results for the swipe ratio was χ2(2) = .716, p = .699.
Conclusion: We conclude that PCASP was able to match with the empirical data without a
significant difference, however, we know that we did not have a sample size large enough to
faithfully represent a general population.
Chapter Overview: In this chapter we discuss validation techniques for PCASP. We then
perform objective validation to measure the accuracy of PCASP by use of the Chi-Squared
Goodness of Fit test to assess the accuracy of expected data (empirical data from the user
study) against observed data (data from the PCASP simulation). Based on the results of
both the Chi-Squared Goodness of Fit tests we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the
observed data was not significantly different from the expected data for both the total swipes
and the swipe ratio. It is important to note that this aligns with the objective of this chapter,
which is to demonstrate and provide assurance that PCASP is behaving in a manner that is
consistent to the real world.
9.1 Background: Validation Techniques
Chapters three to seven have addressed different parts of the same problem. That problem
consists of how to formulate a system representing psychological influences.
Validating a hypothesis or model can often be carried out with empirical evidence.
Particularly when human behaviour is concerned, the empirical results demonstrate reasoning
for why people behave in a certain manner [91]. Validation does not have to be just empirical,
Dash et al. used a data driven approach and achieved next place prediction for people in a
physical space. By utilising known information such as the time of day, current location
9.1 Background: Validation Techniques 163
and day of the week, they were able to accurately predict the next location of a person [40].
Applications for data driven models extend to security, Authentication graphs were derived
from access logs to classify intruders on a network [72].
The tool PCASPallows for simulation of our rule based model. Any validation that we
can provide gives us confidence that the tool is meeting its design objectives.
9.1.1 Validation Techniques
Validation provides confidence for a user that a tool is performing as it should. In a sense, it is
a check for accuracy of a models representation against the real world system it is imitating.
The techniques used for validation are not a fully agreed concept. Sudeikat et al. high-
lights five avenues for validation of Multi-Agent Systems which are testing, run-time mon-
itoring, static analysis, model checking and theorem proving where testing has the least
amount of strength and theorem proving has the most strength [103]. On the other side,
Sargent describes a more general approach to validation that is not specific to the program
or model level, instead it focuses on operational validity which relates to the outputs the
model provides [98]. In this case there are two modes of validation which are objective and
subjective validation.
Program Validation
Testing Testing via user studies and assessing the accuracy of PCASP against real world
data allows for confidence when considering specific use cases which relate to that real world
data.
Run-Time Monitoring Depending on how PCASP is composed, confirming that proper-
ties that violate a data-race if not held is crucial. For instance, we do not want an agent to
move to two different locations at the same time point.
Static Analysis An example of static analysis would be unit testing that we often see
performed in various programming languages. For PCASP, such testing is important when
verifying that a particular element such as a location behaves as intended.
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Model Checking In model checking, we want to achieve correctness in the model and
avoid deadlocks. One property of correctness for PCASP would be An agent can always
perform an action and ensuring this deadlock does not occur would give confidence to the
user that they designed a model that is deadlock-free.
Theorem Proving Theorem-proving ensures specific properties hold in a system. In
PCASP, one such property might be that removing a location has no negative impact on the
compliance attitude of agents and formally proving that maybe true or false dependent on
the location that is removed.
Operational Validity
Objective An objective approach is performed by some form of trusted methodology. For
example, statistical tests comparing the output of a simulation model when compared to real
world data is one approach for objective validation. Often, the type of test and method for
performing the test depends on if the model is underlying model is observable [98].
Subjective A subjective validity check would be performed by experts of the system who
provide opinions on their observed usage of a simulation tool [98].
9.2 Preliminaries
In this chapter we use two different data sets for our comparisons, they are:
Expected Data This is the data collected from the smart card interventions study in
Chapter 7. We make use of the total number of swipes and the swipe rate ratio.
Observed Data In this chapter we use PCASP to create a observed data set that takes the
same format of the expected data and it generated on the basis of the three groups used to
collect the expected data which are Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−.
Additionally we use three terminologies which are people, agents and accuracies:
9.2 Preliminaries 165
People Any mention of people in this chapter refers to the people that participated in the
user study from Chapter 7.
Agents Any mention of agents in this chapter refers to the agents in the simulation.
Accuracies The term accuracies or accuracy refers to how well fitted the observed data in
the simulation is when comparing to the expected data from the empirical study in Chapter 6.
9.2.1 Analysis of Variance
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a set of statistical methods to analyse and approximate
the differences between group means of some samples. In this chapter we used a one-
way omnibus ANOVA which entails comparing the means of all the different experiment
conditions against the simulation conditions and assessing if there is a difference.
9.2.2 Chi Squared Goodness of Fit
Chi Squared Goodness of Fit test The Chi Squared Test is used to determine how sig-
nificantly different some observed data (for us, simulation data) is when compared to the
expected data (for us, empirical data). For a Chi Squared Goodness of Fit test there are four
assumption criteria that must be met:
Assumption 4 (Categorical Variable). One categorical variable (i.e., the variable can be
dichotomous, nominal or ordinal). Examples of dichotomous variables include gender (2
groups: male or female), treatment type (2 groups: medication or no medication), educational
level (2 groups: undergraduate or postgraduate) and religious (2 groups: yes or no).
Assumption 5 (Independence of Observations). We should have independence of observa-
tions, which means that there is no relationship between any of the cases (e.g., participants).
Assumption 6 (Mutually Exclusive). The groups of the categorical variable must be mutually
exclusive.
Assumption 7 (Expected Frequencies). There must be at least 5 expected frequencies in
each group of your categorical variable.
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To clarify, in this chapter, all of the assumption criteria is met in order for us to proceed
with a Chi-Squared Goodness of fit test.
9.3 Aims
Research Question 7 (Tool Accuracy). To what extent is PCASP accurate when comparing
against real world expected data.
Hypotheses on Total Number of Swipes The overall null hypothesis for this experiment
is HS1,0 : There is no mean difference in the total number of swipes when comparing the
expected data against the observed data.
We have subordinate null hypotheses for each group:
HS1,0,ObsC: There is no mean difference in the total number of swipes when comparing the
observed data against the expected data for the Control group.
HS1,0,ObsD+: There is no mean difference in the total number of swipes when comparing the
observed data against the expected data for the Discrete+ group.
HS1,0,ObsC−: : There is no mean difference in the total number of swipes when comparing
the observed data against the expected data for the Continuous− group.
We have these as alternative hypotheses.
HS1,1,ObsC: The means of the observed data and expected data for total number of swipes
are different for the Control group.
HS1,1,ObsD+: The means of the observed data and expected data for total number of swipes
are different for the Discrete+ group.
HS1,1,ObsC−: The means of the observed data and expected data for total number of swipes
are different for the Continuous− group.
Hypotheses on Swipe Rate Ratio The overall null hypothesis for this experiment is HS2,0 :
There is no mean difference in the swipe rate ratio when comparing the expected data against
the observed data.
We have subordinate null hypotheses for each group:
HS2,0,ObsC: There is no mean difference in the swipe rate ratio when comparing the observed
data against the expected data for the Control group.
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HS2,0,ObsD+: There is no mean difference in the swipe rate ratio when comparing the ob-
served data against the expected data for the Discrete+ group.
HS2,0,ObsC−: There is no mean difference in the swipe rate ratio when comparing the ob-
served data against the expected data for the Continuous− group.
HS2,1,ObsC: The means of the observed data and expected data for the swipe rate ratio are
different for the Control group.
HS2,1,ObsD+: The means of the observed data and expected data for the swipe rate ratio are
different for the Discrete+ group.
HS2,1,ObsC−: The means of the observed data and expected data for the swipe rate ratio are
different for the Continuous− group.
Unlike the experiment in the Chapter 7, in this experiment we aim to accept the null
hypothesis for both the total number of swipes and the swipe rate ratio. Accepting the null
hypotheses would indicate that the expected and observed data is well fitted. Unfortunately,
it will not tell us if PCASP is provided a level of accuracy, or if this set of data is by chance.
9.4 Method
9.4.1 PCASP Model
In order to generate the observed data, we first need a model capable of doing so. We define
a swipe card model catering for the four events from the actual user study. We provide two
different contexts for agents. They are compliant and nonCompliant. A model where no


































The actions are mirrored for the action of not swiping. The four actions defined capture
the agents moving from the offline (Cyber Security Room) area to the online (Research) area
and vice versa where they have the possibility to either swipe or not swipe. For the agents,














For all of the agents, we can record each event as it happens and generate a data set which
allows for some post processing where we can gather the total number of swipes per agent
and the swipe rate ratio of each agent.
9.4.2 Model Parameters
There are three parameters to consider. They are the time intervals at which actions can occur,
the contexts of agents, and the impact interventions have on agents behaviour.
Time When designing PCASP, we implemented it utilising as an engine the SysModels
package in Julia [27]. The package deals with time by ensuring that agents behave concur-
rently according to a global clock. In order to specify the amount of time passing for actions
we use a Poisson distribution. This distribution is established from the expected data to assess
roughly how long agents would spend in the research and securityroom locations.
Context An agents context in the model presented in Section 9.4.1 can take the format of
compliant or non− compliant. From the quantitative data of the user study we know that
on average people swiped more often than not. For the purposes of this experiment we
will use the swipe rate ratio of participants to initialise the contexts of agents. The same
parameters for agents context used in the Control simulation are used for the Discrete+ and
Continuous− simulations.
Interventions There are three different groups that we are comparing for the expected data,
which are the Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−. We add to each model some criteria in
order to replicate the behavioural interventions.
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Figure 9.1 An overview of the simulation path.
• Control: There is no change to the model as there is no intervention in this group.
• Discrete+: There is an intervention set at a specific time point to influence agents to
be more likely to swipe.
• Continuous−: There is a constant intervention in place to suppress agents willingness
to swipe their smart card.
9.4.3 Experiment Setup
The experiment is setup using the expected data from Chapter 7 and compares like for like
based on condition for a observed data set generated by the simulation tool PCASP. The
expected data we already have, the observed still needs to be generated.
Faithful to empirical study In this chapter we set up the simulation models as faithful as
possible to the empirical study. By faithful we mean that it attempts to mimic how the user
study originally ran. We do this in five stages which are illustrated in Figure 9.1:
• Generate: We generate fifty four agents with unique ID’s and base their compliance
attitudes off the swipe rate for the Control group from the user study in Chapter 6.
• Select Randomly: We select randomly the agents and assign them to a simulated
Control, Discrete+ or Continuous− group.
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• Simulate Model: We simulate the each model once under it’s particular condition
with the appropriate intervention applied which we discuss in subsection 9.4.5.
• Data Set: From the simulation we then have an established list of swipe card events
which are associated with each agents unique ID.
• Python Script: We run a python script over the data set to collect the total number of
swipes and the swipe ratios for each agent.
9.4.4 Measurements
As per the user study in Chapter 7 we measure the same values in the observed data which is
the total number of swipes and the swipe rate ratio (i.e. the number of total swipes against all
events).
9.4.5 Implementing observed Interventions
Discrete+ In the user study, the Discrete+ intervention consisted of a reminder from the
study leader at the twenty five minute mark. The purpose of the intervention is to increase
the likelihood that a person would swipe their smart card.
To replicate the Discrete+ intervention in the simulation, we deploy a reminder to agents
at the observed time of twenty five minutes in the simulation which increases the likelihood
that an agent will swipe their smart card on entry and exit.
Continuous− In the user study, the Continuous− intervention consisted of a continuous
messy room. The purpose of the intervention is to decrease the likelihood that a person
would swipe their smart card.
To replicate the Continuous− intervention in the simulation, we suppress agents likeli-
hood to swipe their smart card for the duration of the simulation.
9.4.6 Ethics
The expected data collected in the user study catered for the relevant ethics and in this
experiment, there is no ethical consideration as we are including observed data.
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9.5 Results
As a general rule, statistics were computed with a significance level of α = .05. We used an
omnibus ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) with planned contrasts. We assessed the difference
in mean number of total swipes and mean swipe rate ratio between the expected data and
observed data for each group type. Should an effect be apparent (a difference in means), we
then calculate the correlation by means of a χ2 (chi-squared) test for goodness of fit.
9.5.1 Participants
The number of participants of 54 from the user study is reflected in the observed data as 54
agents. Each group in the user study ran with in between 4-6 people. The same is true for the
observed data where we run each study with the same number of agents to match the study.
9.5.2 Metric 1: Total Swipes
The measure total number of swipes is the number of times a participant swiped when
entering and exiting the Cyber Security Room during each session.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 9.1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the three groups in the study for both the
expected and observed data for the total swipes. In Tables 9.1 the values Me and SDe refer
to the mean and standard deviation for the data collected in the user study and Mo and SDo
refer to the mean and standard deviation for the data collected in the simulations.
Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics: Total Swipes
Control Discrete+ Continuous−
Me 9.08 8.55 5.53
SDe 4.48 3.75 2.29
Mo 9.81 10.25 7.01
SDo 2.54 3.36 3.08
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Table 9.2 ANOVA Results: Total Swipes (Control)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
Controle v. Controlo 1 17.29 17.289 6.351 .029
Residuals 11 29.94 2.72
Table 9.3 ANOVA Results: Total Swipes (Discrete+)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
Discrete+e v. Discrete+o 1 .29 .287 .023 .0.881
Residuals 18 225.46 12.526
Table 9.4 ANOVA Results: Total Swipes (Continuous−)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
Continuous−e v. Continuous−o 1 22.8 22.798 2.451 .0.136
Residuals 17 158.2 9.303
ANOVA - Total Swipes
We conducted an omnibus Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to compare each condition against
its observed data on the total number of swipes. We used with planned contrasts for each
ANOVA:
• Control: Controle v. Controlo
• Discrete+: Discrete+e v. Discrete+o
• Continuous−: Continuous−e v. Continuous−o
Control The ANOVA for the Control data shows a statistically significant difference be-
tween means of the expected and observed data, F(1,11) = 6.35, p = .029. We thereby
reject the null hypothesis HS1,0,ObsC that there is no mean difference in the total number of
swipes when comparing the observed data against the expected data for the Control group.
Discrete+ The ANOVA for the Discrete+ data shows no significant difference between
means of the expected and observed data, F(1,18) = .023, p = .0881. We thereby accept
the null hypothesis HS1,0,ObsD that there is no mean difference in the total number of swipes
when comparing the observed data against the expected data for the Discrete+ group.
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Table 9.5 Descriptive Statistics: Swipe Rate Ratio
Control Discrete+ Continuous−
Me .92 .90 .81
SDe .15 .17 .24
Mo .81 .83 .59
SDo .21 .27 .25
Continuous− The ANOVA for the Continuous− data shows no significant difference be-
tween means of the expected and observed data, F(1,17) = 2.45, p = .136. We thereby
accept the null hypothesis HS1,0,ObsC− that there is no mean difference in the total number of
swipes when comparing the observed data against the expected data for the Continuous−
group.
χ2 Test - Total Swipes
A chi-square goodness of fit was calculated comparing the occurrence of the expected data
for total swipes against the occurrence of the simulated data for total swipes. No significant
deviation from the simulated values was and the result of the test is: χ2(2) = .716, p = .699.
We thereby fail to reject the overall null hypothesis HS1,0 that there is no mean difference in
the total number of swipes when comparing the expected data against the observed data.
9.5.3 Metric 2: Swipe Rate Ratio
The Swipe Rate Ratio is the rate at which participants successfully swiped their smart card
on entering and exiting the Cyber Security Room. A swipe rate ratio of 1 indicates that the
participant swiped every time they entered and exited.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 9.5 shows the mean and standard deviation of the three groups in the study for both the
expected and observed data for the swipe rate ratio.
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Table 9.6 ANOVA Results: Swipe Ratio (Control)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
Controle v. Controlo 1 .102 .102 5.696 .0036
Residuals 11 0.2 0.02
Table 9.7 ANOVA Results: Swipe Ratio (Discrete+)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
Discrete+e v. Discrete+o 1 .07 .07 .095 .343
Residuals 18 1.31 0.07
Table 9.8 ANOVA Results: Swipe Ratio (Continuous−)
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F-Value p-Value
Continuous−e v. Continuous−o 1 .14 .14 2.34 .144
Residuals 17 1.05 0.06
ANOVA - Swipe Ratio
We conducted the same ANOVA style tests for the swipe ratio as we did for the total number
of swipes:
Control The ANOVA for the Control data shows a statistically significant difference be-
tween means of the expected and observed data, F(1,11) = 5.696, p = .0036. We thereby
reject the null hypothesis HS2,0,ObsC that there is no mean difference in the swipe ratio when
comparing the observed data against the expected data for the Control group.
Discrete+ The ANOVA for the Discrete+ data shows no significant difference between
means of the expected and observed data, F(1,18) = .095, p = .343. We thereby accept the
null hypothesis HS2,0,ObsD that there is no mean difference in the total number of swipes
when comparing the observed data against the expected data for the Discrete+ group.
Continuous− The ANOVA for the Continuous− data shows no significant difference be-
tween means of the expected and observed data, F(1,17) = 2.34, p = .144. We thereby
accept the null hypothesis HS2,0,ObsC− that there is no mean difference in the total number of
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swipes when comparing the observed data against the expected data for the Continuous−
group.
χ2 Test - Swipe Ratio
A chi-square goodness of fit was calculated comparing the occurrence of the expected data
for swipe ratio against the occurrence of the simulated data for swipe ratio. No significant
deviation from the simulated values was and the result of the test is: χ2(2) = .465, p = .792.
We thereby fail to reject the overall null hypothesis HS2,0 that there is no mean difference in
the swipe ratio when comparing the expected data against the observed data.
9.6 Discussion
9.6.1 Limitations
The parametrisation of the model relied heavily on the quantitative information from
the expected data.
In this experiment we were fortunate to have the data to inform the model about peoples
behaviour and define a model accordingly to represent them as simulated agents. Unfortu-
nately, this would not be the case for the majority of the time when considering the evolution
of compliance attitudes. Nevertheless, we feel that the first version of PCASP provides a
starting point for assessing how validation concepts can be utilised to provide a ground truth.
The model used did not exploit fully the use of observations
The model we used for simulation was a naive reflection of reality. From watching the
video footage of participants in the empirical study there is an indication that proximity of
participants has an influence on another participants chance to swipe. These observations are
something we did not capture in the model and may well improve the result we get from the
chi squared goodness of fit test. Nevertheless, we did make use of the observations with the
simulated Discrete+ model demonstrating that some agents will have noticed and changed
their behaviour due to the intervention part way through the simulation.
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9.6.2 Ecological Validity
The empirical data that we have collected in Chapter 6 is already limited due to the restricted
population that we used via convenience sampling. Because of this method it further limits
the validation in this experiment and makes the work less generalisable than if the sample
had been larger and from a wider pool of potential participants.
9.7 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter we addressed research question 6 with an experiment to validate the accuracy
of PCASP when comparing to empirical data. Our results showed that there is no significant
difference in the observed and expected data for both metrics of the total swipes and the
swipe ratio in two of the conditions.
Failing to reject both null hypotheses in this chapter is considered a success for addressing
the research question. Whilst we did not measure to what extent PCASP is accurate, we
managed to show that in four out of six ANOVAs carried out that there was no significant
difference in the mean values.
This chapter demonstrates that validation techniques can be applied to PCASP and is
another contribution towards the holistic body of research presented in this thesis towards
compliance attitudes for security policies.
In this chapter we did not model the control case where the observed data fit with the
expected data. This then leads us to question whether or not we actually achieved the aim for
this chapter. With one of the conditions failing to fit, we cannot reliably say that the model
simulation is in any way reflective of the real world. However, it does give us a base to go on
as we can now assess what was wrong with the control case. Perhpas the parameterisation
was not optimised to suit for a model of this type, which leads us to wonder what would the
ideal/optimal parameters be as a base for each of the cases.
A key insight for this chapter is that PCASP can be compared against real world data.
This step towards validation is crucial for the tool. Unfortunately we can’t say that it is
accurate, we can only claim that the data sets themselves are significantly different which
allows us to have faith that the tool is heading towards a good fit for what we want.
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An important part of this work was creating the synthetic data set which required us to
run simulations. The simulation was flexible enough to allow us to produce the format of the
data we needed ensuring we could perform automated analysis trivially.
A limitation of this work is that different parameters for the simulations would produce
different results. It would usually not be a problem, however, without any knowledge of what
those parameters were, such as compliance attitude of agents, it means our estimates of an
even distribution have no grounding in reality.
Any future work in this area needs to ensure that any parameters used for the simulation
is faithful to the real world. In essence, this is the correctness and completeness problem
which is consistent throughout this thesis. As the majority of this work is mainly a proof of
concept, it creates that foundation for future work to build on. By assessing and observing




The work in thesis addressed the problem of security policies in organisations where employ-
ees have a choice to comply. The area we concerned ourselves with is that of compliance
attitudes, which are the internal mechanisms guiding a persons compliance behaviour. We
stated and provided evidence that a person’s compliance attitude can be subject to change
from social influences from other people. The importance of assessing social influences
towards compliance attitudes allows an organisation to make more informed decisions about
the current risk environment that they are in. Furthermore, if an organisation could predict
the impact of social influences, then it would inform behavioural interventions should they
be needed. We derived the following aim:
Aim: To provide tools and methodologies for an organisation to predict and
analyse the impact social influences have towards compliance attitudes for
security policies.
We chose to address the aim by identifying and focusing on six research questions that
indicated unknown areas when understanding social influences towards compliance attitudes.
By no means does answering these six research questions provide a finished view of social
influences over compliance attitudes, however, we feel that our holistic approach achieves
the aim.
The contributions of this thesis are the chapters addressing the research questions. Whilst
we do not define a main contribution, the simulation tool PCASP, which at the moment is a
proof on concept language that is manually translated to Julia for simulations is certainly
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one output of the thesis that paves the way for assessing compliance attitudes. As a first
version tool it offers a user the ability to assess compliance attitudes towards security policies.
Chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8 all contribute in some shape towards PCASP whether that is through
design, implementation or a user study for validation. The semantics of the rule based
model demonstrates agents that have the capability to observe the actions of other agents.
The implementation as the model is ported to the first version of the tool PCASP. Finally,
the collection and validation of the model in a trial study for compliance attitudes towards
swiping smart cards.
The modelling to represent of social influences demonstrates the impact that different
social influences have on compliance attitudes. In particular the propagation of an influence
and the uncertainty of compliance attitudes that an adversary faces when exploiting social
influences. We demonstrated propagation in Chapter 3 and briefly touched on the subject in
Chapter 4 when discussing system states.
We demonstrated by machine learning the applications of decision trees to try and identify
compliance attitudes when given a set of agent traces. We are not able to claim that decision
trees were accurate for identifying compliance attitudes. As the complexity of the traces
evolved, the accuracy of the decision trees tended to decrease.
Overall, the methodologies we use in this thesis demonstrate that there does not exist one
approach to solving the problem surrounding social influences towards compliance attitudes.
Our holistic approach with its range of contributions demonstrates requirements for a wide
assessment when addressing social influences towards compliance attitudes.
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10.1 Future Work
Formal Verification If PCASP is to undergo further development, then we would build it
upon a formally verified model to ensure integrity is maintained from design of the model to
implementation as a simulation tool. The work we have carried out in this thesis is mainly a
descriptive overview of how agent observations can be modelled and provides no material
towards formal verification.
Deep Machine Learning In Chapter 5 we assessed the accuracy of decision trees to
identify hidden compliance attitudes. We used a limited amount of data in order to replicate
what one could typically gather if they were to build up the traces through observations in an
organisation. The application of deep Machine Learning may provide further insights into
what sort of data is needed in order to identify hidden compliance attitudes.
Validation: Whilst we have provided a level of validation, it was for one specific user
study where the tests returned values that only indicated that the output of the observed data
matched the expected empirical data from the user study. Further steps to enhance validation
techniques and identify the key requirements is a research area that would need a lot of
attention.
Commercial Tool The tool PCASP is a first version tool that is currently not applicable
for anyone outside of the academic community. Research to both establish the tool as usable
for an organisation and identifying the fundamentals that the tool would need in order to
attract users would provide an impact for PCASP. Furthermore, commercialising the tool in
order to provide organisations with confidence that they can easily predict how compliance
attitudes evolve amongst their employees would be an end goal of this body of research.
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Background. A social influence of a messenger or the broken-window effect may impact
the compliance level for security policies [44, 81, 114].
Aim. We investigate the effect of socio-environmental interventions on smart card swiping
behaviour.
Method. We will conduct a study with three conditions in a between-subjects design on a
sample of university students owning a university-issued access-control smart card.
In all three groups, participants will be asked to complete a set of Capture the Flag
challenges in our Cyber Security Room where they had no Internet access. Outside of the
room, the participants could access the Internet. Thereby, participants will be compelled to
leave and enter the room, without disclosing the experiment purpose.
We will ask participants to swipe their smart card on entering and exiting the Cyber
Security Room. The Control group had no intervention. The Discrete+ experiment group
will be exposed to a Messenger influence [44]. The Continuous− experiment group will be
exposed to a an untidy Cyber Security Room, which was inspired by the broken-window
Theory [114]. We measured swiping behavior on entry and exit, computing total swipes and
swipe rate ratio as key metrics subjected to an Analysis of Variance.
Anticipated Results. We expect to see a shift in the security decision making of the
individuals. We will request a debrief questionnaire from subjects to understand their
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self awareness towards security decision making. In particular, we expect that under the
negative continuous intervention, the total number of swipes decreases. Whereas, the discrete
intervention will increase the number of swipes in a given time interval.
Anticipated Conclusions. We expect that an intervention can change the security decision
making of a group.
A.2 State of Data Collection
Has any data been collected for this study yet?
(a) 2 NO data has been collected.
(b) 2 Some data has been collected, but not analyzed.
(c) 2 Some data has been collected and analyzed.
A.3 Aims
Research Question 8 (Messenger Effect). To what extent does a Messenger effect have on
the swipe rate of participants?
Table A.1 provides an overview of the operationalisation for this research question. As
an independent variable (IV), we have selected the use of the Messenger effect [44].
Research Question 9 (broken-window Effect). To what extend does the broken-window
effect have an effect on the swipe rate of participants?
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Table A.1 also provides the info for the second research question. As the IV for this case,
we consider a messy (‘untidy’) room as the intervention.
For both research questions, we intend to compare them against a Control group which
has no experimental treatment. For all three groups (Control, Discrete+ and Continuous−),
we will measure the dependent variable (DV) by use of a video camera and smart card logging
system. Using both of these metrics, we will generate an event log for all participants.
Hypotheses on Total Number of Swipes The overall null hypothesis for this experiment
is HT,0 : There is no mean difference in the total number of swipes for participants exposed
to an intervention.
We have subordinate null hypotheses for each condition:
HT,0,D+: The Discrete+ intervention does not impact the mean total number of swipes.
HT,0,C−: : The Continuous− intervention does not impact the mean total number of swipes.
We have these as alternative hypotheses.
HT,1,D+: The Discrete+ intervention (Messenger effect) impacts the total number of swipes.
HT,1,C−: A Continuous− messy (‘untidy’) room (broken-window effect) impacts the total
number of swipes.
Hypotheses on Swipe Rate Ratio The overall null hypothesis for this experiment is HR,0 :
There is no mean difference in the swipe rate ratio for participants exposed to an intervention.
The subordinate null hypotheses for each condition are:
HR,0,D+: The Discrete+ intervention does not impact the mean swipe rate ratio.
HR,0,C−: The Continuous− intervention does not impact the mean swipe rate ratio.
HR,1,D+: The Discrete+ intervention (Messenger effect) impacts the swipe rate ratio.
HR,1,C−: A Continuous− messy (‘untidy’) room (broken-window effect) impacts the swipe
rate ratio.
A.4 Methods
This section lists the methods of the experiment construction and provides a clear guide on
what we implemented.
194 Experiment Pre-Registration
As part of the experiment, subjects will complete a variety of tasks over the course of an
hour. Each task has some general theme of security and will be discussed in this section.
A.4.1 Study Groups
Participants are randomly assigned to three groups:
• Control: Our first group is our baseline where participants perform a set of tasks over
fifty five minutes. No intervention is in place here. The room is set in a defined ‘tidy’
state.
• Discrete+: The first experiment group is exposed to a discrete intervention. By
discrete we mean at one time point the group is exposed to some intervention. The
purpose of this intervention is to positively influence group behaviour around swipe
compliance. The room is kept in a defined ‘tidy’ state. We anticipate that this will
increase participants swipe levels.
• Continuous−: The second experiment group is exposed to a continuous intervention
present in the offline Cyber Security Room. The intervention is specifically to set
the room in a defined ‘untidy’ state. The purpose of this intervention is to negatively
influence group behaviour around swipe compliance. We anticipate that this will
decrease participants swipe levels.
In each group we will ensure a short break is in place at the 25 minute mark. At this point
we gathered all of the participants in the clean room and ask them how they are getting on.
The instructor will swipe their smart card as they enter and say "How is everyone finding the
tasks?". The instructor will then swipe their smart card then leave the room. Each groups
session time will be fifty five minutes (±20s).
A.4.2 Experimental Environment
The experiment will be conducted in a purpose-built environment for cyber-security capture-
the-flag tasks.
In the experiment, we designate offline and online areas. The offline area had no Internet
connectivity, which would be considered a high-security clean-room. The online area had
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Raspberry Pis provided to allow for Internet connectivity. Subjects must swipe their student
smart card as they enter and exit the offline area.
Offline Area: The offline area includes a Cyber Security Room and contains sensitive
experimental equipment. During the buildings construction, the room was not fitted with a
smart card reader. We make the following changes to this room:
• Using a Raspberry Pi we design and program an Adafruit PN532 RFID Card Reader
to work with Smart Cards.
• We fit a Video Camera to record the experiment. The camera is inside the offline room,
points at the door, and observes the smart card reader.
Online Area: Subjects will use this area to collect supporting information to assist the
completion of the Capture-The-Flag challenges in the cyber security room. This area has
Raspberry Pis with a mouse, keyboard, monitor and wireless network connection.
A.4.3 Study Groups
For the purposes of this study we are considering different influences towards compliant
behaviour. We split the study into three groups which are the following:
• Control Group: Our first group is our baseline where subjects perform a set of tasks
over an hour. No intervention is in place here. To ensure consistency the room setup
will be maintained for each Control Group.
• Experiment Group One: The first experiment group is a discrete intervention. By
discrete we mean at one time point the group is exposed to some intervention. The
purpose of this intervention is to negatively influence group behaviour around swipe
compliance.
• Experiment Group Two: The second experiment group is a continuous intervention.
This is an intervention which is always present in our clean area. The purpose of this
intervention is to negatively influence group behaviour around swipe compliance.
In each group we will ensure a short break is in place at the 25 minute mark. At this point
we will gather all of the subjects in the clean room and ask them how they are getting on.
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As the instructor I will swipe my smart card as I enter and say "How is everyone finding the
tasks?"
A.4.4 Experiment Group One - Discrete Intervention Positive
The goal of the discrete intervention is to create a positive outlook on swiping a smart card
for subjects. The re-enforcement from us as the instructor provides that authoritative message
that this is the behaviour we expect.
At the short break, once all subjects are in the clean room we will provide our discrete
intervention. As the instructor, I will swipe my card as I enter and say to all participants "Just
a reminder to make sure you all are swiping as you enter and exit. How is everyone finding
the tasks?"
A.4.5 Experiment Group Two - Continuous Intervention Negative
The goal of the continuous intervention is to reduce the swiping of individuals by creating a
untidy environment.
The continuous intervention will consist of making the clean room untidy by placing the
following in the room:
• Out of order signs on unused machine
• Collection of monitors and machines on the floor.
• A wastebin full of plastic items.
The break at the 25 minute mark will still take place. As the instructor I will swipe my
smart card as I enter and say "How is everyone finding the tasks?".
A.4.6 Ecological Validity
In order to misdirect subjects away from the true purpose of the experiment, we must ensure
the ecological validity of the task relates to the security policy in place.
The subjects will be told the following:
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• The experiment is seeking to understand how subjects manage secure information. In
specifics, when you have no Internet connectivity in one location and do in another.
• We are monitoring movement between locations and in this setting a security require-
ment is for everyone to swipe their smart card on entry and exit.
A.5 Independent Variables (IVs)
Describe the conditions (for an experimental study) or predictor variables (for a correlational
study).
Our manipulation is the introduction of an intervention in the experiment groups. This
intervention will be either discrete/continuous.
We thereby have one IV (condition) with three levels:
Control Group: Statement of the security policy only.
Experiment Group One: Discrete intervention, positive: Experimenter entering the room
stating a reminder of the policy.
Experiment Group Two: Continuous intervention, negative: Room put in a specified untidy
state.
A.6 Dependent Variables (DVs)
Dependent variables: Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be
measured.
We measure the consistency of swipes for entry and exit in a secure room against visual logs
which give us the ground truth. The swipes are collected by the smart card reader and the
visual logs from the IP camera.
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A.7 Mediator Variables
Describe any variables you expect to mediate the relationship between your IV’s and DV.
Specify how they will be measured.
N/A
A.8 Moderator Variables
Describe any variables you expect to moderate the relationship between your IV’s and DV.
Specify how they will be measured.
A.9 Control of Confounding Variables (CVs)
We employ the following methods to ensure the control of confounding variables:
• Random assignment of participants for groups. Participants will be randomly assigned
to either a control or experiment group, from there they will be offered randomly
selected slots which they choose to attend.
• Random assignment of tasks for participants. Due to the nature of the tasks, it is not
clear in advance which tasks will cause more people to leave the room, which could
skew our results. As such, we randomly assign tasks to ensure that subjects are not all
completing the same tasks and we have an even distribution for how people move over
the course of a group.
A.10 Data Preparation
Describe what measures will be taken to check assumptions and label outliers.
We will measure who and when subjects swipe their smart cards.
With these two overarching measurements we capture:
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• The relationship between non-compliance and main location in the room.
• When is data correct?
• Do we miss any data?
• Do we check for outliers?
We first consider the function β : S → N, which corresponds to the number of times the
smartcard corresponding to a given subject has been swiped. This information is directly
collected by the smartcard reader. (Any correction for errors? inconsistencies? what
about multiple swipes?).




We then consider a function α : S → N, which corresponds to the number of visual
swipes done by a particular subject. This data is recorded through CCTV/webcam monitoring







The frequency data for the study is shown in Table A.2.
A.11 Data Analysis
The data we collect from running each study group consists of smart card logs, video footage,
pre-study consent form with a personality test for each subject and a post study questionnaire.
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A.11.1 Consistency Check
Of the four data sets we collect for each study, we will use the smart card logs and the video
footage to generate the ground truth, which creates our fifth data set named visual logs. This
empirical evidence will provide us with a high level of certainty for the events that have
occurred.
To generate the visual logs we define a process to ensure that all studies are treated with
the same level of consistency and rigor:
1. Synchronise the times from the video footage and smart card logs.
2. Correlate the visual initial swipe of a subject with the hashed smart card log for that
swipe.
3. Generate the list of events for the timed part of the study, i.e. where subjects are
completing challenges.
Sychronise: The clock on the video footage begins at 00:00 and the smart card logs time as
per Greenwich Mean Time. For each experiment, the study leader will swipe their smart card
after the camera is switched to record mode. From this we can gather the exact timings of
swipes with regards to the smart card logs. This will also assist when we generate the logs
for the visual logs data set, as we can provide an absolute time.
Correlate: As all participants smart cards are hashed, we have no association between the
names of subjects and their smart card number. To ensure that the visual logs can be generated
we correlate the initial swipe of a subject with visual features. We use the following metrics
to classify a subject and address conflict resolution:
• Are they wearing glasses?
• What colour top/t-shirt/coat are they wearing?
• What colour hair do they have?
• If these three features clash with another participant in that group, do they have any
unique features that are easily identifiable?















Figure A.1 Process for recording an event, where Swipe refers to the expected behaviour of
someone swiping, !Swipe is someone entering or exiting with swiping. Finally, Malicious
refers to someone swiping with a different card.
• What is the hash of their smart card?
We should know the hash of each user’s smart card, as they will enter in a specific
ordering, which is associated with a number for where they are sat. This initial swipe will be
before the timed section of the study begins and we will use this to correlate their features to
their smart card hash value.
Generate: In order to generate visual logs we make use the video footage to gather in-
formation for each event that occurs. Where an event is a person entering or exiting the
room.
Figure A.1 describes the process for recording an event so that it can be logged in the
visual logs data set. An outcome will create a log with the timestamp and user number/smart
card hash for the event. After all events have been processed, the visual logs files will provide
the ground truth for what occurred. We make the following assumptions for the data:
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Assumption 1 (Multiple Swipes). If the smart card log contains identical user swipes within
1 seconds of each other, these are removed and treated as the card reader being too sensitive
or the subject tried to swipe for too long of a period.
Assumption 2 (Accurate Smart Card Logs). We assume that the smart card reader is
infallible and does not produce an incorrect log when a smart card is swiped.
Assumption 3 (Accountable Smart Card Logs). We assume that the smart card reader only
produces a smart card log when a RFID card is presented. It will not create phantom logs
when no RFID is present.





Where time is the time of the swipe as adjusted due to the clock synchronisation, group
refers to either Control, Discrete or Continuous, hash is the hashed smart card value providing
a unique identifier and the final entry refers to the type of event that occurred.
A.12 Main Analyses
Describe what analyses (e.g., t-test, repeated-measures ANOVA) you will use to test your
main hypotheses.
We will make use of the ANOVA test then use the planned comparisons to calculate
effect sizes.
Our format will be as follows:
1. Run the ANOVA:
• Assess the F-value and F-test results.
2. Planned Comparisons (Table A.3)
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• Control vs Discrete
• Control vs Continuous
3. Calculate Effect Sizes
Table A.3 Planned Comparisons against Control condition.
Contrast CTRL CONT- DISC+
1 1 -1 0
2 1 0 -1
A.12.1 ANOVA Testing
We will use an analysis of variance testing to ensure that we gather the F-value and F-test
results for the comparisons of mean between Control, Continuous- and Discrete+.
A.12.2 Inclusion of Outliers
As a final data preparation we perform multiple tests which vary the size of an outliers
labelling rule where we use the interquartile range as part of resistant rules to generate inner
fences for an inclusion zone:
IFL = LQ−1.5(IQ) (A.5)
IFL = LQ−3(IQ) (A.6)
IFU =UQ+1.5(IQ) (A.7)
IFU =UQ+3(IQ) (A.8)
Where IF is the inner fence, LQ and UQ are the lower and upper quartile and IQ is the
inter–quartile range [60].
Once outliers have been detected we will then cap them at the 5th and 95th percentile of
data to ensure that results and effect sizes are not heavily influenced by one data point.
204 Experiment Pre-Registration
A.12.3 Calculating Effect Sizes
We will calculate the effect sizes for our planned comparisons using two methods. The first
will be Cohen’s d which we use to describe the standardized mean difference of an effect.
The second is the Hedges-g which is often referred to as the corrected effect size.
A.13 Intermediary Check
We will perform an Intermediary check at the halfway point, roughly 50-60 participants to
assess whether or not it is worth investing continuing resources into the study.
A.14 Pilot Study
We ran a Pilot Study to understand the type of data we receive and to ensure the experiment
would run as expected. It consisted of four PhD students all from Cyber Security. The
participants will be aware of the experiment and its aim before participating. Therefore, the
pilot study does not give us any indication towards the expected data, just ability to validate
the experiment runs. Due to two camera failures we only have data for twenty minutes.
A.14.1 Pilot Study: Results
Table A.4 Pilot Study: Results
User Swipes Visual Ratio IV
In Out In Out
1 4 3 4 3 1 NA
2 3 2 3 2 1 NA
3 3 2 3 2 1 NA
4 1 0 1 0 1 NA
Our results show us that all of the participants swiped as they entered and exited the
Clean room.
After speaking with the participants, we found that they admitted to forgetting to swipe,
however, this was after the twenty minute period where we had no visual log due to multiple
camera failures.
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Table A.4 shows the results from the pilot study. Appendix 3 (last one) shows the type of
data we are getting back from the swipe card system.
A.15 Secondary Analyses
Describe what secondary analyses you plan to conduct (e.g., order or gender effects).
As a secondary analysis, we plan a binomial logistic regression with the experiment
condition as main predictor and the pre-experiment personality traits as co-variate predictors.
We model as response variable the outcomes of the swiping events. Primarily, we are
interested in a binomial logistic regression, that is, collapsing the possibly multinomial
cases of swiped/not-swiped—with-own-card/with-another’s-card to a single nominal DV of
swiped/not-swiped, encoded as 1 and 0. We expect the vast majority of observed cases to be
cleanly projectable onto a binomial response variable.
In this analysis, we consider the effect of the Big Five Personality Traits [13], where we
would expect, for instance, agreeableness to amplify the compliance to the experimenter’s
request under the positive/discrete experiment condition.
Furthermore, we are measuring a physical security policy, where the actions of individuals
are public. Attributional biases within individuals may be influenced by those who do or
don’t comply.
A.16 Validation
Describe what diagnostics or validation methods you plan to employ to check the soundness
of the analyses.
For the the χ2 tests of independence, we will check the expected cell counts after having
established the contingency tables.
For the binomial logistic regressions, we will use the list of assumptions accounted for
by Laerd Statistics [4] as guidance, along with Andy Field’s account of checks for logistic
regression assumptions [47].
A major validation analysis will be on the residual after the model has been obtained. We
will consider standardized and studentized residuals, leverage, and DFBeta.
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To consider multicoliniarity, we will further consider the variance inflation factor (VIF),
per predictor as well as the average VIF. We will test the linearity of the logit following
Field [47, Section 8.8.2].
Overall, we will use the R package car for the regression diagnostics.
In terms of variance explained of the logistic regression model, we will compute pseudo-
R2 metrics: Hosmer and Lemeshow, Cox and Snell, as well as Nagelkerke.
We will compute a validation of the logistic regression model in an 80:20 random
resampling. We will use a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and the Area
Under the Curve (AUC) as metrics for accuracy.
A.17 Sample
Where and from whom will data be collected? How will you decide when to stop collecting
data (e.g., target sample size based on power analysis or accuracy in parameter estimation,
set amount of time)? If you plan to look at the data using sequential analysis, describe that
here.
The total sample size of the groups are expected to be around one hundred. We split
the subjects randomly across the experiment and control group. Each group will then be
allocated a number of sessions where subjects will perform the outlined tasks.
A.18 Exclusion Criteria
Who will be excluded (e.g., outliers, participant who fail manipulation check, demographic
exclusions)? Will they be replaced by other participants?
We will exclude event observations that are inconclusive, that is, cases in which the
observations from the RFID and CCTV1 sensors are contradictory and cannot be resolved
with our decision algorithm.
We will also exclude participants who do not exit the room during the time of the study.
That is, they never swipe.
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A.19 Exception Handling
Should exceptions from the planned study occur (e.g., unexpected effects observed), how will
they be handled?
Exceptions will be documented explicitly. Unexpected effects and further analyses will
be considered exploratory and documented as such.
A.20 Sign-Off
Pre-registration written by (initials): P.C. / T.G.




Documentation for user study starts on next page.
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
   
 
Dear prospective participant: Please read this information sheet carefully and ask as many 
questions as you like before you decide whether you want to participate in this research study. 
You are free to ask questions at any time before, during, or after your participation in this 
research. 
 
Project Title:  Cyber Security Challenges 
Principal Investigator:  Thomas Gross 
Location:  Newcastle University, School of Computing 
 
 
PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
You are being asked to participate in a research study designed to find out how users manage 
solving security challenges when faced with no internet connectivity. 
 
PROCEDURES 
You will be asked to fill in of personality traits (5 minutes). 
You will be asked to fill in a survey on your general attitude towards the study (5 minutes). 
You will be asked to solve a set of security challenges where one of the rooms you work in is 
partially recorded. (We provide a supplemental information sheet about camera data) (60 
minutes) 
The total time of the experiment should not take any longer than 75 minutes. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA PROTECTION 
Only your age and gender will be recorded along with the experimental data. This data will be 
recorded anonymously, i.e. your name will not be associated with them. Your experimental data 




We will compensate you for the time spent in the experiment according to the conventions of 
Newcastle Psychology Schools, a £10 Amazon Voucher. 
 
TERMINATION OF RESEARCH STUDY 
You are free to choose whether or not to participate in this study. You can choose to cease 
participation at any time.  
 
AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Any further questions you have about this study will be answered by the PhD student:  
Name: Peter Carmichael (p.j.carmichael@ncl.ac.uk) 
 
You can also approach the Principal Investigator, Dr. Thomas Gross (thomas.gross@ncl.ac.uk). 
User Number …….. 
How I am in general 
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do you agree 
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a number next to each 


















I am someone who… 
1. _____  Is talkative 
 
2. _____  Tends to find fault with others 
 
3. _____  Does a thorough job 
 
4. _____  Is depressed, blue 
 
5. _____  Is original, comes up with new ideas 
 
6. _____  Is reserved 
 
7. _____  Is helpful and unselfish with others 
 
8. _____  Can be somewhat careless 
 
9. _____  Is relaxed, handles stress well.   
 
10. _____  Is curious about many different things 
 
11. _____  Is full of energy 
 
12. _____  Starts quarrels with others 
 
13. _____  Is a reliable worker 
 
14. _____  Can be tense 
 
15. _____  Is ingenious, a deep thinker 
 
16. _____  Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
 
17. _____  Has a forgiving nature 
 
18. _____  Tends to be disorganized 
 
19. _____  Worries a lot 
 
20. _____  Has an active imagination 
 
21. _____  Tends to be quiet 
 
22. _____  Is generally trusting 
 
23. _____  Tends to be lazy 
 
24. _____  Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
 
25. _____  Is inventive 
 
26. _____  Has an assertive personality 
 
27. _____  Can be cold and aloof 
 
28. _____  Perseveres until the task is finished 
 
29. _____  Can be moody 
 
30. _____  Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
 
31. _____  Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
 
32. _____  Is considerate and kind to almost everyone 
 
33. _____  Does things efficiently 
 
34. _____  Remains calm in tense situations 
 
35. _____  Prefers work that is routine 
 
36. _____  Is outgoing, sociable 
 
37. _____  Is sometimes rude to others 
 
38. _____  Makes plans and follows through with them 
 
39. _____  Gets nervous easily 
 
40. _____  Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
 
41. _____  Has few artistic interests 
 
42. _____  Likes to cooperate with others 
 
43. _____  Is easily distracted 
 
44. _____  Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature
 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
   
 
Dear prospective participant: Please read this information sheet carefully and ask as many 
questions as you like before you decide whether you want to participate in this research study. 
You are free to ask questions at any time before, during, or after your participation in this 
research. 
 
Project Title:  Cyber Security Challenges 
Principal Investigator:  Thomas Gross 
Location:  Newcastle University, School of Computing 
 
 
THE USE OF VIDEO CAMERAS IN EXPERIMENTS 
During this experiment, a high-resolution Webcam will video people moving in and out of one 
location. 
 
PURPOSE OF CAPTURED VIDEOS 
We record your movement to identify how you moved around during the security challenges. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA PROTECTION 
We consider the videos of your face as sensitive information and take special care to protect it. 
We only use the videos for the analysis of information scores and for no other purpose. 
While we are processing the videos they will be stored anonymously, that is, without association 
to your name, and stored securely on an encrypted device. 
 
Once the experiment is complete and we have processed the data, we will delete the captured 
videos. 
 
Under no circumstances will the video itself ever be used in a report, a publication or any other 
research output. 
 
OPT-OUT OF VIDEO CAPTURE 
If you wish to opt out of the video capture then you will opt of the study entirely, you are free to 
do this. 
 
AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Any further questions you have about this study will be answered by the PhD Student:  
Name: Peter Carmichael (p.j.carmichael@ncl.ac.uk)  
 
You can also approach the Principal Investigator, Dr. Thomas Gross (thomas.gross@ncl.ac.uk). 
 
Informed Consent Form      
   
Project Title:  
Main Contact: Peter Carmichael (p.j.carmichael@ncl.ac.uk) 
Cyber Security Study 
I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate): 
 
1. I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the 
Information Sheet dated ________________. 
 
 




3. I voluntarily agree to participate in the project. 
 
 
4. I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be 
penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn. 
 
 
5. The procedures regarding confidentiality and data protection have been clearly 
explained to me (e.g. use of names/pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.). 
 
 
6. If applicable, separate terms of consent for interviews, audio, video or other forms of 
data collection have been explained and provided to me. 
 
 




8. I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to 
preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified 
in this form. 
 
 
9. Select only one of the following: 
 I would like that what I have said or written as part of this study will be used in 
reports, publications and other research outputs.  
 
 I do not want what I have said or written as part of this study used in reports, 








Participant:   
 
________________________ ___________________________ ________________ 





________________________ ___________________________ ________________ 
Name of Researcher  Signature    Date 
How to complete a task 
1. Get the password of the zipped file. 
 
2. Click Extract Here 
 
3. Click Extract twice 
4. Enter Password 
 
Questionnaire – Post Study 
User Number: …….. 
1. How often did the study leader enter the room and remind you to swipe your smart card? 
1-5 (1 – Very Often; 2 – Somewhat Often; 3 – Did not notice; 4 – Not that often; 5 – Not at all) 
………… 
2. How often did you swipe your smartcard during the completion of the cyber security challenges (i.e. the past 
hour)? 
1-5 (1 – Very Often; 2 – Somewhat Often; 3 – Did not notice; 4 – Not that often; 5 – Not at all) 
………… 
3. How diligently have you swiped your smartcard? On a scale of 1-5 where 1 is not diligently to 5 which is very 
diligently 
1-5 (1 – Not diligently; 2 – Somewhat diligently; 3 – Neither diligently or not diligently; 4 – Diligently; 5-Very 
diligently) 
………… 
4. Do you agree that all participants in the group swiped their smart card every time then entered or exited the 
room? 
1-5 (1 – Strongly Disagree; 2 – Somewhat Disagree; 3 – Neither Disagree or Agree; 4 – Somewhat Agree; 5 – 
Strongly Agree) 
………… 
5. How often did you swipe with someone else’s card? 
1-5 (1 – Very Often; 2 –  Somewhat Often; 3 – Did not notice; 4 – Not that often; 5 – Not at all) 
………… 
6. Indicate to what extent you felt during the past hour of this study? (Do this for all emotions) 
1 – Very Slightly or Not at All; 2 – A little; 3- Moderately; 4 – Quite a Bit; 5 Extremely 
 
__________ 1. Interested __________ 2. Distressed __________ 3. Excited  __________ 4. Upset  
__________ 5. Strong __________ 6. Guilty  __________ 7. Scared  __________ 8. Hostile 
__________ 9. Enthusiastic __________ 10. Proud __________ 11. Irritable __________ 12. Alert 
__________ 13. Ashamed __________ 14. Inspired  __________ 15. Nervous __________ 16. Determined 
__________ 17. Attentive __________ 18. Jittery __________ 19. Active __________ 20. Afraid 
 
7. How often did you collaborate with another participant during the study? 
1-5 (1 – Very Often; 2 – Often; 3 – Did not notice; 4 – Not that often; 5 – Not at all) 
………… 
8. How was your behaviour influenced by other participants being in the room? 
1-5 (1 – Very Often; 2 – Often; 3 – Did not notice; 4 – Not that often; 5 – Not at all) 
………… 
9. How did you perceive it when the study leader entered the room to remind you of smartcard swiping? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
10. What were your motivations to swipe or not swipe your smartcard? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
11. How important do you perceive it is to swipe the smartcard for security? 
1-5 (1 – Very Important; 2 – Somewhat Important; 3 – Neither Important or Unimportant; 4 – Somewhat 
Unimportant 5 – Very Unimportant) 
………… 
Secure Data Management 
Project - User Behaviour on Security Challenges 
Peter Carmichael, Thomas Gross & Charles Morisset 
Overview 
This project runs many studies where in each study, participants swipe their smart card and are 
recorded as they move between two different rooms on the sixth floor of the Urban Sciences 
Building. 
Data Management 
We recognise that both the smart card data and video footage must be effectively managed. The 
data we collect in this study does not directly link to identity; however, it is still sensitive. 
Smart Card Data 
The smart card data is one-way hashed and we do this on the UID (Unique Identifier). We do not 
record the student number, picture or name from the card. 
The purpose of this collection is to manage how regularly users move between locations. We do the 
following with the smart card data: 
1. The data is collected on a Raspberry Pi with a micro SD card during each study. 
2. At the end of each study the data is transferred from the SD card to a Newcastle University 
Laptop, where it is stored locally. It is then removed from the SD card. 
3. Once collected at the end of each study, we use a programming script to match a unique 
pseudonym to the hashed UID, which completely removes the opportunity for anyone to 
recover the original UID.  
4. The data is then safe for processing and using in our research. 
Video Recording 
The study records the area where participants swipe their smart card. We use a HD handheld 
camera to record and the video is stored directly onto a micro SD card. 
The purpose of this collection is to manage how regularly users move between locations. We do the 
following with the video recordings: 
1. The video recordings are collected on a HD handheld camera. 
2. At the end of each study the recordings are transferred to a Newcastle University Laptop. It 
is possible we may have to use an external hard drive. In which case, the hard drive is 
encrypted and stored in a locked cabinet. The recording is then wiped from the SD card. 
3. Within reasonable time, the video is processed and used to log the events in the study.  
4. After processing, the video is deleted as it is no longer required. 









Is this approval for a:
Staff Project [A1]
Name of Principal Researcher:
Thomas Gross
Please enter your email address
p.j.carmichael@ncl.ac.uk
Please select your school / academic unit
School of Computing [A1]
Project Details
Project Title
Security Challenge Human Behaviour
Project Synopsis
Recent research investigated the effect of an influence on a private security decision, however, we do not understand how
public security decisions influence a group culture towards security policy compliance.





Is the project externally funded?
No [A3]
Does your project involve collaborators outside of the University?
No [N]
Existing Ethics, Sponsorship & Responsibility
Has ethical approval to cover this proposal already been obtained?
No [N]
Will anyone be acting as sponsor under the NHS Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care?
No [N]
Do you have a Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals (NUTH) reference?
No [N]
Will someone other than you (the principal investigator) or your supervisor (for student projects) be responsible for the
conduct, management and design of the research?
No [N]
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The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act defines protected animals as: 'any living vertebrate other than man…in its foetal, larval
or embryonic form……from the stage of its development when— (a)in the case of a mammal, bird or reptile, half the gestation or
incubation period for the relevant species has elapsed; and (b)in any other case, it becomes capable of independent feeding'. 
In practice 'Protected' animals are all living vertebrates (other than man), including some immature forms, and cephalopods
(e.g. octopus, squid, cuttlefish). 
Using this definition, does your research involve the observation, capture or manipulation of animals or their tissues? 
No [N]
Will the study involve participants recruited by virtue of being NHS patients or service users, their dependents, their carers or
human tissues or the use of NHS & Health/Social Care Facilities or otherwise require REC approval? 
No [N]
Does the research involve human participants e.g. use of questionnaires, focus groups, observation, surveys or lab-based
studies involving human participants?
Yes [Y]
Does the study involve any of the following? [a. The study involves children or other vulnerable groups; as defined in Section 59 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Adults Act 2006 as those who are relatively or absolutely incapable of protecting their own interests, or those in
unequal relationships e.g. participants who are subordinate to the researcher(s) in a context outside the research? ]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [b. The study requires the co-operation of a gatekeeper (defined as someone who can exert undue influence) for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited e.g. students at school, members of a self-help group, or
residents of a nursing home? NB. The IoN & School of Psychology volunteer pools are not considered gatekeepers in this case.]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [c. It is necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and consent e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places?.]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [d. Deliberately misleading participants in any way?]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [e. Discussion of sensitive topics e.g. sexual activity or drug use?]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [f. The administration of drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, vitamins) to the study participants. ]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [g. Invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind?*]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [h. Obtaining blood or tissue samples?*]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [i. Pain or more than mild discomfort?]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [j. Psychological stress, anxiety, harm or negative consequences beyond that encountered in normal life?]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [k. Prolonged or repetitive testing i.e. more than 4 hours commitment or attendance on more than two occasions?]
 
Does the study involve any of the following? [l. Financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time)?]
 
Does the research involve the viewing, usage or transfer of Sensitive Personal Data as defined by the Data Protection Act
1998 or data governed by statute such as the Official Secrets Act 1989 / Terrorism Act 2006, commercial contract or by
convention e.g. client confidentiality? (If you are unsure please tick YES and complete the sub-questions).
No [N]
Will the study cause direct or indirect damage to the environment or emissions outside permissible levels or be conducted in
an Area of Special Scientific Interest or which is of cultural significance?
No [N]
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Based on your responses your project has been categorised as (ethically) low risk and no further review is required before you
start work. You will receive a formal approval email on submission of this form. Should your project change you may need to
apply for new ethical approval.
 
Supporting Documentation
Please upload any documents (not uploaded elsewhere in the application) which you think are relevant to the consideration of
your application.
 
filecount - Please upload any documents (not uploaded elsewhere in the application) which you think are relevant to the
consideration of your application.
0
 
Thank you for completing the University's Ethical Review Form. Based on your answers the University is satisfied that your
project has met its ethical expectations and grants its ethical approval. Please be aware that if you make any significant
changes to your project then you should complete this form again as further review may be required. Confirmation of this
decision will be emailed to you. Please complete the declaration to submit your application. 
Declaration
I certify that:
[the information contained within this application is accurate.]
Yes [Y]
 
Thank you for completing the University's Ethical Review Form. Based on your answers the University is satisfied that your
project has met its ethical expectations and grants its ethical approval. Please be aware that if you make any significant
changes to your project then you should complete this form again as further review may be required. Confirmation of this
decision will be emailed to you. Please complete the declaration to submit your application. 
Declaration
I certify that:
[the research will be undertaken in line with all appropriate, University, legal and local standards and regulations.]
Yes [Y]
 
Thank you for completing the University's Ethical Review Form. Based on your answers the University is satisfied that your
project has met its ethical expectations and grants its ethical approval. Please be aware that if you make any significant
changes to your project then you should complete this form again as further review may be required. Confirmation of this
decision will be emailed to you. Please complete the declaration to submit your application. 
Declaration
I certify that:
[I have attempted to identify the risks that may arise in conducting this research and acknowledge my obligation to (and rights
of) any participants.]
Yes [Y]
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project has met its ethical expectations and grants its ethical approval. Please be aware that if you make any significant
changes to your project then you should complete this form again as further review may be required. Confirmation of this
decision will be emailed to you. Please complete the declaration to submit your application. 
Declaration
I certify that:
[no work will begin until all appropriate permissions are in place.]
Yes [Y]
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C : normsNonCompliant,compliant,nonCompliant, fearCompliant
S : wearingID,carryingID,noID
Link : (hall,off1)(off1,hall)(hall,off2)(off2,hall)(hall,sec)(sec,hall)































































C.2 Challenge: Observation Intervention Model






C.3 Challenge: Forced Challenge Model
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